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FURMAN FUNDAMENTALS 
Corinna Barrett Lain • 
For the first time in a long time, the Supreme Court's most important death penalty 
decisions all have gone the defendant's way. Is the Court's newfound willingness to protect 
capital defendants just a reflection of the times, or could it have come even without public 
support for those protections? At first glance, history allows for optimism. Furman v. 
Georgia, the 1972landmark decision that invalidated the death penalty, provides a seemingly 
perfect example of the Court's ability and inclination to protect capital defendants when no 
one else will. Furman looks countermajoritarian, scholars have claimed it was 
countermajoritarian, and even the Justices saw themselves as playing a heroic, 
countermajoritarian role in the case. But the lessons of Furman are not what they seem. 
Rather than proving the Supreme Court's ability to withstand majoritarian influences, 
Furman teaches the opposite-that even in its rnore countermajoritarian moments, the Court 
never strays far from dominant public opinion, tending instead to reflect the social and 
political movements of its time. This Article examines the historical context of Furman v. 
Georgia and its 1976 counterpart, Gregg v. Georgia, to showcase a fundamental flaw in the 
Supreme Court's role as protector of minority rights: its inherently limited inclination and 
ability to render countermajoritarian change. In theory, the Court protects unpopular 
minorities, but in practice it is unlikely to do so unless a substantial (and growing) segment 
of society supports that protection. Even then, Furman reminds us that the Court's "help" 
may do more harm than good. If the past truly is a prologue, Furman portends that the 
Court's current interest in scrutinizing the death penalty will not last forever. Like the fair-
weather friend, the Court's protection will likely be there in good times but gone when 
needed the most. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The past few years have seen a dramatic tum in the jurisprudence of 
death. After two decades of "deregulating" the death penalty, 1 the 
Supreme Court is once again closely scrutinizing the administration of 
capital punishment in the United States. Since 2002 alone, the Court has 
categorically exempted mentally retarded and juvenile offenders from 
the death penalty/ invalidated death eligibility determinations made by 
judges as opposed to juries/ and insisted upon more than de minimis 
legal representation in capital cases.4 Each move is a major milestone. 
By and large, commentators have applauded the Court's newfound 
willingness to protect capital defendants. 5 Yet at a time of widespread 
I. See generally Robert Weisberg, Deregulating Death, 1983 SUP. CT. REv. 305 (1983) 
(analyzing the 1982 term's capital punishment decisions as an announcement from the Supreme 
Court that it was "going out of the business of telling the states how to administer the death 
penalty"); Kenneth Williams, Deregulation of the Death Penalty, 40 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 677 
(2000) (arguing that the Supreme Court has effectively deregulated the death penalty by closing 
avenues of appellate review and refusing to restrict the manner in which states administer it). 
2. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005) (invalidating the death penalty for juvenile 
offenders); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (invalidating the death penalty for mentally 
retarded offenders). 
3. See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 589 (2002). 
4. See Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 377 (2005) (finding ineffective assistance of counsel 
where attorney failed to conduct reasonable investigation to find and introduce mitigating 
evidence); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 534 (2003) (same). 
5. See, e.g., Editorial, Executing Kids: The High Court Curbs Cruelty, MINN. STAR TRIB., Mar. 4, 
2005, at 20A (praising Supreme Court's decision in Simmons for recognizing the vulnerability of 
juveniles); Clay Robison, Editorial, Justices Took High Road in Juvenile Death Penalty Case, 
HOUSTON CHRON., Mar. 6, 2005, at 3 (applauding Simmons as morally correct); Bruce Shapiro, 
Rethinking the Death Penalty, THE NATION, July 22, 2002, at 14, 17-18 (describing Atkins as an 
"easy" decision and noting that other recent decisions remove "atrocious capital trial lawyering" and 
2 
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public doubts about the death penalty and bipartisan support for death 
penalty reform,6 perhaps we should be only so impressed. Death penalty 
safeguards are popular now, but one day the worm will tum yet again. 
Politicians will stop advocating moratoriums and return to campaigning 
on the number of executions they presided over in their previous term.7 
When support for reform wanes, will the Court still be inclined to 
closely scrutinize the imposition of death? 
To some extent, we can expect the Supreme Court's death penalty 
jurisprudence to reflect prevailing sentiment because doctrine ostensibly 
demands it. The chief constitutional constraint on the death penalty is the 
Eighth Amendment's "cruel and unusual punishments" clause,8 which 
the Court has interpreted to tum on the nation's "evolving standards of 
decency."9 In practice, that means the Court will tend to look for and 
follow national trends when recognizing constitutional protection in this 
area as a matter of doctrinal design. 10 But there must be more to it than 
address "public perceptions of unfairness" in the imposition of death). But see Carol S. Steiker, 
Things Fall Apart. but the Center Holds: The Supreme Court and the Death Penalty, 77 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1475, 1487-88 (2002) (arguing that decisions like Atkins remove the most offensive 
applications of the death penalty, depriving the abolitionists of their "poster children" for reform). 
6. See Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, Another Place Beyond Here: The Death Penalty Moratorium 
Movement in the United States, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. I, 21-97 (2002) (discussing reasons for, and 
evidence of, public doubts about the death penalty and support among even conservatives for death 
penalty reform); Ronald J. Tabak, Finality Without Fairness: Why We Are Moving Towards 
Moratoria on Executions, and the Potential Abolition of Capital Punishment, 33 CONN. L. REV. 733 
(2001)(same). 
7. Compare, e.g., Kirchmeier, supra note 6, at 43-47 (discussing moratorium imposed by Illinois 
Governor George Ryan and similar efforts by other politicians) and Tabak, supra note 6, at 739-45 
(same) with Craig Haney, Riding the Punishment Wave: On the Origins of Our Devolving Standards 
of Decency, 9 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 27, 41-43 (1998) (describing gubernatorial elections in 
Texas as turning on "promises about who can kill the most Texans" and relaying other incidents in 
political campaigns) and Glenn L. Pierce & Michael L. Radelet, The Role and Consequences of the 
Death Penalty in American Politics, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 711, 721 (1990-91) 
(describing the 1990 Florida gubernatorial campaign where an incumbent bragged about the number 
of death warrants he had signed and discussing the death penalty's prominence in other political 
campaigns). 
8. See U.S. CONST. amend. V111 ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines 
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."). 
9. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (explaining that the Eighth Amendment "must 
draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing 
society"); accord Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005) (using "evolving standards of 
decency" framework to exempt juvenile offenders from the death penalty); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 
U.S. 304, 311-12 (2002) (using same to exempt mentally retarded offenders). 
10. See Simmons, 543 U.S. at 560-64, 578 (finding a national consensus against use of death 
penalty with regard to juvenile offenders); Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316 (finding same for mentally 
retarded offenders); see also Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 370-71 (1989) (finding 
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that. Not all of the Court's recent restrictions on the death penalty have 
invoked the Eighth Amendment 11 and besides, one need not know 
Eighth Amendment doctrine to question the Court's willingness to 
intervene in less hospitable times. Supreme Court Justices are a part of 
contemporary society, and thus naturally influenced by the same societal 
forces that shape the rest of the country's views. 12 As a result, the Court 
is unlikely to take positions that depart significantly from prevailing 
sentiment, no matter what its doctrine says. 13 To be clear, this is not to 
suggest that the Court always takes majoritarian positions (though often 
it does). 14 The point is that the Court rarely takes a stance strongly 
contrary to those positions, so its protection is like the help of a [air-
weather friend-dependable in good times, but gone when needed the 
most. 
Given the Eighth Amendment's reliance on "evolving standards of 
decency," the death penalty context might seem ill-suited for 
demonstrating the Supreme Court's inherently limited inclination for 
insufficient evidence of a national consensus regarding execution of juvenile offenders); Penry v. 
Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 334--35 (1989) (rejecting claim that the death penalty for mentally retarded 
offenders violates the Eighth Amendment for same reason). 
II. See, e.g., Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 377 (2005) (considering Sixth Amendment 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510,534 (2003) (same); Ring 
v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 588-89 (2002) (considering challenge under Sixth Amendment right to 
jury). 
12. Former Chief Justice William Rehnquist recognized this very point when he wrote, "But these 
same judges go home at night and read the newspapers or watch the evening news on television; 
they talk to their family and friends about current events .... Judges, so long as they are relatively 
normal human beings, can no more escape being influenced by public opinion in the long run than 
can people working at other jobs." William H. Rehnquist, Constitutional Law and Public Opinion, 
20 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 751,768 (1986). 
13. I have made this point in the criminal procedure context as well. See generally Corinna Barrett 
Lain, Countermajoritarian Hero or Zero? Rethinking the Warren Court's Role in the Criminal 
Procedure Revolution, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1361 (2004); see also BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE 
NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 168 (1921) ("The great tides and currents which engulf the rest 
of men do not tum aside in their course and pass the judges by."); Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking 
the History of American Freedom, 42 WM. & MARY L. REv. 265, 278 (2000) (reviewing ERIC 
FONER, THE STORY OF AMERICAN FREEDOM (1998)) ("Judges are part of contemporary culture and 
thus are exceedingly unlikely to interpret the Constitution in ways that depart dramatically from 
contemporary public opinion."). 
14. By majoritarian positions, I mean positions consistent with dominant public opinion, however 
defined or identified. Justice Kennedy recently recognized the Court's propensity to decide cases 
consistent with public sentiment, stating, "In the long term, the court is not antimajoritarian-it's 
majoritarian." See Jason DeParle, In Battle to Pick Next Justice, Right Says Avoid a Kennedy, N.Y. 
TiMES, June 27, 2005, at AI. Empirical evidence proves him right. See THOMAS R. MARSHALL, 
PUBLIC OPINION AND THE SUPREME COURT 79-81 (1989) (concluding that the Supreme Court is as 
majoritarian as the executive and legislative branches, consistent with other research in field). 
4 
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countermajoritarian decision-making. Yet the closer one looks, the less 
that is true-and no case illustrates the point better than Furman v. 
Georgia, 15 the most famous death penalty decision in Supreme Court 
history. 16 Decided in 1972, Furman ruled that the death penalty violated 
the Eighth Amendment's "cruel and unusual punishments" clause, 
abolishing (at least for a time) capital punishment in the United States. 17 
For the purposes of the present discussion, Furman is uniquely 
instructive in two respects. First, Furman does not present the same 
doctrinal difficulties that the Court's later Eighth Amendment death 
penalty cases do. Although "evolving standards of decency" played a 
role in the decision, Furman's holding did not rest on those grounds. 18 
Thus, if the Supreme Court was following socio-political trends in its 
Furman decision, it was not because doctrine required that result. 
Second, and more importantly, Furman appears at first blush to be a 
perfect example of the Supreme Court's ability and inclination to play 
the proverbial "countermajoritarian hero." 19 We tend to think of Brown 
v. Board of Education20 as the iconic moment of judicial heroism, the 
quintessential example of the Court's willingness to protect unpopular 
minorities from the vagaries of majority will.21 But Brown protected 
innocent schoolchildren. It was Furman that saved the lives of over 600 
convicted capital murderers and rapists22-the most unpopular, 
15. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
16. See Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two 
Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109 HARV. L. REv. 355, 362 (1995) 
("Whatever crude gauge one employs-be it the size and placement of the headlines in the New 
York Times or the number of citations by other courts and commentators-Furman easily wins as 
the landmark Supreme Court decision regarding capital punishment."). 
17. Furman, 408 U.S. at 239-40. The Court reinstated the death penalty in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 
U.S. 153, 187 (1976), discussed infra at Part II.B. 
18. See infra text accompanying notes 79-83. 
19. I credit Michael Klarman for coining the term. See Michael J. Klarman, Majoritarian Judicial 
Review: The Entrenchment Problem, 85 GEO. L.J. 491, 493 (1997) ("[J]udges do not act as 
'countermajoritarian heroes' or 'villains."'); Michael J. Klarman, What's So Great About 
Constitutionalism?, 93 Nw. U. L. REV. 145, 192 (1998) ("Only one who thinks about judicial 
review ahistorically and acontextually could subscribe to the romantic vision of the Court as 
countermajoritarian hero."). 
20. 347 u.s. 483 (1954). 
21. See Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Revolutions, 82 VA. 
L. REV. I, 7 ( 1996) (noting that Brown "represents a paradigmatic example of the Supreme Court 
intervening to protect an oppressed minority from majoritarian overreaching"). 
22. At the time Furman was decided, there were 631 men and two women on death row. 
MICHAEL MELTSNER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL: THE SUPREME COURT AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 
292-93 (1973); James R. Acker, Robert M. Bohm & Charles S. Lanier, Introduction to AMERICA'S 
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politically powerless individuals in America. 23 In Furman, the Supreme 
Court invalidated the death penalty statutes of thirty-nine states and the 
federal government, a move that had to have taken courage in the 
conservative, "law and order" times of 1972.24 Even the Justices in 
Furman saw themselves as playing a heroic, countermajoritarian role?5 
Indeed, the Justices' concern that the death penalty was being selectively 
applied-"feeding prejudices against the accused if he is poor and 
despised, and lacking political clout, or if he is a member of a suspect or 
unpopular minority"26-figured prominently in their decision to 
override, rather than respect, the countervailing position of the states on 
this issue. 27 In short, if any decision showcases the Supreme Court 
EXPERIMENT WITH CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: REFLECTIONS ON THE PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE OF 
THE ULTIMATE PENAL SANCTION 5, 5-6 (James R. Acker et al. eds., 2003); see also infra text 
accompanying note 124 (noting that in the 1960s, ninety-nine percent of all executions were for two 
offenses-murder and rape). 
23. See Williams, supra note I, at 722 (describing death row inmates as "the most despised group 
in America, a constituency without any political representation, and completely unable to fend for 
themselves in the political process"); Editorial, The Ultimate Question, THE NATION, May 17, 1971, 
at 610 ("Cases in which the death penalty can be imposed are cases which arouse fears, hatred, 
ethnic animosities and social prejudices."). 
24. Forty states had death penalty statutes of some variety in 1972, but Rhode Island's capital 
statute was spared because it was a mandatory, rather than discretionary, death penalty provision. 
See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238,417 n.2 (Powell, J., dissenting). Rhode Island's capital statute 
was invalidated as a result of the Court's 1976 decision in Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 
280 (1976). See itifra text accompanying notes 315-21 (discussing Woodson); infra Part I.C.6 
(discussing "law and order" mood of 1972). 
25. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 268--69 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("The right to be free of cruel and 
unusual punishments, like the other guarantees of the Bill of Rights, 'may not be submitted to vote; 
[it] depend[s] on the outcome of no elections.' 'The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to 
withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the 
reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the 
courts."' (internal citations omitted)); id. at 345 (Marshall, J., concurring) ("But the Eighth 
Amendment is our insulation from our baser selves."); see also LEE EPSTEIN & JOSEPH F. 
KOBYLKA, THE SUPREME COURT AND LEGAL CHANGE 72 (1992) (noting that NAACP briefs in 
Furman stressed just one view of the Court's institutional function: that of protector of minority 
interests). 
26. Furman, 408 U.S. at 255 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
27. See, e.g., id. at 249-50 (Douglas, J., concurring) ("'The death sentence is disproportionately 
imposed and carried out on the poor, the Negro, and the members of unpopular groups."' (internal 
citation omitted)); id. at 365--66 (Marshall, J., concurring) ("It also is evident that the burden of 
capital punishment falls upon the poor, the ignorant, and the underprivileged members of society. It 
is the poor, and the members of minority groups who are least able to voice their complaints against 
capital punishment."); id. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring) ("[I]f any basis can be discerned for the 
selection of these few to be sentenced to die, it is the constitutionally impermissible basis of race."); 
id. at 294 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("No one has yet suggested a rational basis that could 
differentiate ... the few who die from the many who go to prison."). Justice White's statements in 
6 
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protecting unpopular minorities in the face of strong majoritarian 
opposition, it is Furman v. Georgia. 
But the lessons of Furman are not what they seem. Rather than 
proving the Supreme Court's ability to withstand majoritarian 
influences, Furman teaches the opposite-that even in its more 
countermajoritarian moments, the Court never strays far from dominant 
public opinion, tending instead to reflect the social and political 
movements of its time. In Furman, the Supreme Court did take a 
countermajoritarian position, but the circumstances in which it did so 
say more about the Court's limited inclination for countermajoritarian 
decision-making than the contrary. When the Court decided Furman, 
public support for the death penalty was only fifty percent,28 and 
opposition to the practice had been mounting for over a decade.29 To 
many contemporary observers, the abolition of capital punishment was 
just a matter of time.30 Against that backdrop, it is difficult to conclude 
that Furman was countermajoritarian in any strong sense of the word; 
the Court only saw fit to play a countermajoritarian role once it almost 
no longer was. Like several other seemingly countermajoritarian 
decisions, the Court in Furman decided an issue that split the nation 
roughly in half, adopting a slightly minority position with momentum on 
its side.31 
In fairness, not all of Furman's lessons can be gleaned from a 
discussion of the decision itself. To understand Furman, one must also 
understand the backlash it engendered and the ruling that came in the 
wake of that backlash, Gregg v. Georgia. 32 Decided just four years after 
Furman, Gregg reinstated the death penalty33 and made its own point 
conference made the same point. There he reportedly stated, "The nut of the case is that only a small 
proportion are put to death, and I can't believe that they are picked out on the basis of killing those 
who should be killed. I can't believe that it is meted out fairly." See THE SUPREME COURT IN 
CONFERENCE ( 1940--1985), at 617 (Del Dickson ed., 200 I). 
28. See infra text accompanying note 205. 
29. See infra Parts I.C.5--6 (discussing rising public, political, and judicial opposition to the death 
penalty). 
30. See infra text accompanying notes 234-38. 
31. See Klarman, supra note 21, at 8 (discussing Brown v. Board of Education, 34 7 U.S. 483 
(1954)); Lain, supra note 13, at 1420--27 (discussing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 486 (1966)); 
EPSTEIN & KOBYLKA, supra note 25, at 136-54 (discussing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)); see 
also Michael J. Klarman, Brown and Lawrence (and Goodridge), I 04 MICH. L. REv. 431,486 n.396 
(2005) (citing public opinion poll data from 1974 showing that forty-seven percent of Americans 
supported Roe, while forty-four percent opposed it). 
32. 428 U.S. 153 (1976). 
33. /d. at 169 ("We now hold that the punishment of death does not invariably violate the 
7 
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about the Court's willingness to act in a heroic, countermajoritarian 
fashion. In Furman, the Supreme Court seemed like the 
countermajoritarian savior but was not; in Gregg, the Court could have 
been the countermajoritarian savior but was not. In different ways, both 
decisions showcase the inherently limited nature of the Court's 
inclination to protect. 
In the discussion that follows, I argue that Furman, Gregg, and the 
events that transpired between them highlight a fundamental flaw in the 
Supreme Court's role as protector of minority rights-its limited 
inclination and ability to render countermajoritarian change. Part I 
establishes Furman as a decision profoundly affected by the social and 
political movements of its time. Part II considers the backlash that 
Furman generated and the Court's response to that backlash in Gregg, 
arguing that Gregg likewise illustrates the pervasive effect of extralegal 
context on judicial decision-making. Part III extrapolates two lessons 
from the inherently majoritarian influence of context in Furman and 
Gregg, arguing first, that the Court's inclination for countermajoritarian 
decision-making is extremely limited and second, that to the extent the 
Justices issue even slightly countermajoritarian rulings, they risk 
retarding the very cause they are trying to promote. If the past truly is a 
prologue, Furman portends that the Court will be an unlikely source of 
protection when capital defendants need it most. We ought to recognize 
that fact and rethink our reliance on the Court to protect these and other 
unpopular minorities from the tyrannical potential of majority rule. 
I. RETHINKING FURMAN 
Rethinking Furman as a decision that reflected, rather than rejected, 
the majoritarian influences of its time requires consideration of the 
decision's legal, as well as extralegal, context. Consideration of 
Furman's legal context is necessary because we lawyers tend to think 
judicial decisions are primarily a product of the rule of law.34 
Presumably, the law matters, which is why law professors teach the law 
and law students study the law. Thus, in order to see Furman for what it 
was-a product of the social and political movements of its time--one 
must first recognize what Furman was not: a product of purely (or even 
Constitution."). 
34. See Barry Friedman, The Importance of Being Positive: The Nature and Function of Judicial 
Review, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 1257, 1273-74 (2004). This starting assumption is not shared by all 
lawyers, nor is it shared by many outside the field oflaw. See id. 
8 
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mainly) principled decision-making. And to do that, it is first instructive 
to view the doctrinal landscape of the Eighth Amendment's "cruel and 
unusual punishments" clause as it stood before Furman. As discussed 
below, Furman made little sense based on previously established Eighth 
Amendment doctrine and traditional sources of legal analysis, but was 
perfectly understandable in light of the social and political movements of 
its time. 
A. Eighth Amendment Doctrine Before Furman 
Before Furman was decided in 1972, the Eighth Amendment's "cruel 
and unusual punishments" clause was largely a dead letter in 
constitutional law. During the first 175 years of its existence, the clause 
provided the basis for decision in just six Supreme Court cases and 
produced just three guiding principles. 35 The first two were substantive 
prohibitions: a punishment could not "involve torture or a lingering 
death,"36 nor could it be grossly disproportionate to the crime.37 The 
third was a principle designed to guide interpretation of the clause itself. 
In 1910, the Supreme Court in Weems v. United States38 declared that 
the meaning of the "cruel and unusual punishments" clause was "capable 
35. See infra notes 36-37. The first of those cases was not decided untill878, almost a century 
after the Bill of Rights was ratified. See id. 
36. In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890) (upholding death by electrocution); accord 
Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 136-37 (1878) (upholding death by public shooting). The Court's 
later decision in Louisiana ex rei. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947), would prove that even 
the "lingering death" prohibition had leeway. In Francis, officials botched the defendant's 
electrocution and wanted to try again. During the initial attempt, the defendant's body had reacted 
so violently to the shock it was receiving that the electric chair, which had not been anchored to the 
floor, gave way. A majority of the Court upheld what the dissenters called "death by installments." 
/d. at 474 (Burton, J., dissenting). According to the majority, even a lingering death was tolerable so 
long as the state did not mean for it to be. /d. at 464. After Francis, the Court's point was clear-
while the "cruel and unusual punishments" clause spoke to the method of imposing death, it did not 
have much to say. For the story of Francis, see MELTSNER, supra note 22, at 177-78. 
37. See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910) ("[I]t is a precept of justice that 
punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to offense."). The Court articulated and 
applied the proportionality principle in three cases prior to Furman. See, e.g., id. (holding that 
twelve-year sentence of cadena temporal-forced labor while chained at the ankles and wrists-is 
"cruel and unusual" punishment for the crime of forging a public document); Robinson v. 
California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962) (holding that imprisonment for narcotics addiction is "cruel 
and unusual" punishment, explaining that "[e]ven one day in prison would be cruel and unusual 
punishment for the 'crime' of having a common cold"); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 103 (1958) 
(holding that expatriation is "cruel and unusual" punishment for a soldier's wartime desertion for a 
day). 
38. 217 U.S. 349 (1910). 
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of wider application than the mischief which gave it birth" and would 
"acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane 
justice."39 Echoing that sentiment in 1958, the Court in Trop v. Dulles40 
interpreted the clause in accordance with "evolving standards of decency 
that mark the progress of a maturing society."41 Penned by Chief Justice 
Warren, those words would become the touchstone of modem Eighth 
Amendment interpretation, spawning an entire body of constitutional 
constraints on the imposition of death.42 
Concededly, the dynamic nature of the "cruel and unusual 
punishments" clause left plenty of room for the Supreme Court to read 
new protections into the Eighth Amendment. Before 1972, however, that 
potential had yet to be realized. As Hugo Bedau observed in 1968, "not a 
single death penalty statute, not a single statutorily imposed mode of 
execution, not a single attempted execution has ever been held by any 
court to be 'cruel and unusual punishment' under any state or federal 
constitution."43 Then came Furman. 
Furman v. Georgia stands alone in American death penalty 
jurisprudence not only because of what the Court held-"the imposition 
and carrying out of the death penalty ... constitute cruel and unusual 
punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments"44-
but also because of how the Court held it. The decision itself was 
announced in a terse, one paragraph per curiam opinion that was not at 
all remarkable.45 The remarkable part is what came next: nine separate 
opinions (five concurring and four dissenting) totaling 233 pages of 
official reports, earning Furman the dubious distinction of being the 
39. !d. at 373, 378. It was this declaration, in fact, that justified the Court's recognition of the 
proportionality principle in the first place. See id. at 367. 
40. 356 u.s. 86 (1958). 
41. Id. at 101. 
42. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text. 
43. HUGO ADAM BEDAU, THE COURTS, THE CONSTITUTION AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 35 
(1977). Granted, the Eighth Amendment's "cruel and unusual punishments" clause had only been 
incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment's due process protections since 1962. See Robinson v. 
California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962) (implicitly incorporating the clause). This may explain the 
paucity of cases decided under the clause prior to Furman and, if one sees Furman as an early 
"misstep" due to the Court's inexperience with the clause, it may even help explain the decision's 
weak doctrinal basis. None of this detracts from the point of Parts l.A and 1.8-that the Justices 
decided Furman as they did because they wanted to, not because they had to or even had the 
doctrinal room to do so. 
44. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238,239--40 (1972). 
45. The paragraph identified the petitioners, posed the question, answered it in one sentence, and 
reversed and remanded the cases. See id. 
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longest decision in Supreme Court history.46 Because none of Furman's 
concurring Justices joined in any other concurring Justice's opinion, 
identifying Furman's doctrinal basis is itself no small feat.47 As Norman 
Finkel has aptly noted, "Furman has the feel of an anthology desperately 
in need of an editor.'148 Still, whatever was driving the result in Furman, 
it was almost certainly not principled decision-making despite the Eighth 
Amendment's relatively blank slate. 
B. Furman as a Product of (Un)Principled Decision-Making 
For those patient (and awake) long enough to read Furman from start 
to finish, the true wonder of its dichotomy becomes readily apparent. On 
the one hand, Furman is utterly convincing as a moral, philosophical, 
and penological proposition. On the other, its dearth of doctrinal support 
is equally palpable. Even with the Eighth Amendment's expansive 
potential, it is difficult to conclude that principled decision-making 
played a role in Furman. Indeed, one cannot help but wonder if the 
Justices' inability to agree on a doctrinal basis for their ruling was due to 
the fact that one simply did not exist. In virtually every conceivable way, 
traditional sources of legal analysis pointed away from-rather than 
toward-the result in Furman. 
First, neither the text nor the original understanding of the 
Constitution supported Furman's ruling. The Fifth Amendment, adopted 
the same day as the Eighth Amendment in 1 791, provides protection for 
those accused of a "capital" crime, limiting the number of times they 
may be put in "jeopardy of life" and preventing deprivations of "life, 
liberty, or property ... without due process oflaw.''49 The Constitution's 
text clearly assumes the death penalty's legitimacy, and the Framers did 
as well. At the time the Eighth Amendment was adopted, the death 
46. See NORMAN J. FINKEL, COMMONSENSE JUSTICE: JURORS' NOTIONS OF THE LAW 172 (1995) 
(recognizing Furman as "the lengthiest opinion ever written in the history of the Supreme Court"); 
Steiker & Steiker, supra note 16, at 362 (same). 
47. HUGO ADAM BEDAU, THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 249 (3d ed. 1982) ("Because the 
Court majority was fractured five separate ways, however, it was no small exercise in interpretation 
to determine on precisely which issues the Justices agreed."); Steiker & Steiker, supra note 16, at 
362 ("The opinions presented a staggering array of arguments for and against the constitutionality 
of the death penalty and offered little means, aside from shrewd political prediction, of determining 
which arguments would dominate in the decision of any future cases."); Weisberg, supra note I, at 
317 ("[T]here really is no doctrinal holding in Furman"). 
48. FINKEL, supra note 46, at 172. 
49. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
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penalty was mandatory for most felonies and prevalent in every state.50 
Executions were common; even twelve-year-old children were not 
imrnune.51 Indeed, the same First Congress that drafted and debated the 
Eighth Amendment also passed the nation's first death penalty law.52 
Whatever the Framers thought the "cruel and unusual punishments" 
clause prohibited, the death penalty itself was not on the list. 
To be fair, Furman's difficulties with the text and original 
understanding of the Constitution are hardly insurmountable. True fans 
of originalism would have to concede considerable doubt as to whether 
even the Framers knew what the phrase "cruel and unusual 
punishments" meant at the time they adopted it.53 Besides, after Weems 
interpreted the clause in a dynamic manner in 1910,54 what the Framers 
thought (or did not think) hardly could be considered decisive. The 
whole point of "evolving standards of decency" was that the Eighth 
Amendment's meaning could change; what the clause allowed in the 
1790s it might not allow in the 1970s.55 After all, the Framers also 
50. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 335--41 (Marshall, J., concurring) (detailing the history of capital 
punishment in the United States). 
51. See Victor L. Streib, Emerging Issues in Juvenile Death Penalty Law, 26 OHIO N. U. L. REV. 
725, 728 (2000) (discussing execution of twelve-year-old Hannah Ocuish in 1786, as well as other 
juvenile offender executions). 
52. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 420 (Powell, J., dissenting). The nation's first federal death penalty 
law can be found in the First Crimes Act of 1790. See I Cong. ch. 9, I Stat. 112 (providing death 
penalty for murder, treason, sodomy, among other felony offenses). 
53. According to accounts of the First Congress, a number of legislators objected to the "cruel 
and unusual punishments" clause based on its vague language. Samuel Livermore of New 
Hampshire appears to have captured the sentiment best when he remarked, "The clause seems to 
express a great deal of humanity, on which account I have no objection to it; but as it seems to have 
no meaning in it, I do not think it necessary." I ANNALS OF CONGRESS 754 (1789). See also 
Furman, 408 U.S. at 258--64 (Brennan, J., concurring) (elaborating lack of evidence regarding the 
Framers' intent in incorporating the "cruel and unusual punishments" clause in the Bill of Rights). 
To the extent the prohibition against "cruel and unusual punishments" had an original 
understanding, it was thought to prevent particularly barbaric punishments-an interpretation based 
on English law that several scholars have shown to be mistaken. See Laurence Claus, The 
Antidiscrimination Eighth Amendment, 28 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 119, 121 (2004) (arguing that 
the English version of the clause was meant to prohibit excessive, rather than torturous, 
punishments but that the Framers interpreted it incorrectly); Anthony F. Granucci, "Nor Cruel and 
Unusual Punishments Inflicted:" The Original Meaning, 57 CAL. L. REv. 839, 843--44 (1969) 
(arguing that the English version of the clause was meant to prohibit discrimination in punishments 
but that the Framers interpreted it incorrectly). 
54. See supra text accompanying notes 38-39. 
55. The phraseology is adapted from an NAACP memo created in preparation for Furman, which 
noted that the Eighth Amendment "may condemn in 1971 what it permitted in 1791." EPSTEIN & 
KOBYLKA, supra note 25, at 73 (reproducing memo). 
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thought ear-cropping was perfectly acceptable, but no one would have 
considered that practice constitutional when Furman was decided in 
1972.56 In short, the text and original understanding of the Constitution 
may not have made Furman's holding lawless (though the dissenters 
thought so i 7 -but that is not the point. The point is that neither of these 
interpretive sources would have led the Justices in Furman to rule as 
they did. 
Similarly, nothing in the Supreme Court's prior Eighth Amendment 
decisions suggested that the death penalty itself could violate the "cruel 
and unusual punishments" clause. To the contrary, almost every one of 
the Court's few decisions interpreting the clause before 1972 
acknowledged the death penalty's legitimacy in some form or fashion. In 
1890, for example, the Court explained: 
Punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering 
death; but the punishment of death is not cruel, within the 
meaning of that word as used in the Constitution. It implies there 
something inhuman and barbarous, something more than the 
mere extinguishment of life. 58 
Likewise, virtually all of the Court's other pre-Furman Eighth 
Amendment decisions contain statements-some by the Court, some by 
individual Justices-assuming or asserting as a matter of settled law the 
death penalty's constitutionality.59 Of course, the comments in these 
decisions were technically dicta; the Justices had never before squarely 
confronted the issue. But Chief Justice Burger was undoubtedly correct 
when he wrote in his Furman dissent, "In the 181 years since the 
enactment of the Eighth Amendment, not a single decision of this Court 
56. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 384 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (conceding point). 
57. See, e.g., id. at 414 (B1ackmun, J., dissenting) (noting that the Court's decision is "difficult to 
accept or to justify as a matter of history, of law, or of constitutional pronouncement"); id. at 417 
(Powell, J., dissenting) (lamenting that "(t]he Court rejects as not decisive the clearest evidence that 
the Framers of the Constitution and the authors of the Fourteenth Amendment believed that those 
documents posed no barrier to the death penalty"). 
58. In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436,447 (1890). 
59. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 421-28 (Powell, J., dissenting) ("On virtually every occasion that 
any opinion has touched on the question of the constitutionality of the death penalty, it has been 
asserted affirmatively, or tacitly assumed, that the Constitution does not prohibit the penalty."); id. 
at 407-08 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (discussing cases and making same point); id. at 329 
(Marshall, J., concurring) (conceding that a "fair reading" of the Court's prior death penalty cases 
"would certainly indicate an acceptance sub silentio of capital punishment as constitutionally 
permissible"). 
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has cast the slightest shadow of a doubt on the constitutionality of capital 
punishment. "60 
That said, the largest hurdle for the Justices in Furman's majority was 
not prior dicta, but the Court's decision just fourteen months earlier in 
McGautha v. California.61 In McGautha, the Supreme Court considered 
and rejected the claim that standardless discretion in the imposition of 
death violated due process.62 According to the Court, juries did not need 
standards to guide capital sentencing determinations and in any event, 
standards would do little to protect against the arbitrary imposition of 
death that formed the gist of the defendant's complaint.63 After extolling 
the virtues of a jury's ability to afford mercy whenever it saw fit, the 
Court in McGautha concluded: 
In light of history, experience, and the present limitations of 
human knowledge, we find it quite impossible to say that 
committing to the untrammeled discretion of the jury the power 
to pronounce life or death in capital cases is offensive to 
anything in the Constitution. 64 
Guided discretion statutes might be a better way of approaching capital 
jury trials, the Court conceded, but they were not constitutionally 
required. 65 
For the majority in Furman, McGautha was a problem because the 
one point on which all of the concurring Justices agreed-and the one 
point that Furman would come to represent-was that the arbitrary 
imposition of death was constitutionally impermissible.66 The facts of 
Furman (as well as its companion cases)67 were perfect for making the 
60. /d. at 380 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
61. 402 U.S. 183 (1971). 
62. See id. at 207. 
63. See id.; see also infra text accompanying note 334 (quoting McGautha). 
64. 402 U.S. at 207. 
65. See id. at 221 (conceding that standards in capital sentencing may be "superior" means of 
administering the death penalty, while noting that the Constitution "does not guarantee trial 
procedures that are the best of all worlds"). 
66. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976) ("Because of the uniqueness of the death 
penalty, Furman held that it could not be imposed under sentencing procedures that created a 
substantial risk that it would be inflicted in an arbitrary and capricious manner."); EPSTEIN & 
KOBYLKA, supra note 25, at 78 ("[T]he five Justices agreed on one major point of jurisprudence: 
that those states using capital punishment do so in an arbitrary manner." (citing WILLIAM J. 
BOWERS, LEGAL HOMICIDE 174 (Northeastern Univ. Press 1984)). 
67. Both of Furman's companion cases were rapes of white women by black defendants where 
the victim did not otherwise suffer serious injuries. For a discussion of the facts of those cases, see 
MELTSNER, supra note 22, at 246-48. In fairness, a third companion case, which presented the 
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point. William Henry Furman was a black man of limited intelligence 
who shot and killed a white man, arguably by accident, as he was fleeing 
a burglary of the man's home.68 Yes, he had killed someone, but what 
distinguished Furman from the countless other killers who had not 
received the death penalty? For Justice Stewart, it was the fact that there 
was no distinction that rendered the death penalty constitutionally 
impermissible; Furman was simply one of a "capriciously selected 
random handful" upon whom death was "wantonly" and "freakishly" 
imposed.69 For Justice White, the death penalty's infrequent and 
arbitrary imposition rendered it completely ineffective as a deterrent, so 
the states no longer had a legitimate reason to put people to death.7° For 
Justice Douglas, the imposition of death was not only arbitrary and 
capricious, but discriminatory as well, preying on "only those in the 
lower strata, only those who are members of an unpopular minority or 
the poor and despised."71 For the two remaining members of Furman's 
majority-Justices Brennan and Marshall-the infrequent, arbitrary, 
and/or discriminatory imposition of death was just one of several reasons 
that capital punishment was "cruel and unusual" per se.72 In short, each 
of the Justices in Furman's majority based his decision at least in part on 
the arbitrary results of a capital punishment system that the Court had 
just upheld against the claim that it produced arbitrary results. 
Granted, the constitutional questions considered in McGautha and 
Furman were different, but not much. In both, the petitioners argued that 
unbridled discretion made it impossible to rationally distinguish between 
Court with a brutal rape-murder, was remanded before Furman was decided when the California 
Supreme Court in People v. Anderson, 493 P.2d 880 (Cal.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 958 (1972), 
invalidated the death penalty under its state constitution. See MELTSNER, supra note 22, at 247 
(discussing facts of People v. Aikens, 450 P.2d 258 (Cal. 1969), cert. dismissed, Aikens v. 
California, 406 U.S. 813 (1972)); infra text accompanying note 232 (discussing remand of Aikens in 
light of Anderson). 
68. See MELTSNER, supra note 22, at 247--48. 
69. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 309-10 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
70. See id. at 313 (White, J., concurring) ("! cannot avoid the conclusion that as the statutes 
before us are now administered, the penalty is so infrequently imposed that the threat of execution is 
too attenuated to be of substantial service to criminal justice."). 
71. /d. at 247 n.lO (Douglas, J., concurring). 
72. See id. at 281-306 (Brennan, J., concurring) (invalidating the death penalty because it is 
unusually severe, inflicted arbitrarily, substantially rejected by contemporary society, and unable to 
serve any penal purpose more effectively than some less severe punishment); id. at 342-71 
(Marshall, J., concurring) (invalidating the death penalty because it is an excessive and unnecessary 
penalty, because informed public opinion would reject it, and because it is used in a discriminatory 
manner). 
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those who would live and those who would die. 73 The real difference 
was that in Furman the argument worked. This was particularly ironic 
because at its core, the arbitrariness that Furman denunciated was a 
procedural problem. It was a problem with how the death penalty was 
applied, rather than with the penalty itself, and thus better suited for the 
due process challenge made and rejected in McGautha. 74 Acutely aware 
of the inconsistency, the Justices in Furman's majority dealt with 
McGautha as well as they could-rejecting it, distinguishing it, even 
ignoring it altogether. 75 They had understood what McGautha meant for 
future challenges to the death penalty at the time it was decided. In fact, 
McGautha was thought to have so decisively settled the death penalty's 
constitutionality that Justice Douglas initially drafted a dissent to the 
Court's grant of certiorari in Furman, claiming it was "cruel and 
unusual" for the Court to give false hope to death row inmates only to 
announce "in draconian fashion that the death penalty passes muster."76 
He later withdrew it, but others who would form Furman's majority 
initially thought the same thing-having just held that the Constitution 
73. Compare McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 204 (1971) (rejecting McGautha's complaint 
that the statutes at issue "failed to provide a rational basis for distinguishing" those who would live 
from those who would die) with Furman, 408 U.S. at 313 (White, J., concurring) ("[T]here is no 
meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which [the death penalty] is imposed from the 
many cases in which it is not."); id. at 294 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("No one has yet suggested a 
rational basis that could differentiate ... the few who die from the many who go to prison."). 
74. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 398-99 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) ("The decisive grievance of the 
opinions-not translated into Eighth Amendment terms-is that the present system of discretionary 
sentencing in capital cases has failed to produce evenhanded justice; the problem is not that too few 
have been sentenced to die, but that the selection process has followed no rational pattern .... The 
approach of these concurring opinions has no antecedent in the Eighth Amendment cases. It is 
essentially and exclusively a procedural due process argument."). Justice Douglas's concurrence 
implicitly recognized the point. See id. at 256-57 (Douglas, J., concurring) ("(T]hese discretionary 
statutes are ... pregnant with discrimination and discrimination is an ingredient not compatible with 
the idea of equal protection of the laws that is implicit in the ban on 'cruel and unusual' 
punishments."). 
75. Justices Douglas, Marshall, and Brennan had dissented in McGautha, and stayed with that 
position in Furman. See McGautha, 402 U.S. at 248, (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by Douglas, J. 
and Marshall, J.); Furman, 408 U.S. at 248 n.ll (Douglas, J., concurring) (arguing the "correctness 
of Mr. Justice Brennan's dissent" in McGautha). For Justices Stewart and White, who had voted 
with the majority in McGautha, the task was not that simple. Justice Stewart distinguished 
McGautha in a footnote as a case arising under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses, see 
id. at 310 n.l2, while Justice White ignored McGautha altogether. See id. at 31 0-14; see also id. at 
427 n.ll (Powell, J., dissenting) (chiding Justice Stewart for attempting to "dispose(] of McGautha 
in a footnote" and Justice White for making "no attempt to distinguish McGautha's clear holding"). 
76. See MARK V. TUSHNET, MAKING CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 150 (Oxford Univ. Press 1997) 
(discussing and quoting draft dissent). 
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did not require standards in the imposition of death, the Court was 
unlikely to then strike the death penalty because there were no 
standards.77 The ink on McGautha was barely dry when certiorari in 
Furman was granted two months later.78 It was simply unthinkable that 
the Court would turn its back on a case of such recent vintage, until it 
did. 
Arguably, the concept of "evolving standards of decency" provided a 
way around McGautha, 79 but not even this doctrinal basis can explain 
the Court's decision in Furman. Only Justices Brennan and Marshall 
relied on "evolving standards of decency" to support their ruling; as 
previously noted, the other three Justices in Furman's majority relied 
exclusively on some variation of the arbitrary manner in which death 
was inflicted.80 Even then, Justice Marshall did not contend that the 
nation's standards of decency had actually evolved to a point where 
capital punishment was considered socially unacceptable. His 
conclusion, soon to be dubbed the "Marshall Hypothesis,"8 I was that the 
death penalty would be socially unacceptable if only Americans knew 
more about it. 82 That left only Justice Brennan claiming that the death 
77. Like Justice Douglas, Justice Brennan assumed the Court would uphold the death penalty in 
Furman, and had prepared a draft dissent before oral arguments in the case. /d. By the morning of 
oral arguments in Furman, Justice Marshall had done the same. William J. Brennan, Jr., 
Constitutional Adjudication and the Death Penalty: A View from the Court, 100 HARV. L. REV. 313, 
322 (\ 986-87). Apparently, the whole point of granting certiorari in Furman was to "once and for 
all ... make it clear to the nation that the death penalty and all its aspects pass constitutional 
muster." See STUART BANNER, THE DEATH PENALTY: AN AMERICAN HISTORY 257-58 (Harvard 
Univ. Press 2002) (quoting Justice Black); see also Brennan, supra, at 322 (discussing Justice 
Black's role in the decision to grant certiorari in Furman); MELTSNER, supra note 22, at 287 
(arguing that McGautha ensured Furman's result "would rank among the greatest surprises in 
American legal history"). 
78. McGautha was decided May 3, 1971. See McGautha, 402 U.S. at 183. Certiorari in Furman 
was granted June 28, 1971. See Furman v. Georgia, 403 U.S. 952 (1971). 
79. Before Furman, "evolving standards of decency" was an interpretive principle, not a 
substantive constraint. As Chief Justice Burger recognized in his Furman dissent, the Court had 
never before held that a punishment could be "cruel and unusual" because it was out of step with 
societal values. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 383 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). See also supra Part LA 
(discussing Eighth Amendment doctrine before Furman). 
80. See supra text accompanying notes 69-75. 
81. See Austin Sarat & Neil Vidmar, Public Opinion, the Death Penalty, and the Eighth 
Amendment: Testing the Marshall Hypothesis, in CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 
190, 190-207 (Hugo Adam Bedau & Chester M. Pierce eds., 1975) (reporting substantial empirical 
support for the Marshall Hypothesis). 
82. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 369 (Marshall, J., concurring) ("Assuming knowledge of all the facts 
presently available regarding capital punishment, the average citizen would, in my opinion, find it 
shocking to his conscience and sense of justice."). 
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penalty had in fact been rejected by contemporary society and for him, 
"evolving standards" was just one of four reasons that the death penalty 
was unconstitutional per se.83 In short, "evolving standards of decency" 
cannot explain Furman's result because by and large, the Justices did not 
use it. 
In retrospect, it is not difficult to understand why Furman's holding 
did not rely more heavily on "evolving standards of decency" despite the 
end run it provided around McGautha. In 1972, forty states had death 
penalty statutes, 84 juries were still imposing death sentences (at least on 
occasion), 85 and death penalty supporters slightly outnumbered its 
opponents.86 Given those considerations, it was virtually impossible to 
conclude that capital punishment had become morally repugnant to the 
nation as a whole, notwithstanding Justice Brennan's eloquent opinion 
to the contrary. This is not to deny that the death penalty was extremely 
controversial at the time-nor is it to deny the direction in which the 
nation's standards appeared to be evolving. 87 But to claim in 1972 that 
the nation had soundly rejected capital punishment was more than a little 
difficult-it was utterly unconvincing. 
In the end, then, this much is clear: Furman was a decision the 
Justices wanted to make, not one they had to make (or even had 
doctrinal room to make). The Justices in Furman's majority invalidated 
the death penalty because they were convinced it was the right thing to 
do, and if traditional sources of legal analysis did not support that 
result-well, they would simply have to give way. The question is why 
the Justices wanted to strike the death penalty in Furman (and better yet, 
why they wanted to in Furman but not in McGautha). 
Although it is impossible to know exactly why the Justices in 
Furman's majority ruled as they did and no single explanation is 
completely satisfactory on its own, the role of extralegal context in the 
decision was clearly significant. The Justices in Furman made a policy 
choice, pure and simple, and it is more than mere coincidence that they 
did so in a socio-political context extremely conducive to that choice. 
Only by understanding the socio-political context in which Furman was 
decided can we begin to understand why the Justices would have 
83. See supra note 72. 
84. See supra note 24. 
85. See infra text accompanying notes 100-04 (discussing sentencing patterns in 1960s). 
86. See infra text accompanying note 205. 
87. See infra Part I.C (discussing socio-political context of Furman). 
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thought invalidating the death penalty was the right thing to do despite 
doctrine, rather than because of it. 
C. Furman as a Product of Broader Socio-Political Trends 
Furman's socio-political context began long before 1972. Although it 
was not until the late 1950s that abolition sentiment started to gain 
momentum, the country had begun to distance itself from the death 
penalty even before then. 88 By the mid-1960s, the nation appeared to be 
moving towards abolition of its own accord. As discussed below, 
executions were dwindling, state legislatures were abolishing the death 
penalty, a world-wide abolition movement was underway, and domestic 
egalitarianism was feeding a similar movement at home. Even as the 
country turned increasingly conservative on criminal justice issues, 
political and judicial opposition to the death penalty mounted. The result 
was a socio-political context uniquely conducive to the Court's 1972 
landmark ruling. 
1. Use of the Death Penalty 
One of the earliest (and clearest) indications of the nation's growing 
discomfort with capital punishment was an increasing reluctance to 
actually use it. In the 1930s, the average number of executions per year 
was 167; in the 1940s, the average was 128.89 By the 1950s, that figure 
had dropped to 72.90 In 1962, there were only 47 executions, and the 
numbers plummeted from there-1963 had 21 executions, 1964 had 15, 
1965 had 7, 1966 had one, 1967 had two, and from 1968 until the death 
penalty was reinstated in 1976, there were none.91 
88. See infra Parts l.C.i (discussing decline in executions as early as the 1930s) and l.C.2 
(discussing state legislative trend towards abolition beginning in the late 1950s). 
89. See Walter C. Reckless, The Use of the Death Penalty: A Factual Statement, in CAPITAL 
PUNISHMENT 38, 51 (James A. McCafferty ed., 1974) (charting executions from 1930 through 
1970). 
90. /d. 
91. /d.; see also PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF 
JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY: A REPORT BY THE PRESIDENT'S 
COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 143 (U.S. Gov't Printing 
Office 1967) [hereinafter NAT'L CRIME COMM'N REPORT] ("The most salient characteristic of 
capital punishment is that it is infrequently applied."); Reckless, The Use of the Death Penalty: A 
Factual Statement, in CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, supra note 89, at 51; EPSTEIN & KOBYLKA, supra note 
25, at 59 (recognizing 1968 as "the first year in American history in which no executions 
occurred"). 
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Granted, the fact that executions had ground to a halt by the late 
1960s was attributable to a litigation-induced de facto moratorium in 
place while the Supreme Court waded through various constitutional 
challenges to the death penalty.92 But the National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), which led those challenges, 
did not begin to systematically attack the death penalty's 
constitutionality until 1967.93 Before then, its efforts had focused on 
defending blacks in Southern rape cases, where racial discrimination in 
the imposition of death was most apparent.94 Even the American Civil 
Liberties Union (ACLU), which partnered in the NAACP's 1967 
massive litigation campaign,95 did not take a stand against the death 
penalty until 1965.96 Before then, its official position was that capital 
punishment did not present a civil liberties issue.97 Thus, while the 
NAACP and ACLU deserve the credit (or blame) for stopping 
executions entirely, these so-called "moral elites" entered the fray too 
late to have played a significant role in the death penalty's dwindling 
use. 98 
92. For fascinating accounts of the evolution and execution of the NAACP's litigation-based 
"moratorium strategy," see MELTSNER, supra note 22, at 106-67. See also EPSTEIN & KOBYLKA, 
supra note 25, at 48-61 (discussing moratorium strategy and aptly describing it as "litigation laced 
with psychological warfare"); infra note 313 (discussing "pileup on death row"). 
93. See EPSTEIN & KOBYLKA, supra note 25, at 53 (discussing NAACP's decision "to change 
their strategy dramatically in 1967"); MELTSNER, supra note 22, at 108-10 (discussing 1967 Ford 
Foundation grant to NAACP that made moratorium strategy possible). The NAACP achieved its 
moratorium by distributing "Last Aid Kits"-packets of virtually every motion, pleading, or other 
document a lawyer might need to postpone an execution-to hundreds of capital defense attorneys 
nationwide. For a discussion of the Last Aid Kits and their contents, see CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN 
THE UNITED STATES 130-32 (Bryan Vila & Cynthia Morris, eds., Greenwood Press 1997). 
94. See EPSTEIN & KOBYLKA, supra note 25, at 48-53 (discussing evolution of NAACP's focus 
beyond southern racism in interracial rape cases); MELTSNER, supra note 22, at 106--07 (same). The 
NAACP collected data on rape cases that occurred between 1945 and 1965 in twelve Southern 
states. That data revealed that of 119 defendants sentenced to death during those years, II 0 were 
black. After examining twenty-nine variables, the NAACP study concluded that "[i]n less than one 
time in a thousand could these associations have occurred by the operation of chance factors alone." 
EPSTEIN & KOBYLKA, supra note 25, at 50-51. 
95. See EPSTEIN & KOBYLKA, supra note 25, at 54-58 (discussing ACLU contributions to 
NAACP litigation strategy). 
96. CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 93, at 125-27 (reproducing ACLU-
issued statement against the death penalty in 1965). 
97. See MELTSNER, supra note 22, at 55 (discussing ACLU's 1965 stand against the death 
penalty). 
98. See HUGO ADAM BEDAU, DEATH IS DIFFERENT 134-45 (Northeastern Univ. Press 1987) 
(considering and rejecting claim that decline in death penalty's use was imposed by "moral elites" 
like the NAACP and ACLU). 
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A number of factors likely contributed to the fall in executions prior 
to 1967. The 1960s criminal procedure revolution almost certainly 
played a part-if nothing else, its launch in 1961 gave death row inmates 
new opportunities to litigate just to stay alive.99 But not even the 1960s 
criminal procedure revolution can account for the dramatic decline in 
executions over the previous thirty years. Before (and during) the 1960s, 
executions fell at least in part because juries were less inclined to impose 
death sentences and other institutional actors were less inclined to carry 
them out. From 1935-1942, courts imposed an average of 142 death 
sentences per year; 100 by the 1960s, that number had dropped to 106101 
despite a significant rise in population and capital crimes committed 
during that interval. 102 In practice, juries in the 1960s were returning 
death sentences only around ten-to-twenty percent of the time they were 
asked to do so, 103 a remarkably low figure considering the fact that 
death-qualified "hanging juries" were not prohibited until 1968.104 
99. The term "criminal procedure revolution" refers to a series of rulings by the Warren Court in 
the 1960s that recognized new constitutional rights in the criminal procedure context. See Lain, 
supra note 13, at 1363-64. The Supreme Court's 1961 decision in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 
(1961), which applied the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule to the states, is widely credited 
with launching the revolution. See Lain, supra note 13, at 1373. The Supreme Court ultimately held 
that Mapp was not retroactive, Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 640 (1965), rendering it 
unavailable to defendants whose conviction was already final as of 1961-but even death row 
inmates who would ultimately fail in their exclusionary rule claim were still able to litigate it (and 
thus postpone their executions) in the meantime. 
100. BANNER, supra note 77, at 244. 
101. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 291-92 & n.41 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring) 
(listing number of death sentences imposed from 1961 to 1970 and averaging those figures). 
I 02. !d. at 291. From 1936--1937, the number of murders and non-negligent manslaughters was 
7894. See FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS FOR 
THE UNITED STATES, FIRST QUARTERLY BULLETIN, 1937, at 211 (1937). In 1960, by comparison, 
that number was 9136. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME 
REPORTS FOR THE UNITED STATES-1960, at 33 (1961 ). In the last half of the 1960s, the number of 
murders and non-negligent manslaughters skyrocketed. In 1966, that number was 10,920; in 1967, it 
was 12,090; in 1968, it was 13,650; in 1969, it was 14,590; and in 1970, it was 15,810. See FED. 
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS FOR THE UNITED 
STATES-1970, at 65 (1971). 
103. Exact figures are not available, and estimates vary. The NAACP estimated that only around 
one in every twelve-to-thirteen capital trials resulted in a death sentence. See MEL TSNER, supra note 
22, at 273. Furman's dissenting justices estimated that figure at closer to twenty percent, see, e.g., 
Furman, 408 U.S. at 435 n.I9 (Powell, J., dissenting), and the Court in Gregg estimated it at "less 
than twenty percent." Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 182 n.26 (1976). 
I 04. See Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 523 (1968) (holding that excluding veniremen for 
cause because they voice general objections to the death penalty creates a "hanging jury" and is 
constitutionally impermissible). The Supreme Court subsequently "softened" Witherspoon in 
Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 183-84 (1986) (upholding "death qualification" of jurors so 
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Commutations and other reprieves removed over half the individuals 
entering death row in the 1960s, and of those that remained, only around 
one in five was actually executed. 105 As the National Crime Commission 
recognized in its 1967 Report, those responsible for the administration of 
capital punishment were losing the will to carry it out. 106 
2. State Trends in Death Penalty Legislation 
State legislative trends likewise evidenced a shift away from the death 
penalty. In fact, those trends may well be another reason for the long-
term decline in the death penalty's use. 107 The most visible legislative 
movement was towards abolition. In 1957, the territories of Alaska and 
Hawaii abolished the death penalty. 108 Oregon followed suit in 1964,109 
kicking off a flurry of abolition activity in the states. In 1965, two 
states-West Virginia and Iowa-abolished the death penalty 
completely while another two-New York and Vermont-abolished it 
for all but extraordinary crimes such as murder by a life prisoner. 110 New 
Mexico similarly chose limited abolition in 1969 ,I 11 becoming the 
fourteenth state to formally or informally end capital punishment within 
long as it removes only those jurors whose opposition to the death penalty is so strong that it would 
substantially impair the performance of their deliberative duties). 
105. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 292 n.46 (Brennan, J., concurring); see also NAT'L CRIME COMM'N 
REPORT, supra note 91, at 143 ("Only 67 persons were sentenced to death by the courts in 1965, a 
decline of 31 from the previous year, and 62 prisoners were reprieved from their death sentences."); 
Signs of an End to "Death Row", U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., May 31, 1971, at 37-38 (noting 
increasing reluctance to use the death penalty in recent years and high number of commutations). 
106. NAT'L CRIME COMM'N REPORT, supra note 91, at 143 ("[AJII available data indicate that 
judges, juries, and governors are becoming increasingly reluctant to impose, or authorize the 
carrying out of a death sentence."); see also McCafferty, Attack on the Death Penalty, in CAPITAL 
PUNISHMENT, supra note 89, at 225, 226-27 (noting growing opposition to death penalty among 
governors, state attorneys general, correctional administrators, and wardens); Signs of an End to 
"Death Row", supra note I 05, at 38 (noting increasing reluctance to use the death penalty in recent 
years and high number of commutations). 
107. But the point is less obvious than it looks. States tended to abolish the death penalty only 
after it had already dwindled away in practice, so it is not entirely clear that legislative abolition 
would have had much effect on the death penalty's use. See BANNER, supra note 77, at 244-45 
(arguing that state legislative activity did not contribute to decline in death penalty's use). 
108. Reckless, supra note 89, at 50. 
109. BEDAU, supra note 43, at 4-5. 
110. BEDAU, supra note 43, at 4-5. 
Ill. FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE AMERICAN 
AGENDA 31 ( 1986). 
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its borders. 112 Before the late 1950s, no state had made that legislative 
move in forty years. 113 
Admittedly, the trend towards abolition was inconsistent. One state, 
Delaware, reinstated the death penalty in 1961 after abolishing it in 
1958. 114 And for every state that rejected the death penalty during this 
time, many more elected to keep it. In 1965, twenty states considered 
proposals to abolish capital punishment; the vast majority failed 
miserably .115 But the fact that half the death penalty states were at least 
thinking about abolition was itself significant. Before the 1960s, those 
proposals were not even on the table. 116 Moreover, it was hardly 
surprising to see state legislatures lag behind juries and other 
institutional actors in gradually rejecting capital punishment. As is often 
the case with penal prohibitions, support for officially discarding death 
penalty statutes tended not to materialize until well after those statutes 
already had been discarded in practice. 117 
Even die-hard death penalty states gradually underwent two 
legislative changes restricting its use. One was the move from 
mandatory to discretionary death penalty provisions. In colonial days, a 
lack of facilities and manpower for long-term incarceration required 
punishments that could be carried out swiftly-fines, mutilations, and 
for serious felonies, death. 118 Over time, juries maneuvered around the 
112. BANNER, supra note 77, at 244. 
113. WILLIAM J. BOWERS, LEGAL HOMICIDE: DEATH AS PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA, 1864-1982, 
at 9-10 (Northeastern Univ. Press 1984)(1974). 
114. BEDAU, supra note 43, at 59. 
115. See BEDAU, supra note 43, at 64 (estimating that three-fourths of all legislative attempts to 
repeal the death penalty have failed); HUGO ADAM BEDAU, THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 232 
(Anchor Books 1967) (I 964) (noting same and that "the vote in most instances wasn't even close"); 
see also BANNER, supra note 77, at 244 (noting that twenty state legislatures were considering bills 
to abolish capital punishment in 1965, and discussing some instances in which the bills came close 
to being passed). 
116. See BEDAU, supra note 43, at 64 ("In no other decade of American history have there been 
such referenda on this issue."). 
117. See Sol Rubin, The Supreme Court, Cruel and Unusual Punishment, and the Death Penalty, 
in CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, supra note 89, at 245, 258 ("The laws for the burning of witches were 
repealed only some time after the burning of witches had stopped."); supra note 107. In conference 
after Furman, Justice Powell implicitly recognized the point, noting that "juries have begun to move 
ahead of the legislatures" and that "our legislative guardians have abdicated their responsibilities, 
hoping that this Court would take the problem off of their backs." THE SUPREME COURT IN 
CONFERENCE (1940-1985),supra note 27, at 618-19. 
118. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 335 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring) ("'With county 
jails inadequate and insecure, the criminal population seemed best controlled by death, mutilation, 
and fines."' (quoting Filler, Movements to Abolish the Death Penalty in the United States, 284 
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law's harshness by refusing to convict those they wanted to spare, and 
the law responded by formally recognizing the discretion in capital 
sentencing that jurors were already exercising in practice. 119 By the turn 
of the twentieth century, twenty states had moved from mandatory to 
discretionary death penalty statutes. 120 By 1950, that number had nearly 
doubled. 121 By the 1960s, mandatory death penalty provisions were 
virtually nonexistent; a few were still on the books for rare, narrowly 
defined crimes but they sat largely in desuetude, forgotten relics of a 
bygone era. 122 Concomitant with this trend, state legislatures also 
gradually reduced the list of offenses punishable by death. Once 
available for burglary, sodomy, arson and other serious felonies, 123 
capital punishment in the twentieth century became increasingly 
narrowly prescribed. Between 1930 and 1967, when the moratorium 
began, ninety-nine percent of all executions were for just two offenses, 
murder and rape, with murder alone accounting for eighty-seven 
percent. 124 
Granted, the death penalty was still firmly entrenched at the state 
level when Furman was decided. In 1972, forty states had at least one 
death penalty statute on the books. 125 As a measure of support for capital 
punishment, however, that number was deceptive. Five of the forty 
states had death penalty statutes so limited that they were almost never 
applicable, and another six had death penalty statutes that were generally 
applicable but almost never put to use. 126 Of the remaining twenty-nine 
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. SCI. 124 (1952))). 
119. See McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 198-99 (1971) (discussing jury nullification of 
mandatory death penalty laws). 
120. See BOWERS, supra note 113, at I 0. 
121. See id. at 10-11. 
122. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 153, 292 n.25 (1976) (discussing the "handful of 
obscure statutes" imposing a mandatory death penalty before Furman, such as causing a trainwreck 
resulting in death and peljury resulting in the execution of an innocent person, while noting that 
none of these statutes appeared to be in active use). 
123. See BEDAU, supra note 47, at 6 (listing capital offenses in colonial times as including 
murder, treason, piracy, arson, rape, robbery, burglary, and sodomy). 
124. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238,297 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring). 
125. /d. at 417 (Powell, J., dissenting). That number had been forty-one until 1971, when the 
California Supreme Court held that the death penalty violated its state constitution's "cruel or 
unusual punishments" clause. For a discussion of that development, see infra text accompanying 
notes 228-33. 
126. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 298 n.53 (Brennan, J., concurring) (listing five states that had 
virtually abolished the death penalty legislatively and six others that had more general death penalty 
statutes but made virtually no use of them, averaging about one execution every ten years). 
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states, few were embracing capital punishment; death penalty laws were 
on the books, but with one regional exception-the South-they were 
rarely invoked in practice. 127 
Only in the South, where the death penalty was "as firmly entrenched 
as grits for breakfast," 128 did capital punishment continue to flourish in 
the 1960s. Then, as now, Southern states led the nation in death penalty 
statutes and a willingness to use them. 129 From 1935 to 1969, Southern 
states conducted more executions than all other regions of the United 
States combined; in the 1950s and 1960s, they accounted for nearly two-
thirds of all executions. 130 Explanations for the so-called Southern 
"death belt" are varied, but the most prominent is capital punishment's 
unique legacy there as a tool of racial control. 131 In the antebellum 
South, "black codes" explicitly allocated the death penalty along racial 
lines, typically providing that black defendants could be put to death for 
any crime that could result in three or more years of imprisonment if 
committed by a white. 132 Over time, these codes were replaced by the 
127. See infra text accompanying note 136. 
128. HUGO ADAM BEDAU, THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA: CURRENT CONTROVERSIES 21 
(Oxford Univ. Press 1997). 
129. See AUSTIN SARAT & CHRISTIAN BOULANGER, THE CULTURAL LIVES OF CAPITAL 
PUNISHMENT 98-99 (Stanford Univ. Press 2005) (comparing Southern death penalty statutes and 
reforms to those of rest of nation); ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note Ill, at 30-32 (discussing 
unique prevalence of the death penalty in the South in the 1950s and 1960s); id. at x (noting same 
post-Furman); see also BEDAU, supra note 128, at 21 ("As of May 1996, two-thirds of all 
executions since Furman have been carried out in just five southern states: Texas, Florida, Virginia, 
Louisiana, and Georgia."). 
130. See ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note Ill, at 30-32; (discussing and charting Southern 
dominance in executions); see also id. at 89 (concluding that the most powerful predictor of the 
death penalty is geography). Ironically, public support for the death penalty is lowest in the South. 
See infra note 304 (discussing phenomenon). 
131. See BEDAU, supra note 128, at 23 (describing "conventional explanation" for Southern 
"death belt" as relating to racist attitudes and use of death penalty as a form of social, political, and 
legal control over blacks); Carol S. Steiker, Capital Punishment and American Exceptionalism, 81 
OR. L. REv. 97, 122-26 (2002) (considering various explanations for Southern exceptionalism 
regarding the death penalty, including "the most obvious" explanation of race, noting, "[the] long-
standing and close association of capital punishment with the formal and informal social control of 
blacks in the South may contribute to Southern unwillingness to part with the death penalty"). 
132. See BEDAU, supra note 128, at 23 (describing conventional explanation that the death 
penalty in the South is "nothing but the survival in a socially acceptable form of the old Black 
Codes and the lynch law enforced by the Klu Klux Klan"); EPSTEIN & KOBYLKA, supra note 25, at 
333 n.31 (noting that antebellum Southern states had codes "'that explicitly discriminated against 
blacks by making some types of conduct punishable by death only if the defendant was black, or the 
victim was white, or both"' (quoting Samuel R. Gross & Robert Mauro, Patterns of Death, 37 
STAN. L. REV. 27 (1989))); SARAT & BOULANGER, supra note 129, at 98-99 (discussing various 
black codes). 
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informal (but just as effective) practice of mob lynching until private 
violence gradually gave way to capital trials. 133 Despite the progress, 
blacks continued to be the primary recipients of capital punishment in 
the South. In Southern rape cases, for example, they accounted for over 
ninety percent of all executions. 134 
Even in the South, however, support for the death penalty had begun 
to soften in the decades preceding Furman. Between 1940 and 1960, 
Southern executions fell by fifty percent, eclipsing the more gradual 
descent then underway in the rest of the nation. 135 In fact, the long-term 
decline in executions nationwide was largely attributable to a marked 
decline of executions in the South. 136 
In sum, state legislatures were slowly but surely moving away from 
the death penalty, restricting its use and in a few (but growing) number 
of instances, abandoning it altogether. Although forty states still had 
death penalty statutes in 1972, few states were routinely using them 
outside the South. Only in the South did the death penalty continue to 
thrive, although in the decades prior to Furman even this geographical 
region experienced a significant drop in the executioner's work. 
3. International Norms 
Just as the death penalty isolated the South from the rest of the nation, 
it also isolated the nation from the rest of the world. The 1960s saw a 
global movement towards the abolition of capital punishment; between 
1960 and 1970, the number of countries abolishing the death penalty 
more than doubled. 137 By 1968, more than seventy nations had formally 
rejected capital punishment, including almost all of Western Europe. 138 
133. For insightful discussions of the relationship between lynching and capital trials, see 
FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE CONTRADICTIONS OF AMERICAN CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 89-118 
(Oxford Univ. Press 2003) and Michael J. Klarman, The Racial Origins of Modern Criminal 
Procedure, 99 MICH. L. REv. 48 (2000). 
134. See supra note 94 (noting that of 119 defendants executed in the South for rape between 
!945 and 1965, 110 were black). 
135. See ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note Ill, at 32. 
136. See ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note Ill, at 32. 
137. Viktor Mayer-Schonberger, Crossing the River of No Return: International Restrictions on 
the Death Penalty and the Execution of Charles Coleman, 43 OKLA. L. REv. 677, 678 (1990). 
138. See Negating the Absolute, TiME, July 12, 1968, at 17 (noting that seventy-three foreign 
countries had already abolished the death penalty); see also Paul L. Montgomery, Campaign 
Against Capital Punishment Has Gained in West in the Last 200 Years, N.Y. TiMES, June 30, 1972, 
at 14 ("In Western Europe, only France and Spain retain the death penalty, and France is in the 
midst of a concerted campaign for abolition."). 
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Countries most like the United States had either abolished the death 
penalty by that time or at least begun the process. Great Britain 
temporarily suspended the death penalty in 1965, abandoning it 
permanently in 1969.139 Canada imposed a five-year moratorium in 
1967, the same year that Australia saw its last execution.140 New Zealand 
had abolished the death penalty back in 1961.141 By the late 1960s, the 
United States had become an outlier among Western democracies in 
retaining the death penalty. 142 Abolition was a world-wide phenomenon, 
and as time Magazine observed in 1968, America was lagging 
behind.143 
With the death penalty losing support abroad, executions in the 
United States became increasingly problematic as a matter of foreign 
relations. In 1958, for example, the case of Jimmy Wilson, a Southern 
black man sentenced to death for robbing a white woman of $1.95, 
provoked intense international criticism. 144 Headlines in Prague read 
"This Is America," while papers in Great Britain, Venezuela, 
Yugoslavia, and Ghana decried what Jamaican news referred to as a 
"macabre anachronism." 145 Alabama Governor James Folsom received 
some 3000 letters of protest on the case; he ultimately commuted 
Wilson's sentence after the Secretary of State complained about adverse 
foreign publicity .146 Even death penalty cases without racial undertones 
resulted in international scorn. 147 Of course, none of this was the press 
139. BANNER, supra note 77, at 242. 
140. See BANNER, supra note 77, at 242; The Death Penalty: A World Survey, U.S. NEWS & 
WORLD REP., May 31, 1971, at 38. 
141. EPSTEIN & KOBYLKA, supra note 25, at 39; The Death Penalty: A World Survey, supra note 
140, at 38. 
142. See BANNER, supra note 77, at 242 (discussing movement among various Western 
democracies to abolish the death penalty in the 1960s); Franklin E. Zimring & Gordon Hawkins, 
Capital Punishment and the Eighth Amendment: Furman and Gregg in Retrospect, 18 U.C. DAVIS 
L. REV. 927, 943 (1984-1985) (noting the "almost universal trend in Western democracies" toward 
abolition in the 1960s and 1970s). 
143. See Negating the Absolute, supra note 138, at 17 ("In failing to abolish the death penalty 
nationwide, the United States lags behind 73 foreign countries as well as 13 of its own states, which 
have abolished the death sentence."). 
144. See BANNER, supra note 77, at 243. 
145. See BANNER, supra note 77, at 243-44. 
146. See BANNER, supra note 77, at 243-44. 
147. One example is the 1960 execution of Caryl Chessman, who wrote several best-selling 
books during his eleven-year stay on death row. Bowing to international pressure, President 
Eisenhower actually had Chessman's execution postponed until after his trip to Latin America 
because he feared the protests that would result. See BANNER, supra note 77, at 243; (discussing 
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that the United States wanted in the cold war that followed World War 
II. Having just fought (and won) a world war against fascism, the last 
thing the country needed was to lose the moral high ground with its 
seemingly indiscriminate--or worse yet, racially discriminate-use of 
the death penalty. Cases like that of Jimmy Wilson were a blemish on 
the nation's self-aggrandized image of equality and justice at a time 
when its reputation internationally had never been more important. 148 
Even so, the nation's movement away from the death penalty in the late 
1950s and 1960s had as much to do with events at home as it did with 
those in the world at large. 
4. Domestic Norms 
If the late 1950s and 1960s in the United States had one overriding 
theme, it was egalitarianism. Equality, particularly before the law, was 
the very point of the civil rights movement and it pervaded the social, 
political, and legal reforms that marked the nation's war on poverty as 
well. 149 By the mid-1960s, de jure equality for racial minorities and the 
poor was well underway and had widespread support. 150 Anything less 
was considered grossly unfair. 151 Against this backdrop, it is little 
wonder that abolition sentiment in the late 1950s and 1960s gathered 
substantial momentum. Once the country's concern for equality changed 
the way it approached access to education and the voting booth, it was 
only natural to think about equality in other contexts as well-and none 
was more important than when the stakes were life or death. 152 To many, 
international outrage and State Department's request to postpone execution); MELTSNER, supra note 
22, at 20 (noting national and international controversy surrounding Caryl Chessman's execution); 
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 93, at 109 (crediting execution of best-
selling author Caryl Chessman for bringing the issue of capital punishment to center stage). 
148. See generally MARY L. DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE AND THE IMAGE OF 
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 3--6 (2000). 
149. See JAN GORECKI, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: CRIMINAL LAW AND SOCIAL EVOLUTION 90 
(1983) (describing "egalitarianism, and especially equality before the law" as the "pervasive social 
and legal concern" of the time and a major theme of the Warren Court's decisions); Lain, supra note 
13, at 1385-1420 (discussing civil rights movement and war on poverty, and the influence of those 
movements on the Warren Court's 1960s criminal procedure decisions). 
150. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964); Voting Rights 
Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110,79 Stat. 437 (1965). 
151. See Lain, supra at note 13, at 1395-98 (discussing egalitarian values of 1960s). 
152. See BANNER, supra note 77, at 247 (crediting the civil rights movement for heightening 
awareness of race discrimination in capital punishment); CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED 
STATES, supra note 93, at 109 (same); SAMUEL WALKER, POPULAR JUSTICE 250-51 (1980)(same); 
Lain, supra note 13, at 1388-89 ("Once loosed, the idea of equality is not easily cabined." (quoting 
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the death penalty represented the ultimate expression of race and class 
discrimination. 153 At a time when the nation was rejecting state-
sponsored discrimination, the abolition of capital punishment appeared 
to be a logical, if not necessary, step in harmonizing American practice 
with its reinvigorated egalitarian ideals. 154 
The link between 1960s egalitarianism and the abolition movement 
was most apparent in the public debate over capital punishment. 
Although the death penalty was controversial for a number of reasons, 155 
its disproportionate impact on underprivileged members of society, 
particularly racial minorities and the poor, was chief among them. 156 As 
one commentator explained: 
We have always picked quite arbitrarily a tiny handful of people 
among those convicted of murder to be executed, not those who 
have committed the most heinous, the most revolting, the most 
destructive murders, but always the poor, the black, the 
friendless, the life's losers, those without competent, private 
attorneys, the illiterate, those despised or ignored by the 
community for reasons having nothing to do with their 
crime .... The penalty of death is imposed almost entirely upon 
members of what the distinguished social psychologist Kenneth 
B. Clark has referred to as "the lower status elements of 
American society."157 
The sentiment was a common one. Contemporary newspaper and 
magazine articles talked about racial and economic discrimination in the 
Archibold Cox) (internal citation omitted)). 
153. BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN 205 (1979) (describing Justice 
Marshall's view that the death penalty was "the most conspicuous example of the unfairness in the 
criminal justice system" and "the ultimate form of racial discrimination"). 
154. See ZIMRJNG & HAWKINS, supra note Ill, at 165 ("In the end, by discarding capital 
punishment, American society will be catching up with itself."). 
155. See MELTSNER, supra note 22, at 57 (noting that one observer has counted sixty-five 
arguments for the death penalty, and eighty-seven arguments against it); Pros, Cons of an End to 
Death Penalty, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Jan. 31, 1972, at 56; James Q. Wilson, The Death 
Penalty: Is It Useful? Is It Just? Or Is It Only Cruel? N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 1973, at 27 (discussing 
major arguments for and against the death penalty). 
156. Montgomery, supra note 138, at 14 ("Debates on the death penalty generally center on two 
points: whether it prevents crime, and whether it falls with equal weight on the rich and the poor."). 
157. Henry Schwarzschild, In Opposition to Death Penalty Legislation, in THE DEATH PENALTY 
IN AMERICA, supra note 47, at 364, 366-67. Although this particular statement was made post-
Furman, see id. at 364, the sentiment expressed was common in the 1960s. See infra notes 158-60 
and accompanying text. 
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imposition of death, 158 as did law reviews and other elite publications. 159 
The National Crime Commission's 1967 report likewise focused on the 
issue, recommending that capital punishment be abandoned if it could 
not be administered in a nondiscriminatory fashion. 160 The argument was 
hardly new. In the 1920s, Clarence Darrow had advocated the abolition 
of capital punishment because it was imposed upon "the poor, the 
ignorant, the friendless." 161 What was new was the nation's inclination 
to listen. 
Of all the socio-political conditions favoring Furman's result, the 
country's renewed commitment to egalitarian ideals had the most direct 
impact. First, it was almost entirely responsible for the litigation that 
culminated in Furman. The NAACP and ACLU only challenged the 
death penalty because they thought it was being discriminatorily 
applied. 162 Second, it played a significant role in the amicus briefs 
158. See, e.g., Clark Calls for End of Death Penalty, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 1968, at I (quoting 
Attorney General Ramsey Clark as stating "it is the poor, the weak, the ignorant, the hated who are 
executed" in his request to Congress to abolish the death penalty); Death Row: A New Kind of 
Suspense, NEWSWEEK, Jan. II, 1971, at 23-24 (noting that "(t]o be sure, disproportionate numbers 
of blacks are arrested for capital crimes[;] [b Jut that does not sufficiently explain the inordinately 
high percentage of Negroes on death row"); Death Row Survives, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 1971, at 42 
("The death penalty is, in practice, inflicted only on the black, the brown and the poor."); Negating 
the Absolute, supra note 138, at 17 (noting that the "great majority of those awaiting execution are 
Negroes" and that "[f]ew well-to-do prisoners are ever executed"); The Ultimate Question, supra 
note 23, at 610 (noting that only "abject, unknown, friendless, poor, rejected specimens of the 
human race" are sentenced to death and that "the character of the condemned constitutes one of the 
best arguments for abolition"). 
159. See, e.g., Arthur J. Goldberg & Alan M. Dershowitz, Declaring the Death Penalty 
Unconstitutional, 83 HARV. L. REv. 1773, 1792 ( 1969-1970) (discussing discriminatory aspects of 
the death penalty and quoting other commentators recognizing same); Sarah R. Ehrmann, For 
Whom the Chair Waits, FED. PROBATION Q. 14 (Mar. 1962), reprinted in CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, 
supra note 89, at 205-06 ("It is difficult to find cases where persons of means or social position 
have been executed .... Likewise, most of the defendants sentenced to die and those executed are 
from minority racial groups, especially Negroes."). 
160. See NAT'L CRIME COMM'N REPORT, supra note 91, at 143 (noting that "(t]he death sentence 
is disproportionately imposed and carried out on the poor, the Negro, and the members of unpopular 
groups" and recommending that it be abandoned if states cannot administer it in "an evenhanded 
and nondiscriminatory manner"). 
161. See BEDAU, supra note 43, at 71 (quoting Clarence Darrow, co-founder of the American 
League to Abolish Capital Punishment). 
162. See BANNER, supra note 77, at 250-51 (noting that the NAACP "existed to help black 
people" and "was interested in capital punishment primarily because of the racial disparities in 
capital sentencing"); MELTSNER, supra note 22, at 15 (noting that the NAACP initially became 
involved in Southern rape cases because doing so provided an opportunity to advance its general 
interest in eliminating racial discrimination in the criminal law); id. at 55 (noting that the ACLU's 
involvement came in 1965 when the organization authorized its lawyers to enter death penalty cases 
provided there was evidence in those cases suggesting that the death penalty had been imposed on 
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supporting Furman. 163 Typical of those briefs was a statement by former 
prison officials, who rhetorically asked, "What is it that distinguishes 
those who have been condemned to die from those who are permitted to 
live?"164 The answer was blunt: "poverty, ignorance, and out of all 
statistical proportion, race." 165 Finally, egalitarian concerns propelled the 
Court's decision in the case. Three of the five Justices in Furman's 
majority-Justices Douglas, Marshall, and Stewart-explicitly 
acknowledged or based their ruling on the racially discriminatory 
manner in which the death penalty was being imposed, 166 while the 
remaining two members of Furman's majority-Justices Brennan and 
White-at least thought it was being inequitably applied. 167 Even 
Furman's companion cases, both of which involved Southern black 
defendants accused of raping white victims, were perfectly suited for 
making the point. 168 In short, it is no coincidence that Furman 
invalidated the death penalty for the same reasons it was being 
denounced in the public discourse. Egalitarian themes drove the 1960s 
criminal procedure revolution,169 so it only made sense that they would 
influence the way the Court saw the death penalty as well. 
the basis of race or class); see also supra notes 93-94 (discussing evolution of NAACP's focus 
beyond southern racism in interracial rape cases). 
163. See BURT HENSON & ROSS R. OLNEY, FURMAN V. GEORGIA: THE DEATH PENALTY AND THE 
CONSTITUTION 58-61 (1996); MELTSNER, supra note 22, at 255-57; LEONARD A. STEVENS, DEATH 
PENALTY: THE CASE OF LIFE VS. DEATH IN THE UNITED STATES 112-21 (1978). 
164. HENSON&OLNEY,supranote 163,at58. 
165. HENSON & OLNEY, supra note 163, at 58-59. 
166. See THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE 2001, supra note 27, at 616-19 (quoting passages 
from concurring opinions). 
167. In his concurring opinion, Justice Brennan wrote, "No one has yet suggested a rational basis 
that could differentiate ... the few who die from the many who go to prison." Furman v. Georgia, 
408 U.S. 238, 294 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice White made the same point in 
conference, stating, "The nut of the case is that only a small proportion are put to death, and I can't 
believe that they are picked out on the basis of killing those who should be killed. I can't believe 
that it is meted out fairly." THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE 2001, supra note 27, at 617. 
168. See supra note 67. 
169. See Lain, supra note 13, at 1368-1418. As others have recognized, Furman can easily be 
seen as just an extension of the criminal procedure revolution, which was likewise aimed at 
removing discretion-and the potential for discrimination that came with it-in law enforcement 
practices. See BANNER, supra note 77, at 265 (viewing Furman as the "high-water mark" of a 
general trend towards standardizing criminal procedure, comparing it to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 
U.S. 436 (1966)). 
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5. Public and Political Opposition to the Death Penalty 
As one might expect, capital punishment in the late 1950s and 1960s 
was a particularly salient issue. High school students across the nation 
discussed it, debated it, and wrote about it. 170 State governors received 
more letters about it than they could answer. 171 In an unprecedented 
fashion, individuals and organizations alike took a stand on the death 
penalty-and more often than not, that stand was against it. The nation's 
most prominent newspapers-the New York Times, Washington Post, 
Los Angeles Times, and Philadelphia Inquirer, among others-all 
voiced opposition to capital punishment during this time, 172 as did elite 
organizations like the American Judicature Society, the American 
Correctional Association, and the National Council on Crime and 
Delinquency. 173 By the close of the. 1960s, most major Protestant 
denominations officially opposed the death penalty as well, including the 
Methodist, Lutheran, Episcopal, and Presbyterian Churches. 174 Perhaps 
most indicative of the death penalty's decline in institutional backing 
was the dearth of amicus support it received in Furman. Of the dozen 
amici to file briefs in Furman, only one-the State of Indiana-
defended capital punishment; every other amicus urged the Supreme 
Court to abolish it. 175 
Public opinion poll data likewise evidenced a drop in death penalty 
support. In 1953, sixty-eight percent of the public supported capital 
170. See BANNER, supra note 77, at 241-42 (discussing prominence of capital punishment as a 
civic issue in the I 960s). 
171. See BANNER, supra note 77, at 241-42. 
I 72. See BEDAU, supra note 98, at I 44. 
173. See BEDAU, supra note 43, at 60 (noting that opposition to the death penalty "became the 
national policy of a number of secular nationwide organizations with professional or political 
stature"); Thou Shalt Not Kill, JUDICATURE 227, reprinted in CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, supra note 89, 
at 185; Victor H. Evjen, Let's Abolish Capital Punishment, in CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, supra note 89, 
at 218, 219; Abolition of Death Penalty is Urged by Urban League, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 1969, at 19. 
174. See BANNER, supra note 77, at 241; BEDAU, supra note 43, at 4. 
175. See supra note I 63 (discussing amicus support for abolition in Furman). Of course, the fact 
that the death penalty had virtually no amicus support in Furman could also be a reflection of the 
fact that organizations supporting the practice did not think it necessary to file a brief, but this is 
unlikely for two reasons. First, there were few organizations that still supported the death penalty in 
1972; as discussed in the text, both private and governmental organizations generally opposed the 
death penalty during this time. See supra text accompanying notes 172-74 and infra text 
accompanying notes 182-86. Second, with death penalty support at a low fifty percent, political and 
judicial resistance to the practice, and concern among death penalty supporters that the Court would 
strike down the death penalty, there was clearly an incentive to organize and defend capital 
punishment See infra text accompanying notes 205, 213-37. 
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punishment; by 1965, less than half of those surveyed did so. 176 That 
year, Gallup reported support for the death penalty at forty-five percent 
and opposition to it at forty-three percent. 177 Harris poll results for 1965 
were even more striking, reporting death penalty support at just thirty-
eight percent and opposition to it at forty-seven percent. 178 In 1966, 
Gallup similarly reported death penalty abolitionists outnumbering its 
supporters-that year only forty-two percent of those surveyed 
supported capital punishment, while forty-seven percent opposed it. 179 In 
short, support for the death penalty fell between twenty-five and thirty 
percentage points in a little over a decade-the steepest decline since 
polling on the issue began in the 1930s.180 Given these figures, the 
Supreme Court appeared to be exactly right when in 1968 it referred to 
death penalty supporters as "a distinct and dwindling minority."181 
Like bees to honey, the death penalty's falling popularity attracted 
political opposition to the practice as well. In 1965, the Department of 
Justice announced its opposition to the death penalty182 and in 1968, the 
Johnson Administration asked Congress to abolish it. 183 The request was 
a historic first. 184 In 1967, the National Crime Commission likewise took 
176. GEORGE H. GALLUP, 2 THE GALLUP POLL: PUBLIC OPINION 1935-1971, at 1187 (1972); 
GEORGE H. GALLUP, 3 THE GALLUP POLL: PUBLIC OPINION 1935-1971, at 1659 (1972). 
177. GALLUP, 3 THE GALLUP POLL: PUBLIC OPINION 1935-1971, supra note 176, at 1922. That 
year, twelve percent of those polled were undecided. /d. 
178. See Humphrey Taylor, Support for Death Penalty Down Sharply Since Last Year, But Still 
64% to 25% in Favor, THE HARRIS POLL #41, Aug. 2, 2000, available at 
http://www.harrisinteractive.com/harris_poll/index.asp?PID=IOI. Fifteen percent of those asked 
were undecided. /d. 
179. GALLUP, 3 THE GALLUP POLL: PUBLIC OPINION 1935-1971, supra note 176, at 2016. Eleven 
percent of those asked were undecided. !d. 
180. In 1937, support for the death penalty registered at sixty-five percent. GEORGE H. GALLUP, I 
THE GALLUP POLL: PUBLIC OPINION 1935-1971, at 85 (1972). 
181. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 520 (1968) (holding that excluding veniremen for 
cause because they voice general objections to the death penalty violates the Sixth Amendment right 
to an impartial jury drawn from a cross-section of the community); see also supra note I 04 and 
accompanying text (discussing Witherspoon decision). 
182. See EPSTEIN & KOBYLKA, supra note 25, at 334 n.39 (quoting Attorney General Ramsey 
Clark's 1965 letter to Congress stating "[w]e favor abolition of the death penalty," and noting the 
stance .was an abrupt change from his position when President John F. Kennedy was assassinated 
two years earlier). 
183. In a statement before the Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate 
Judiciary Committee, Attorney General Ramsey Clark stated, "Executions cheapen life. We must 
cherish life .... The death penalty should be abolished." Ramsey Clark, To Abolish the Death 
Penalty, reprinted in CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, supra note 89, at 176, 177, 180. 
184. EPSTEIN & KOBYLKA, supra note 25, at 58-59. 
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a stance sharply critical of the death penalty, describing its 
administration as "intolerable" and recommending abolition absent 
substantial reform. I85 At the state level as well, politicians became 
increasingly willing to speak out against the death penalty. In North 
Carolina, where one would expect to see strong political support for 
capital punishment, the governor made so many public comments 
against the death penalty that clemency petitions routinely referenced 
them.I 86 In Ohio, the governor even hired convicted murderers to prove 
that rehabilitation was possible.I 87 Whether following public opinion or 
leading it, politicians in the 1960s were beginning to reach the same 
conclusion Furman would in 1972. 
6. "Law and Order" Crosswinds 
Admittedly, the political context in which Furman was decided had 
cooled considerably since the mid-1960s, when abolitionist momentum 
peaked.I 88 Events in the last three years of the decade would tum the 
country sharply conservative and earn the "turbulent 1960s" its name. 
Urban riots, I89 campus unrest, I90 political violence, I9I and a spate of 
prominent assassinations and multiple murders I92 gripped the nation in 
185. See NAT'L CRIME COMM'N REPORT, supra note 91, at 143 ("Some members of the 
Commission favor the abolition of capital punishment, while other members favor its 
retention .... All members of the Commission agree that the present situation in the administration 
of the death penalty in many states is intolerable .... When a state finds that it cannot administer 
the penalty in such a [fair and expeditious] manner, or that the death penalty is being imposed but 
not carried into effect, the penalty should be abandoned."); see also BEDAU, supra note 98, at 144 
(describing National Crime Commission Report as taking a position "virtually in favor" of 
abolition). 
186. BANNER, supra note 77, at 240-41. Similarly, in Arkansas, the governor's outspoken 
criticism of the death penalty resulted in the state's execution chamber being converted into a 
hospital. See Richard Hammer, The Case That Could End Capital Punishment, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 
1969, at SM46. 
187. BANNER, supra note 77, at 240-41. 
188. See supra notes 108-16 and 176-80 and accompanying text (discussing state legislative 
trends and public opinion poll data, respectively). 
189. See Lain, supra note 13, at 1428-29, 1447-58 (discussing urban riots in mid- to late-1960s, 
in particular those of the "long, hot summer" of 1967). 
190. See MELTSNER, supra note 22, at 212 (discussing violence at Kent State University); Lain, 
supra note 13, at 1448 (discussing violence at Columbia University). 
191. MELTSNER, supra note 22, at 211 (referencing violence at the 1968 Democratic 
Convention). 
192. See CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 93, at 112 (discussing 
extensive publicity associated with trial and conviction of Albert DeSalvo-a.k.a. the "Boston 
Strangler"-in January 1967, and of Richard Speck in April 1967 for murdering eight student 
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the late 1960s, as did skyrocketing crime rates. 193 By 1968, crime 
dominated the public consciousness and political landscape. 194 That 
year, Richard Nixon won the presidency on a "law and order" 
campaign, 195 while Congress enacted the most extensive anti-crime 
legislation in history. 196 Not surprisingly, the Johnson Administration's 
bill to abolish the death penalty never made it out of committee. 197 Over 
the next three years, Congress would enact two new death penalty 
statutes instead. 198 Times were tough for those trying to save convicted 
capital murderers-any stance that could be considered "soft on crime" 
was a relatively unpopular stance in 1972. 199 
nurses in Chicago); Lain, supra note 13, at 1447--48 (discussing assassinations of Martin Luther 
King and Robert F. Kennedy in context of other violence in 1968); Death Sentences for Manson 
Clan. But-, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Apr. 12, 1971, at 26 (discussing Manson murders in 1969 
and death sentences for its perpetrators in 1971 ). 
193. See Lain, supra note 13, at 1427-28, 1447--48 (discussing crime rates in the late 1960s and 
their salience among American public). 
194. Events in 1971 would continue that trend, leading Vice President Spiro Agnew to lament 
"the whole damn zoo" of "deserters, malcontents, radicals, incendiaries, the civil and uncivil 
disobedients." See MELTSNER, supra note 22, at 212-13 (discussing string of bombings in spring 
1970, campus violence at Kent State and Jackson State, and Vice President Agnew). For an 
excellent discussion of crime and its effect on the American psyche in the late 1960s, see generally 
MICHAEL W. FLAMM, LAW & ORDER: STREET CRIME, CIVIL UNREST, AND THE CRJSIS OF 
LIBERALISM IN THE 1960s (2005). 
195. EPSTEIN & KOBYLKA, supra note 25, at 60; Lain, supra note 13, at 1424-25. 
196. David J. Bodenhamer, Reversing the Revolution: Rights of the Accused in a Conservative 
Age, in THE BILL OF RIGHTS IN MODERN AMERICA AFTER 200 YEARS, at 101, 112 (David J. 
Bodenhamer and James W. Ely, Jr. eds., 1993). 
197. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238,427 (1972) (Powell, J., dissenting). 
198. Four federal death-penalty statutes were enacted in the decade before Furman, punishing air 
piracy that resulted in death (1961 ), assassination of the president ( 1965), transporting illegal 
explosives that resulted in death (1970), and assassination of a member of Congress (1971 ). See id., 
408 U.S. at 385 (Burger, J., dissenting) (citing the four death penalty statutes enacted in decade 
prior to Furman); id. at 412-13 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (discussing in detail federal death penalty 
legislation enacted in the 1960s and 1970s, along with lopsided votes enacting them); see also infra 
note 221 (discussing largely symbolic significance of federal legislation). 
199. See BEDAU, supra note 43, at 69 (noting that pressure for "law and order" tends to make 
opposition to the death penalty an unpopular stance for politicians); BEDAU, supra note 98, at 166 
(describing the public mood as "hostile in the 1970s to any policies that appeared to be 'soft' on 
criminals"); STEVENS, supra note 163, at 108 (noting that "days were difficult for anyone trying to 
save the lives of some of the most brutal felons in the nation" and that the "drift of the times ... was 
clearly moving against those who felt that capital punishment was inappropriate for an America of 
the 1970s"); Daniel D. Polsby, The Death of Capital Punishment? Furman v. Georgia, 1972 SUP. 
CT. REv. I, 2-3 (1972) (noting that "the past few years have scarcely provided a tranquil 
environment for the nurture of new and more polished ideals of reverence for human life"). 
35 
Washington Law Review Vol. 82:1,2007 
Even so, the country's support for crime control measures in the late 
1960s and early 1970s had curiously little effect on support for capital 
punishment. Death penalty support jumped just once in the late 1960s 
and early 1970s before Furman was decided-and that was in 1967?00 
After its historic low in 1966/01 death penalty support surged twelve 
points the following year to fifty-four percent, most likely due to 
extensive publicity surrounding the convictions of Albert DeSalvo 
(a.k.a. "the Boston Strangler") and Richard Speck (murderer of eight 
student nurses in Chicago) just before polling began.202 From there, 
however, it once again began a slow but perceptible descent. Gallup 
reported death penalty support at fifty-one percent in 1969 and forty-
nine percent in 1971, while Furman was pending.203 The Harris Poll 
listed death penalty support as consistently just under fifty percent 
during this time?04 In March 1972, three months before Furman was 
decided, Gallup reported public support for the death penalty at an even 
fifty percent, with forty-one percent of the public opposed to the practice 
and nine percent undecided.205 Given the "law and order" tenor of the 
times, 206 these figures were truly remarkable. In 1968, the American 
public identified crime as the nation's top domestic problem, and an 
overwhelming eighty-one percent of those asked believed that law 
enforcement in the country had "broken down."207 Yet despite the 
200. See David W. Moore, Americans Firmly Support Death Penalty, GALLUP POLL MONTHLY, 
June 1995, at 25. 
20 I. See supra note I 79 and accompanying text. 
202. See CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 93, at 112 (discussing timing 
of DeSalvo and Speck convictions in relation to Gallup's 1967 polling on the death penalty); 
Moore, supra note 200, at 25 (reporting death penalty support in 1967). One might speculate that 
the riotous "long, hot summer" of 1967 also contributed to the spike, but the 1967 poll was given in 
June and the heaviest rioting that year did not occur until July. See Lain, supra note 13, at 1428-29. 
203. See Moore, supra note 200, at 25. In 1969, forty percent of those asked said they opposed 
the death penalty, and nine percent were undecided. !d. In 1971, forty percent again said they 
opposed the death penalty, with eleven percent answering that they were undecided. !d.; see also 
ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note III, at 39 (noting that opposition to capital punishment dropped 
in 1967, but that the trend was quickly reversed and opposition remained high until 1972, when 
Furman was decided). 
204. Harris reported death penalty support at forty-eight percent in 1969, and forty-seven percent 
in 1970. Taylor, supra note 178. 
205. GEORGE H. GALLUP, I THE GALLUP POLL: PUBLIC OPINION 1972-1977, at20 (1978). 
206. See Lain, supra note 13, at 1427-29 (discussing nation's turn to "law and order" in 1967); 
supra notes 189-99 and accompanying text (same). 
207. See GALLUP, 3 THE GALLUP POLL: PUBLIC OPINION 1935-1971, supra note 176, at 2107 
(reporting results of 1968 poll indicating that crime and lawlessness were mentioned almost twice as 
often as any other local problem); Poll Finds Crime Top Fear at Home, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 1968, 
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nation's punitive attitude, the public could barely muster fifty percent 
support for capital punishment in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The 
difference between death penalty supporters and opponents was only 
nine percentage points at the time Furman was decided and if the 
previous four years were any indication, support for the practice was 
unlikely to make a strong rebound. 
From a modem perspective, the public's weak support for the death 
penalty but strong support for "law and order" prior to Furman is 
perplexing. Today, support for the death penalty is considered a symbol 
of strong support for law enforcement in genera1.208 In the late 1960s and 
early 1970s, however, this did not appear to be the case. Even before the 
Supreme Court articulated the concept in Furman,209 Americans seemed 
to think death was different. As a result, it was possible to maintain "law 
and order" credentials and oppose the death penalty, too. Abolitionists 
clarified that opposition to the death penalty was not about protecting 
criminals-it was about putting them to death, an act they found morally 
bankrupt for a number of different reasons.210 In the minds of many, the 
at 29 (reporting that "[ c ]rime and lawlessness are viewed by the public as the top domestic problem 
facing the nation for the first time since the beginning of scientific polling in the mid-thirties, 
according to the latest Gallup Poll"); Public Opinion Online, Accession No. 0174 711, Question No. 
012 (Harris Survey, Aug. 24, 1968), available at https://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe (follow 
"Reference" hyperlink; follow "Polls and Survey" hyperlink; enter "crime" into "Keyword" box, 
enter "0174711" into "Roper Accession Number" box, and select "All Available Dates" from the 
"Date" drop down menu) (reporting that eighty-one percent of pollsters agreed with the statement 
that law and order had "broken down"). For a discussion of incidents contributing to this belief, see 
supra text accompanying notes 189-93. 
208. See Robert M. Bohm, American Death Penalty Attitudes: A Critical Examination of Recent 
Evidence, 14 CRIM. JUST. AND BEHAV. 380,393 (1987) (noting that politicians often promote the 
death penalty as a symbol of law enforcement in general, and that empirical evidence suggests that 
this strategy works); Steiker, supra note 131, at 113-14 (noting that the death penalty is a potent 
symbol in the politics of "law and order" and that support for capital punishment translates to voters 
as support for tough crime control generally). 
209. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 306 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring) ("The penalty of 
death differs from all other forms of criminal punishment, not in degree but in kind. It is unique in 
its total irrevocability. It is unique in its rejection of rehabilitation of the convict as a basic purpose 
of criminal justice. And it is unique, finally, in its absolute renunciation of all that is embodied in 
our concept of humanity."); id. at 286-87 (Brennan, J., concurring) ('There has been no national 
debate about punishment, in general or by imprisonment, comparable to the debate about the 
punishment of death .... Death is today an unusually severe punishment, unusual in its pain, in its 
finality, and in its enormity."). 
210. For example, the former Director of Corrections in California said, "I am not a stranger to 
violence or to violent men .... It is my conviction, from the vantage point of my experience, that 
vengeance and retribution carried to the point of taking human life in this deliberate fashion is 
beneath the dignity of a modem democratic government." Voting Their Fears, THE NATION, Dec. 4, 
1972, at 548. Similarly, the British Chancellor stated, "We did not abolish [capital] punishment 
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death penalty went beyond calls for "law and order." It was, in a word, 
different. 
Perhaps because death truly was seen as different, political support 
for capital punishment also remained low during this time. President 
Nixon supported the death penalty," but he did not campaign on the issue 
in 1968;211 the death penalty was much too controversial for that. Nor 
did the Nixon Administration file an amicus brief while Furman was 
pending, despite the obvious constitutional implications of the decision 
at the federal level. 212 Indeed, the 1972 Republican Party platform was 
conspicuously silent on the death penalty issue, while the Democratic 
Party platform that year favored abolishing it.213 
Similarly, "law and order" politics did not prevent political opposition 
to the death penalty from mounting into the early 1970s. In December 
1970, the lame-duck Governor of Arkansas made history when he 
commuted the death sentences of all fifteen people then on death row, 
encouraging other state governors to "hasten the elimination of 
barbarism as a tool of American justice."214 In January 1971, 
Pennsylvania's outgoing Attorney General ordered the state's electric 
chair to be dismantled, calling the death penalty a "disgusting 
indecency" and the electric chair a "cruel instrument of public 
vengeance."215 The state's new Governor pledged that there would be no 
executions while he was chief executive and had the execution room 
converted into a psychologist's office.216 The same month, the National 
because we sympathized with traitors, but because we took the view that it was a punishment no 
longer consistent with our self-respect." The Death Penalty: Cruel and Unusual?, TiME, Jan. 24, 
1972, at 55. 
211. Nixon refrained from commenting on the issue, although his new Attorney General had 
stated that Nixon was "not opposed to capital punishment." EPSTEIN & KOBYLKA, supra note 25, at 
61. 
212. EPSTEIN & KOBYLKA, supra note 25, at 97 (noting that the federal government had stayed 
out of Furman). The Nixon Administration did file an amicus brief in McGautha, see MELTSNER, 
supra note 22, at 23Q-31, so perhaps it simply thought one unnecessary. See supra text 
accompanying notes 76---77 (discussing expectation among the Justices that Furman would affirm 
death sentences). 
213. See DONALD BRUCE JOHNSON & KIRK H. PORTER, NATIONAL PARTY PLATFORMS 184Q-
1972, at 809 (1973); Cornell W. Clayton & J. Mitchell Pickerill, The Politics of Criminal Justice: 
How the New Right Regime Shaped the Rehnquist Court's Criminal Justice Jurisprudence, 94 GEO. 
L.J. 1385, 1402 (2006). 
214. MELTSNER, supra note 22, at 235-36; see also James A. McCafferty, Introduction to 
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, supra note 89, at I, I (discussing incident). 
215. MELTSNER, supra note 22, at 236---37. 
216. See MEL TSNER, supra note 22, at 23 7. 
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Commission on the Reform of Federal Criminal Laws issued a 
comprehensive report that recommended abolishing the death penalty at 
the federal level,217 making front-page headlines and receiving 
substantial editorial support.218 Finally, in May 1971, just before 
certiorari in Furman was granted, 219 Congress again began considering 
well-backed legislation to halt executions. In the wake of McGautha, the 
Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee had introduced a bill 
proposing a two-year moratorium on executions designed to give 
Congress and the states breathing room to decide whether to revise their 
death penalty statutes or abandon them altogether.220 The bill was still 
pending when Furman was decided but its outlook (at least in the 
House) was thought to be good.221 
By the early 1970s, even the judiciary had become more willing to 
rule against the death penalty. In December 1970, the Fourth Circuit 
became the first court in the country to hold that the death penalty itself 
could violate the Eighth Amendment's "cruel and unusual punishments" 
clause.222 By its own terms, the Fourth Circuit's ruling was extremely 
limited, applying only in rape cases where the victim was otherwise not 
seriously physically harmed.223 But it was a breakthrough nonetheless. 
217. See NAT'L COMM'N ON REFORM OF FED. CRIMINAL LAWS, FINAL REPORT TO THE 
PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS 312 (1971 ); see also MEL TSNER, supra note 22, at 236 (discussing 
Commission's 1971 Report). 
218. See BEDAU, supra note 43, at 63; EPSTEIN & KOBYLKA, supra note 25, at 68. 
219. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Furman on June 28, 1971. Furman v. Georgia, 408 
u.s. 952, 952 (1971 ). 
220. MELTSNER, supra note 22, at 245; Charles L. Black, Jr., The Crisis in Capital Punishment, 
31 MD. L. REV. 289,307 (1971). Sponsors of the bill gave two reasons to support the measure, 
citing evidence that the death penalty was being discriminatorily applied against minorities and the 
poor, and "a growing basis" to conclude that executions constituted "cruel and unusual 
punishment." Bill to Seek Stay of Executions, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 1971, at 14. 
221. See Bill to Seek Stay of Executions, supra note 220, at 14. One might question this prediction 
given the fact that Congress had just passed two death-penalty statutes the year before. See supra 
note 198. But it is difficult to know how much weight to give those statutes. Both were in response 
to highly salient political events-Bobby Kennedy's assassination in one case, a courthouse 
bombing where Black Panther H. Rap Brown was supposed to stand trial in the other-and had little 
more than symbolic significance. Despite a wide array of death penalty statutes at the federal level, 
only one federal prisoner was executed after the 1950s, and the number of federal inmates on death 
row during this time never exceeded two. See Zimring & Hawkins, supra note 142, at 940 (noting 
that "out of a federal prison population averaging 22,430 the number of prisoners on death row 
never rose above two" (internal citation omitted)); MELTSNER, supra note 22, at 212 (discussing 
courthouse bombing incident and legislative response). 
222. Ralph v. Warden, 438 F.2d 786, 793 (4th Cir. 1970); see also EPSTEIN & KOBYLKA, supra 
note 25, at 68; MELTSNER, supra note 22, at 231-33. 
223. See Ralph, 438 F.2d at 793 (expressly limiting holding to cases where the victim's life is not 
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The following year, the New Jersey Supreme Court invalidated the 
state's death penalty statute because it impermissibly encouraged guilty 
pleas to avoid death,224 and the Alabama Court of Appeals issued a 
short-lived ruling that amounted to a blanket commutation.225 Because 
Alabama's death penalty statute identified the location for executions as 
Kilby Prison and because Kilby Prison had been demolished, the Court 
of Appeals ruled that no pending death sentences could be carried out-
nor could they ever be, since any legislative attempt to cure the problem 
would constitute an ex post facto law. 226 The decision was quickly 
overturned by the Alabama Supreme Court,227 but two decades earlier 
that sort of resistance to the death penalty (especially in the South) 
would have been unfathomable in the first place. 
That said, the abolitionists' most significant legal victory before 
Furman was the California Supreme Court's decision in People v. 
Anderson,228 which invalidated the death penalty in California because it 
violated the state constitution's "cruel or unusual punishments" 
clause.229 Announced in February 1972, just one month after oral 
arguments in Furman, Anderson was a tremendous boost to the abolition 
movement. At the time, California had the largest death row population 
in the country/30 and the California Supreme Court was considered the 
most well-respected and innovative state judicial body.231 Anderson 
carried considerable weight in the legal community, helped in part by the 
endangered). The Fourth Circuit rested its holding on the proportionality principle long recognized 
in the Eighth Amendment. See id.; supra text accompanying note 37. 
224. See State v. Funicello, 286 A.2d 55, 58-59 (N.J. 1972); MELTSNER, supra note 22, at 279-
80. 
225. See Brown v. State, 264 So. 2d 529 (Ala. App.), rev'd, 264 So. 2d 549 (Ala. 1971); 
MELTSNER, supra note 22, at 237. 
226. See Brown, 264 So. 2d at 538; MELTSNER, supra note 22, at 237. 
227. See Brown, 264 So. 2d at 549. 
228. 493 P.2d 880 (Cal.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 958 (1972). 
229. !d. at 883 (emphasis added); see also CAL. CONST. art. I, § 6; MELTSNER, supra note 22, at 
281-85. Ironically, Anderson also reversed recent precedent; the Court had just rejected the same 
claim made by the same capital defendant in 1968. See In re Anderson, 447 P.2d 117, 128-30 (Cal. 
1968) (rejecting challenges to death penalty under federal and state constitutions); id. at 155 
(Tobriner, 1., dissenting) (concluding that death penalty is unconstitutional because it is "capricious, 
discriminatory, and guess-infected"). 
230. EPSTEIN & KOBYLKA, supra note 25, at 77. California's death row population was I 07 at the 
time, and included notorious murderers Charles Manson and Sirhan-Sirhan. !d. 
231. See EPSTEIN & KOBYLKA, supra note 25, at 77; MEL TSNER, supra note 22, at 284-85. As 
Anthony Amsterdam, who argued Furman for the NAACP, explained at the time, "The California 
Supreme Court is to the courts what UCLA is to basketball." !d. at 266. 
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fact that it was an "easy" six-to-one decision and written by Chief 
Justice Wright, a conservative Governor Reagan appointee.232 For the 
petitioners in Furman, it could not have been better timed. Anderson was 
the final piece of the puzzle that formed Furman's socio-political 
backdrop, capping the most powerful abolition movement the nation had 
ever seen. 
233 
Looking back, then, the nation's conservatism in the years before 
Furman may have slowed the abolition movement's momentum, but it 
did not halt or reverse it. Public support for the death penalty continued 
to hover at just fifty percent in the years immediately preceding Furman, 
while political and judicial support for abolition slowly mounted. In 
short, the nation may have been in a "law and order" moment, but it was 
still in the midst of an abolition movement. 
7. The Impact of Socio-Political Context in Furman 
Given the socio-political forces discussed at length above, it should 
come as no surprise that in the years before Furman, many 
contemporary observers believed the abolition of capital punishment was 
just a matter of time. 234 Time magazine twice wrote about "The Dying 
232. See MELTSNER, supra note 22, at 281-85 (discussing reasons for decision's influence); A 
Decision that May Reach Far Beyond California, N.Y. TiMES, Feb. 20, 1972, at E3 (discussing 
same and speculating that the U.S. Supreme Court may find its reasoning persuasive). Because of 
Anderson, the most brutal of the cases under consideration in Furman-People v. Aikens, 450 P.2d 
258 (Cal. 1969), cert. granted, 403 U.S. 952 (1971), cert. dismissed, 406 U.S. 813 (1972)--was 
removed from consideration, much to the delight of the NAACP and the dismay of Chief Justice 
Burger. See MELTSNER, supra note 22, at 246-48 (discussing facts of Aikens); EPSTEIN & 
KOBYLKA, supra note 25, at 340 n.89 (noting the NAACP's "collective sigh of relief' when Aikens 
was remanded); WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 153, at 212 (discussing Chief Justice 
Burger's reaction to Anderson). 
233. See Rubin, supra note 117, at 256 ("The death penalty is being subjected to the most 
powerful attack it has ever had in this country."). 
234. See BEDAU, supra note 43, at 98-99 (discussing book published shortly before Furman that 
depicted capital punishment as a "dying and indefensible penal institution"); GORECKI, supra note 
149, at 93 (noting belief at the time of Furman that total abolition was just around the corner); 
Evjen, supra note 173, at 218 (observing that "the death penalty seems to be on its way out"); 
Samuel R. Gross & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Second Thoughts: Americans' Views on the Death Penalty 
at the Turn of the Century 15, in BEYOND REPAIR?: AMERICA'S DEATH PENALTY 7, 7-57 (S.P. 
Garvey, ed., 2003) (noting that the death penalty in the early 1970s "was unusual, it was 
controversial, and many people believed that America had evolved to a stage where it would soon 
be abolished"); Joseph L. Hoffmann, Narrowing Habeas Corpus, in THE REHNQUIST LEGACY 156, 
161 (2006) ("Many observers believed that the end was near for the American death penalty."); 
What Shall We Do About Capital Punishment?, ESQUIRE, Oct. 1968, at 193 (quoting criminal trial 
lawyer as professing his firm belief that the death penalty would be abolished in the next ten years). 
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Death Penalty" in 1967,235 and U.S. News & World Report (among 
others) reported increasing abolitionist sentiment as late as 1971.236 
While Furman was pending, supporters of capital punishment lamented 
the "mounting zeal for abolition" and the likelihood of its success. 237 
Even the 1972 Supreme Court Review gave the decision little more than 
a figurative yawn, writing that in Furman, "the inevitable came to 
pass."23s 
To be clear, this is not to say that Furman's result was predetermined 
or even predictable; it was neither.239 Given the Court's decision in 
McGautha,240 one can certainly imagine the Justices going the other 
way. But they did not, and socio-political context provides one 
explanation why. For swing Justices Stewart and White, who frequently 
dissented in the Warren Court's criminal procedure decisions, 241 the 
235. See The Dying Death Penalty, TIME, Feb. 17, 1967, at 50; Killing the Death Penalty, TIME, 
July 7, 1967, at 47 ("By inches, the death penalty is dying in the U.S."). 
236. See Death Sentence for Manson Clan, But-, supra note 192, at 26 ("Sentiment to abolish 
the death penalty altogether appears to be growing throughout the United States."); Signs of an End 
to 'Death Row,· supra note 105, at 37 ("Now a nationwide drive to do away with the death penalty 
is gaining momentum."); see also BEDAU, supra note 47, at 236 ("The general public shows a 
steadily growing trend to doubt the death penalty and to favor abolishing it."); No Work for the 
Hangman, THE NATION, Jan. 27, 1969, at 101--02 (noting growing opposition to the death penalty 
despite public concern over crime). But see Death Row: A New Kind of Suspense, supra note 158, at 
24 (noting that "certainly the law-and-order surge of the last several years has weakened the 
abolitionist's cause"). 
237. Donald A. Zoll, A Wistful Goodbye to Capital Punishment, 23 NAT'L REv. 1351, 1354 (Dec. 
3, 1971). 
238. Philip Kurland, 1971 Term: The Year of the Stewart-White Court, 1972 SUP. CT. REV. 181, 
297 {1972). 
239. See Bad News for the 648 on Death Row, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 1971, at E8 (noting that 
defense lawyers have little optimism about the Supreme Court's position on whether death penalty 
is "cruel and unusual" based on its recent record); Closing Death Row, TIME, July 10, 1972, at 37 
(noting that the Supreme Court "was expected to uphold the death penalty" in Furman but instead 
produced a surprise); The Death Penalty: Cruel and Unusual?, supra note 210, at 55 (reporting that 
"educated guessers" predict that the Supreme Court will uphold the death penalty); Mixed Reviews, 
THE NEW REPUBLIC, July 15, 1972, at 7 (describing the Supreme Court's ruling in Furman as "one 
of the biggest surprises in its history" due to the votes of Justices Stewart and White). 
240. See supra notes 61-78 and accompanying text; Fatal Decision, TIME, May 17, 1971, at 64 
(noting lack of optimism among abolitionists in Furman given the Court's decision in McGautha 
the previous year). 
241. See BANNER, supra note 77, at 260--62 (noting that Justice White "had dissented at virtually 
every opportunity in the Warren Court's famous cases expanding the constitutional rights of 
criminal defendants"); EPSTEIN & KOBYLKA, supra note 25, at 71 (describing Justice White as 
"clearly a vote on which the conservative wing of the Court could count"); MELTSNER, supra note 
22, at 157 (describing Justice Stewart as "something of an enigma when it came to capital 
punishment," noting that he had dissented frequently in the Warren Court's criminal procedure 
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country's seemingly inexorable movement towards abolition played a 
pivotal role in the case. Justice Stewart, who found the death penalty 
issue excruciatingly difficult,242 voted to reverse in Furman partly 
because he thought a vote to affirm would just delay abolition.243 Justice 
White's comments after oral argument suggested he felt the same 
way,244 and his observation in Furman that the death penalty "has for all 
practical purposes run its course" figured prominently in the deterrence-
based rationale for his ruling.245 
In more subtle ways, too, the socio-political context in which Furman 
was decided had an effect on the outcome of the case. As previously 
discussed, the Justices in Furman's majority ruled the way they did 
because they thought abolishing the death penalty was the right thing to 
do at the time.246 1t is no accident that almost half the American public-
and particularly highly educated elites-felt the same way.247 By 1972, 
even the Court's conservatives thought the death penalty was wrong on 
the merits. Three of Furman's four dissenters-including Chief Justice 
Burger-made a point of stating their personal distaste for the death 
penaltl48 and Justice Blackmun, a conservative Nixon appointee, came 
decisions but had also written the majority opinion in Witherspoon v. 1/linois, 391 U.S. 510, 523 
( 1968)). Witherspoon is discussed supra note I 04. 
242. Justice Stewart changed his mind three times on the death penalty issue-and almost 
changed it again. See infra note 399 (discussing Justice Stewart's comments in a late 1976 case that 
he might well change his mind about the death penalty's constitutionality); see also BARRY NAKELL 
& KENNETH A. HARDY, THE ARBITRARINESS OF THE DEATH PENALTY 44 (Temple Univ. Press 
1987) ("Tracing these decisions obviously follows a course of personal agonizing over a major 
ethical issue and over the extent of judicial responsibility for deciding it. Justice Stewart struggled 
with inconsistencies in his search for a satisfying resolution of a conscientious conflict."). 
243. In conference, Justice Stewart reportedly stated, "If we hold it constitutional in 1972, it 
would only delay its abolition." See THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE ( 1940-1985), supra note 
27, at 617. 
244. In conference, Justice White reportedly stated, "We should not legalize the death penalty at 
this time in our history. I reverse in all of these cases." See THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE 
(1940-1985),supra note 27, at 618. 
245. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 313 (1972) (White, J., concurring). 
246. See supra Part I. B. 
247. See supra note 205 and accompanying text (noting abolition sentiment at forty-one percent 
in March 1972); supra note 173 and accompanying text (discussing opposition to capital 
punishment voiced by elite organizations in the 1960s). 
248. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 375 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) ("If we were possessed of legislative 
power, I would either join with Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice Marshall or, at the very least, 
restrict the use of capital punishment to a small category of the most heinous crimes."); id. at 405 
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("I yield to no one in the depth of my distaste, antipathy, and, indeed, 
abhorrence, for the death penalty .... "); id. at 465 (Powell, J., dissenting) ("Many may regret, as I 
do, the failure of some legislative bodies to address the capital punishment issue with greater 
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close to voting to reverse in the case. 249 Only Justice Rehnquist 
supported capital punishment as a matter of policy and law?50 In short, 
Furman was a decision subtly and not-so-subtly affected by the social 
and political currents of the era in which it was decided. About the only 
way to make sense of Furman is to view the decision as a product of its 
time. 
This is not to say that Furman was solely a product of its time, for 
context does not fully explain the Court's contrary decision in 
McGautha eleven months earlier. Aside from the California Supreme 
Court's decision in Anderson, which came after McGautha but before 
Furman, the socio-political context of the two decisions was about the 
same. Justice Blackmun believed Anderson influenced Furman's 
result/51 and he may well have been right-but if not, something besides 
context had to have caused the change. Whatever it was, it could not 
have been the Court's composition; two Justices retired between 
McGautha and Furman,252 but Furman's majority consisted of 
McGautha's three dissenters and Justices Stewart and White, who 
switched sides.253 As others have suggested, superior advocacy probably 
played a role in the switch.254 Anthony Amsterdam, who argued Furman 
for the NAACP, was legendary for his exceptional advocacy skills.255 In 
frankness or effectiveness."). 
249. In conference, Justice Blackmun reportedly stated, "I am inclined to affirm shakily. I am not 
at rest. I might join a reversal opinion, but not now." See THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE 
( 1940--1985), supra note 27, at 618. 
250. In conference, Justice Rehnquist reportedly stated, "As a legislator, I would keep it. I am not 
tom by the problem and affirm." See THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE (1940--1985), supra 
note 27, at 619. Then-Justice Rehnquist's stance was not surprising. See EPSTEIN & KOBYLKA, 
supra note 25, at 16 (discussing Rehnquist's ultra-conservative background). 
251. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 411 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("The Court, in my view, is 
somewhat propelled towards its result by the interim decision of the Caiifomia Supreme Court, with 
one justice dissenting, that the death penalty is violative of that State's constitution."). See supra 
notes 228-32 and accompanying text (discussing Anderson decision). 
252. See MELTSNER, supra note 22, at 257-65 (discussing the resignations of Justices Black and 
Harlan in September 1971, and their replacement by Justices Powell and Rehnquist). 
253. Compare McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 236 (Justices Brennan, Douglas, and 
Marshall, dissenting) with Furman, 408 U.S. at 240--375 (Justices Brennan, Douglas, Marshall, 
Stewart, and White, concurring). 
254. See EPSTEIN & KOBYLKA, supra note 25, at 79 (concluding that the NAACP's involvement, 
particularly that of Amsterdam, "appear[s] to have played a leading role in convincing White and 
Stewart, the 'pivotal' block, to vote to strike"). 
255. See EPSTEIN & KOBYLKA, supra note 25, at 49-50 (noting that stories about Amsterdam's 
keen legal skills are of "mythical proportions" and relating incidents to support that conclusion); 
EDWARD LAZARUS, CLOSED CHAMBERS 90 (1998) (describing Amsterdam as "the finest lawyer of 
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fact, Justice White would later claim that Amsterdam's argument in 
Furman was among the best he had ever heard?56 Even this explanation, 
however, is not fully persuasive. Amsterdam did not argue McGautha,257 
but he did argue several other death penalty cases before the Court 
during this time and was largely unsuccessful in those, despite the 
extremely favorable factual context in which the claims were 
presented. 258 
In the end, then, no single explanation can fully account for Furman's 
result. Perhaps the most that can be said is that the decision was a 
product of numerous social and political forces, although other 
influences were probably also in play. Of this much one can be certain: 
the Justices in Furman's majority did not have doctrine on their side, but 
they believed their decision was the right one and there was good reason 
to believe history would see it that way too. Virtually every socio-
political indicator pointed towards the Court's decision in Furman-that 
is, until those indicators changed. 
II. REVIVING DEATH 
When the Supreme Court decided Furman in June 1972, almost 
everyone-including the Justices themselves259 -believed that America 
had seen its last execution?60 The Court had not invalidated the death 
his generation" and relaying seemingly incredible "legal fish stories" supporting the conclusion). 
256. WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 153, at 209. 
257. See MELTSNER, supra note 22, at 229 (noting that the NAACP filed an amicus brief in 
McGautha, but was not directly involved in the case). 
258. The best example is Boykin v. Alabama, where Amsterdam argued that the death penalty for 
robbery (at least in the absence of aggravating circumstances) violated the Eighth Amendment. See 
Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 240-41(1969); MELTSNER, supra note 22, at 168-85 (discussing 
Boykin's ultimate resolution on guilty plea grounds and concluding that "the failure of the Court to 
reach the cruel and unusual punishment issue when a state sought to impose the death penalty on a 
robber-the most disproportionate use of capital punishment it was likely to face-was a sad 
omen"). 
259. See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 313 (1972) (White, J., concurring) (noting that 
the death penalty "has for all practical purposes run its course"); THE SUPREME COURT IN 
CONFERENCE (1940--1985), supra note 27, at 619 (recording Justice Stewart's personal belief that 
after Furman, the death penalty "was finished" in America); WoODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra 
note 153, at 219 (noting Chief Justice Burger's private prediction that "[t]here will never be another 
execution in this country"). Former Justices, too, thought Furman had abolished the death penalty 
for good. See Arthur J. Goldberg, The Death Penalty and the Supreme Court, 15 ARIZ. L. REV. 355, 
366-67 (1973)(discussing initial reaction to Furman). 
260. See EPSTEIN & KOBYLKA, supra note 25, at 80--81 (noting the widespread belief after 
Furman that there would never be another execution in America, quoting contemporary sources); 
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penalty per se, but that certainly appeared to be the effect of its ruling. 
McGautha had already rejected the notion that standards could reduce 
arbitrariness in the imposition of death and the only other option, 
mandatory death penalties, seemed truly barbaric.261 Even if the states 
enacted new death penalty statutes, it would take years for them to work 
their way through the legal system and it was highly unlikely that 
executions would resume after a decade-long hiatus?62 But the worm 
was about to tum. In the wake of Furman, death penalty supporters 
mobilized, resulting in one of the most dramatic backlashes the nation 
had ever seen. 263 In response, the Court backed down, provmg once 
again the limited nature of its inclination to protect. 
A. The Furman Backlash 
At first, the country's reaction to Furman was mixed. Abolitionists 
praised the ruling, as did some politicians and law enforcement 
officers.264 President Nixon had a measured response; like others, he did 
not seem to know what the Justices' ruling meant.265 Elsewhere, intense 
ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note Ill, at 26 (same); The Death Penalty Revived, TIME, July 12, 
1976, at 35 (noting that at the time, Furman "sounded to many like a constitutional ban on 
executions"); Death Rattles, TIME, Nov. 20, 1972, at 73 ("Most people assumed that the death 
penalty died last June when the U.S. Supreme Court, by a 5-4 vote in Furman v. Georgia, declared 
capital punishment unconstitutional."); An End to "Death Row"? What Supreme Court Ruled, U.S. 
NEWS & WORLD REP., July I 0, 1972, at 25, 27 (quoting prosecutor as saying Furman "resolves the 
issue once and for all"). 
261. See supra text accompanying notes 61-78 (discussing McGautha) and 118-122 (discussing 
the demise of mandatory death penalties); infra text accompanying notes 326-35 (discussing 
McGautha and mandatory death penalties). 
262. See Zimring & Hawkins, supra note 142, at 944 (quoting Anthony Amsterdam). 
263. See BANNER, supra note 77, at 267 (noting that Furman "touched off the biggest flurry of 
capital punishment legislation the nation had ever seen"); BEDAU, supra note 98, at 149 (observing 
that "the death penalty was defended on a national scale in an unprecedented fashion"); EPSTEIN & 
KOBYLKA, supra note 25, at 83-90 (discussing in detail the "tremendous backlash" that Furman 
inspired and noting that "virtually every political indicator pointed to massive disdain" for the 
decision); Jonathan Simon, Why Do You Think They Call It CAPITAL Punishment? Reading the 
Killing State, 36 LAW & Soc. REv. 783, 795 (2002) ("Few other decisions of the Supreme Court 
have ever received a more rapid legislative response."). 
264. See An End to "Death Row"? What Supreme Court Ruled, supra note 260, at 27 (reporting 
that "[a]cross the U.S., reaction to the ruling was mixed" and giving examples); Martin Arnold, 
Parole in Capital Offenses Less Likely, Officials Say, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 1972, at I (discussing 
divided reaction to Furman among law enforcement officials and politicians); The Court on the 
Death Penalty, NEWSWEEK, July I 0, 1972, at 20 (noting mixed reaction to Furman among 
politicians). 
265. See An End to "Death Row"? What Supreme Court Ruled, supra note 260, at 27 (noting 
uncertainty surrounding meaning of decision); Transcript of President Nixon's News Conference 
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pockets of resistance immediately surfaced. In Georgia, the Lieutenant 
Governor called Furman "[a] license for anarchy, rape, murder," while 
in Alabama, the Lieutenant Governor claimed that the Supreme Court 
"had lost contact with the real world."266 The New York Daily News 
called for passing "old time" mandatory death penalty laws to see "what 
the Supreme Court does about that."267 Within a day of the decision, 
legislators in five states had announced their intent to enact new death 
penalty legislation and seventeen congressmen had joined in sponsoring 
a constitutional amendment to reinstate the death penalty.268 Several 
months later, in November 1972, resistance to Furman gained 
momentum when California voters amended their state constitution to 
negate Anderson by a 2:1 margin.269 In December 1972, it gained 
momentum again when the National Association of Attorneys General 
voted 32:1 to adopt a resolution asking Congress and the states to enact 
new death penalty statutes that would pass constitutional muster. 270 
By January 1973, the tide had clearly turned against the Supreme 
Court's decision in Furman. One state-Florida-had already reenacted 
its death penalty statute,271 and others were certain to follow. In the 1973 
Emphasizing Foreign Affairs, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 1972, at 2 (answering questions on Furman). 
266. See MELTSNER, supra note 22, at 290-91; An End to "Death Row"? What Supreme Court 
Ruled, supra note 260, at 27. 
267. MELTSNER, supra note 22, at 291 (quoting paper). 
268. See Richard Phalon, Death Penalty Urged in 5 States; Some Legislators Are Uncertain, N.Y. 
TIMES, July I, 1972, at 10 (discussing intent to restore the death penalty among some state and 
national legislators). 
269. See Moves to Restore the Death Penalty, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec. 4, 1972, at 60 
(reporting vote as 5.38 million to 2.59 million); see also BEDAU, supra note 98, at 169 (describing 
California referendum as an important political event); EPSTEIN & KOBYLKA, supra note 25, at 85; 
Voting Their Fears, supra note 210, at 548 (same); Tom Wicker, Death Again in California, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 12, 1972, at E II (noting that California's action may set off a flurry of activity in other 
states to restore the death penalty). Governor Reagan had characterized Anderson as a "lethal blow" 
to the state's right to protect its citizens against violent crime and threatened to appeal the decision 
to the United States Supreme Court-dearly a political ploy since Anderson was a decision based 
solely on state law. See MELTSNER, supra note 22, at 284-85; see also supra notes 228-32 and 
accompanying text (discussing Anderson). 
270. See MELTSNER, supra note 22, at 308 (discussing development); Rebirth of Death?, 
NEWSWEEK, Dec. 18, 1972, at 23 (discussing development as part of"a quickening effort to bring 
the death penalty back to life"). 
271. Florida's governor called the state legislature into a special session to enact new death 
penalty legislation, which it did in just four days. See EPSTEIN & KOBYLKA, supra note 25, at 85-86 
(discussing Florida's restoration of the death penalty post-Furman); John H. Culver, State Politics 
and the Death Penalty: From Furman to McClesky, 12 J. CRIME & JUST. I, 9 (1989) (same); Simon, 
supra note 263, at 798 (same). 
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legislative session, bills to restore the death penalty were submitted in 
three-fourths of the former death-penalty states plus Michigan, which 
had not had capital punishment for 127 years.272 By March, President 
Nixon was blasting the "soft-headed judges" who had invalidated the 
death penalty, asking Congress to reenact federal death penalty 
legislation.273 Other politicians joined the charge, having discovered that 
the surest way to draw applause in a speech was to call for return of the 
death penalty.274 Reflecting the nation's sea-change in attitude, state 
legislatures passed new death penalty statutes with unprecedented speed 
and determination.275 By May 1973, thirteen states had new death 
penalty statutes, including New Mexico, which had abolished the death 
penalty on its own in 1969.276 By Furman's one-year anniversary, 
twenty states had restored the death penalty277-and by 1976, that 
number had grown to thirty-five?78 
Concomitant with this trend was a tremendous surge in death 
sentences. After a slow start in 1973, death sentences hit a three-decade 
high of 149 in 1974.279 In 1975, a whopping 298 death sentences were 
imposed-at the time, the highest year-end figure ever recorded.280 Of 
course, none of these sentences could be carried out until the Supreme 
Court once again ruled on the death penalty's constitutionality, but that 
272. See MELTSNER, supra note 22, at 308. Michigan's attempt at restoring capital punishment 
failed. See Death Penalty Has Been Restored by 13 States, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 1973, at 18 (listing 
states that restored death penalty in 1973 legislative session). 
273. See Strong Medicine Indeed, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 1973, at 205 (describing the particulars 
of the Nixon Administration's proposed legislation); Warren Weaver, Jr., Gives Drug Plan, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. II, 1973, at I (quoting President Nixon and discussing his efforts to restore the federal 
death penalty). 
274. See Jerry M. Flint, States on Move, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. II, 1973, at I (discussing "thunderous 
applause" in political speeches upon mention of restoration of the death penalty). 
275. See The Death Penalty Gets a Big Push, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Mar. 26, 1973, at 70; 
supra notes 268-72 and accompanying text. 
276. See Death Penalty Has Been Restored by 13 States, supra note 272, at 18; supra text 
accompanying note Ill. 
277. See BEDAU, supra note 47, at 93. By Furman's second anniversary, twenty-eight states had 
reenacted death penalty statutes. See id. 
278. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 179-80 (1976) (discussing and listing new death 
penalty statutes). 
279. See BANNER, supra note 77, at 270 (discussing death sentences in 1973, 1974, and 1975). 
280. See BANNER, supra note 77, at 270. Of course, this figure included sentences imposed under 
mandatory death penalty statutes, which significantly skewed death-sentencing patterns. See THE 
SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE (1940-1985), supra note 27, at 620 n.384 (noting that death 




is not the point.281 The point is that for the first time in years, imposing 
death was something juries were suddenly ready and willing to do. 
The nation's renewed support for the death penalty was apparent in 
the public opinion poll data collected during this time as well. As 
previously noted, public support for the death penalty was an even fifty 
percent when Furman was decided, with forty-one percent of those 
asked supporting abolition and nine percent undecided.282 In November 
1972, just months after Furman, death penalty support was at fifty-seven 
percent, with thirty-two percent of the public opposed to the practice and 
eleven percent undecided. 283 In short, the difference between death 
penalty supporters and opponents went from nine percentage points 
before Furman to twenty-five points after it-and that margin would 
only increase over the next several years.284 By 1976, sixty-six percent 
of those asked favored the death penalty, marking the highest level of 
death penalty support in nearly twenty-five years.285 Not surprisingly, 
both Republican presidential candidate Gerald Ford and his Democratic 
rival, Jimmy Carter, supported the death penalty in the 1976 election.286 
As Gallup reported that year, "large majorities in every socio-economic 
group--with the single exception[] of non-whites-favor death for 
convicted murderers. "287 
In fairness, the nation's renewed support for capital punishment also 
may have reflected rising violent crime rates between 1972 and 1976, as 
others have alleged.288 But several considerations cast doubt on this 
281. This is not to say that uncertainty as to whether the sentences would be carried out was 
irrelevant. See Tom Goldstein, Capital Punishment: Confusion Reigns as Law Is in Limbo, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. I 0, 1976, at 35 (arguing that jurors know their verdict is not final); Joseph Onek, Letter 
to the Editor, Capital Punishment, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. I, 1976, at 132 (arguing that jurors who 
imposed capital punishment probably did not believe death sentence would ever be carried out). 
282. See supra text accompanying note 205. 
283. See Moore, supra note 200, at 24. 
284. See infra note 285. 
285. Moore, supra note 200, at 24. That year, only twenty-six percent of those asked said that 
they opposed the death penalty, while eight percent were undecided. !d. Harris Poll results in 1976 
were virtually identical, recording sixty-seven percent support for the death penalty, twenty-five 
percent opposition to it, and eight percent undecided on the issue. See Taylor, supra note 178. 
286. EPSTEIN & KOBYLKA, supra note 25, at 112 (discussing positions of presidential candidates 
Carter and Ford). 
287. See CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 93, at 160 (reproducing 1967 
Gallup report). 
288. See, e.g., Joseph H. Rankin, Changing Attitudes Toward Capital Punishment, 58 SOC. 
FORCES 194, 204 (1979) (explaining increased support for capital punishment from 1972-1976 as a 
function of higher violent crime rates). I credit Ron Wright for impressing upon me the possible 
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hypothesis. First, crime rates had risen before Furman as well, with little 
to no effect on death penalty support.289 Second, the crime rate actually 
dropped in 1976, while support for the death penalty skyrocketed.290 
Finally, crime had begun to occupy the public consciousness as early as 
1966, when pollsters named it the nation's second most important 
domestic problem and President Johnson issued a special message to 
Congress on the topic.291 That same year, however, marked the lowest 
level of death penalty support in recorded history, with death penalty 
opponents outnumbering its supporters.292 For these reasons, it is 
unlikely that crime rates were driving the rebound in death penalty 
support in the wake of Furman. Given Furman's high profile among 
politicians and the popular press, the main reason for the surge in death 
penalty support-particularly between March and November 1972-was 
almost certainly negative public reaction to the decision itself.293 
A number of factors likely contributed to the backlash that Furman 
inspired, and the fractured nature of the Court's decision was surely one 
of them. Part of the problem was that no one knew just what the Justices 
had held, allowing states already so inclined to test the Court's 
resolve.294 Also problematic was the fact that the decision was too 
validity of this argument. 
289. See supra Part I.C.6 (discussing crime in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the "law and order" 
mood of the nation, and death penalty support during that time). 
290. See Rankin, supra note 288, at 208 n.4 (conceding point, but arguing that public opinion lags 
behind crime rates). 
291. See Lain, supra note 13, at 1417 (discussing crime rate in 1966 as compared to earlier years 
in the 1960s and the rising salience of crime that year as a political issue). 
292. See supra note 179 and accompanying text. 
293. See BANNER, supra note 77, at 268 (noting that even if crime rates would have caused 
support for the death penalty to rise anyway, Furman influenced the speed-if not direction-of 
change); Robert M. Bohm, American Death Penalty Opinion: Past. Present, and Future in 
AMERICA'S EXPERIMENT WITH CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, supra note 22, at 29 (discussing 1972 public 
opinion polls and concluding that "[a]lthough other factors may have had an effect, it appears that 
significant public discontent with the Furman decision was decisive"); Steiker, supra note 131, at 
108 ("[I]t seems likely that the Supreme Court's decision in Furman itself played a bigger role in 
bolstering public support for capital punishment, at least as reflected in polling data, than did rising 
homicide rates."). 
294. This point was recognized by the popular press. See, e.g., Capital Punishment: It's Being 
Revived in Many States, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Mar. 4, 1974, at 46 (attributing resurgence of 
dispute over death penalty's legality to dispute about the meaning of the Supreme Court's ruling in 
Furman); Death Rattles, supra note 260, at 72 (attributing California's efforts to restore the death 
penalty to ambiguity in Furman); Moves to Restore the Death Penalty, supra note 269, at 60 
("Behind all this [legislative] activity is an area of legal confusion created by [Furman]."). As 
Learned Hand once explained, "Disunity cancels the impact of monolithic solidarity on which the 
authority of a bench of judges so largely depends. People become aware that the answer to the 
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splintered to carry much moral force or legitimacy.295 Furman looked 
nakedly political, pitting five Warren Court holdovers against four 
Nixon appointees, and it had no jointly expressed rationale for the 
ruling. Absent even a plurality consensus, the Justices in Furman 
appeared to be speaking more as individuals (because they were) than as 
The Supreme Court, raising the question of why individuals-
particularly non-elected ones-should be telling the states what to do 
about a matter that traditionally had been their sole prerogative?96 
Perhaps not even unanimity would have prevented resistance to Furman; 
it did not seem to make a difference in Brown.297 But having the Court's 
full authority and prestige behind a decision of that magnitude could not 
have hurt. Furman's lack of leadership and clear moral guidance 
rendered it vulnerable to attack from the start.298 
controversy is uncertain, even to those best qualified, and they feel free, unless especially docile, to 
ignore it. ... " The Divided Court, N.Y. TIMES, July I, 1972, at 21. 
295. See LAZARUS, supra note 255, at 109-10 (arguing that "[f]or five Justices to issue one of the 
most far-reaching constitutional rulings in the Court's history without even agreeing among 
themselves on a legal rationale betrayed the very rule of law they claimed to be upholding" and 
contrasting Furman with Brown); MELTSNER, supra note 22, at 303 (recognizing that Furman's 
moral force was diluted by five separate opinions); Steiker, supra note 131, at 129 (speculating that 
"[i]f the Supreme Court had managed to speak more clearly, emphatically, and unanimously" in 
Furman, abolition may have been permanent); Steiker & Steiker, supra note 16, at 407 (noting that 
"the Furman Court was badly splintered, in terms of both votes and rationales; it did not speak with 
the same clear tone of moral authority sounded in the unanimous Brown opinion"); Welsh S. White, 
Patterns in Capital Punishment, 75 CAL. L. REV. 2165, 2174-75 (1987) (reviewing GORDON 
HAWKINS & FRANKLIN ZIMRING, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE AMERICAN AGENDA (1877)) 
(discussing Furman's inherent weaknesses and concluding that it "seemed to invite a backlash-the 
Court was fragmented, the moral basis for its decision was unclear, and the states were not 
precluded from enacting new death penalty statutes"). 
296. See ZIMRING, supra note 133, at 69 ("There were no special federal restrictions on capital 
punishment in the United States for the first 150 years of constitutional government. Each state 
decided whether to have a death penalty, the crimes for which a death penalty might be imposed, 
and the range of special procedures (if any) that would be provided when a defendant faced the 
death penalty."); Simon, supra note 263, at 794-95 ("Murder, like most other serious crimes, is 
primarily a state matter. ... Likewise, the death penalty, as a response to murder, provided a 
traditional form of state authority with little real competition at the federal level."). 
297. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). For an excellent discussion of the massive 
resistance to Brown, see MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS 385-442 (2004). 
298. Contemporary observers recognized Furman's vulnerability. See Lesley Oelsner, Banned-
But For How Long? N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 1972, at El (quoting Professor Yale Kamisar as observing, 
"[w]henever you've got five opinions, you've got a very vulnerable precedent"); Polsby, supra note 
199, at 40 (noting that Furman's five separate opinions "seemed almost deliberately calculated to 
make this judgment of dubious value as a precedent"); see also supra note 295 (comparing 
solidarity lacking in Furman to that present in Brown). 
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Another factor contributing to the backlash that Furman engendered 
was Chief Justice Burger's dissenting opinion, which stressed just how 
weak the ruling truly was. As Chief Justice Burger pointed out, only two 
of Furman's concurring Justices-Justices Brennan and Marshall-held 
that capital punishment was unconstitutional per se; the others were 
unwilling to go that far. 299 In Chief Justice Burger's mind, this gave 
states "the opportunity, and indeed unavoidable responsibility" to 
reconsider their death penalty statutes and, if desired, to redraft those 
statutes to conform with Furman's ruling. 300 He then proceeded to tell 
them how. 301 Although couched in terms of compliance, Chief Justice 
Burger's highly publicized dissent was as much an instigation of 
defiance-which is exactly how the legislative response to Furman was 
depicted in the popular press. 302 At the very least, the dissent was an 
invitation for death penalty supporters to reassert their position, virtually 
assuring that attempts to reinstate capital punishment would follow. 
That said, the most intriguing question is whether Furman's backlash 
shows that the decision was countermajoritarian on the merits, as others 
have claimed. 303 This account best explains the intense backlash against 
Furman in the South, which had a strong preference for capital 
punishment and led the drive to enact the new death penalty statutes. 304 
299. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 375 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
300. !d. at 403-04 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
301. See id. at 400-04 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (noting that "if state legislatures and the 
Congress wish to maintain the availability of capital punishment, significant statutory changes will 
have to be made" and discussing how states might pass death penalty laws in compliance with the 
Court's ruling). 
302. See The Death Penalty Gets a Big Push, supra note 275, at 70 (detailing legislation 
"designed to overturn the Supreme Court's ruling" in Furman); Strong Medicine Indeed, supra note 
273, at 205 (reporting that "[t]he Nixon legislation will attempt to circumvent Supreme Court 
opposition to the death penalty"); Tom Wicker, The Question of Death, N.Y. TiMES, Mar. 14, 1975, 
at 39 (reporting that thirty-one states have moved "to circumvent the Furman decision and retain 
capital punishment"); see also Phalon, supra note 268, at I 0 (discussing legislative attempts to 
restore the death penalty and crediting Chief Justice Burger's dissent for encouraging them); States 
on Move, supra note 274 (same). 
303. See EPSTEIN & KOBYLKA, supra note 25, at 129-32 (noting that public opinion, state 
legislation, and the national administration were against the decision in Furman and resulted in a 
backlash); Steiker & Steiker, supra note 16, at 407-10 (discussing Furman backlash as a result of 
the Court misreading popular sentiment); see also supra note 199 and accompanying text (noting 
relative unpopularity of any stance that could be considered "soft on crime" in 1972). 
304. See Steiker & Steiker, supra note 16, at 406 (noting that the most vocal and indignant 
opposition to Furman came from Southern politicians and that Southern states led efforts to reenact 
death penalty statutes); supra notes 128-36 and accompanying text (discussing prominence of the 
death penalty in the South).· Ironically, public support for the death penalty typically has been lowest 
in the South, most likely a reflection of the region's large minority population and the reticence of 
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Outside the South, however, the countermajoritarian theory is less 
persuasive. Admittedly, the nation did not like Furman's ruling, but the 
problem could not have been that the Justices took a policy position 
significantly at odds with prevailing sentiment-Part I of this Article 
makes that much painstakingly clear.305 Abolition sentiment was still 
mounting as late as 1971,306 so why the hostile reaction to Furman? 
The most plausible explanation is not that the Justices in Furman 
misread the tide of public opinion, but rather that they unwittingly 
turned it, just as contemporary observers thought.307 Furman inspired a 
sense of righteous indignation among death penalty supporters, 
hardening their resolve while providing an occasion for them to join 
together and speak out. In short, instead of settling the death penalty 
debate, Furman reinvigorated those who were losing it, stimulating 
political countermobilization and a resurgence of death penalty 
support.308 Much of this was helped by the fact that capital punishment 
was a matter traditionally considered to be a state prerogative.309 For 
that population to support capital punishment. See Robert M. Bohm, American Death Penalty 
Opinion. 1936-/986: A Critical Examination of Gallup Polls, in THE DEATH PENALTY IN 
AMERICA: CURRENT RESEARCH 113, 119-21, 127-29 (Robert M. Bohm ed., 1991) (discussing 
support for the death penalty by race and region). 
305. See supra Part I. C. 
306. See supra text accompanying notes 235-37. 
307. The New York Times made the point best, reporting: 
(l)n a curious way, [Furman] has had the opposite effect of what many who favor abolishing 
the death penalty had hoped .... For decades, the death penalty was slowly withering away as 
judges and juries exercised ever more discretion in reaching their verdicts in capital cases. This 
withering away pleased abolitionists, though of course they wished it would proceed even 
faster. And as executions became less common, they seemed to become more arbitrary. The 
result, it was supposed, would be a Court-imposed end to all executions under any 
circumstances. Instead, we have a rush of new laws that may well rescue, by making more 
predictable, the use of capital punishment. 
Wilson, supra note 155, at 27. Others also recognized the point. See Death Row Returns, THE 
NATION, Oct. 15, 1973, at 356 (noting that "[t]or two decades up to June 29, 1972, the movement to 
abolish capital punishment seemed to be making slow but steady progress" and that the effect of 
Furman was "retrogression" of death penalty support); Dusting Off 'Old Sparky·, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 
29, 1976, at 35 (noting that "[j]ust a decade ago, capital punishment in the U.S. seemed on the way 
to extinction" and that Furman was "the high-water mark" of the abolition movement, with 
momentum now going the opposite way). 
308. See DAVID R. DOW, EXECUTED ON A TECHNICALITY xvii (2005) ("The Court (in Furman] 
did not complete a process; it instigated one."); ZIMRING, supra note 133, at 82 (noting swift 
reenactment of death penalty statutes without protracted debate as evidence that states were reacting 
to Furman rather than public opinion per se). For excellent discussions of the backlash phenomenon 
in general, see Michael McCann, How the Supreme Court Matters in American Politics: New 
Institutionalist Perspectives, in THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN POLITICS 63, 71-77 (Howard 
Gillman & Cornell Clayton eds., 1999); Friedman, supra note 34, at 1291-93. 
309. See supra note 296 and accompanying text. 
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death penalty supporters, there were two reasons to complain about 
Furman: the merits of the ruling and the propriety of federal intervention 
itself. Interestingly, the brunt of Furman's criticism focused on the 
latter. As others have recognized, hostility towards the decision was 
couched mainly in terms of undue federal interference and usurped state 
authority.310 Upon reflection, this makes perfect sense. States' rights 
provided an easy rallying cry for those who disagreed with the Court's 
ruling, especially when compared to defending the death penalty on the 
merits (at least at ftrst). 311 Moreover, the Supreme Court had just spent 
the last decade forcing its will upon the states in areas traditionally 
considered to be state affairs, 312 and Furman decided one of the most 
important and controversial state issues of the previous decade. Given 
the choice, it is little wonder that death penalty supporters attacked 
Furman primarily on federalism grounds. 
In sum, it is difficult to see the country's resurgence of death penalty 
support in the wake of Furman as anything other than a reaction to-and 
rejection of-the Court's ruling itself. Given Furman's fractured, fragile 
ruling, Chief Justice Burger's goading dissent, and the intensely 
personal, divisive nature of the issue involved, it is no surprise that the 
decision fared as poorly as it did. Yet just as important as making sense 
310. See WENDY KAMINER, IT'S ALL THE RAGE: CRIME AND CULTURE 137 (1995) (noting that 
Furman was "met with considerable outrage about judicial activism and federal court 
interference"); ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note III, at 41-45, 68 (describing hostility to Furman 
as "a state response to a federal slight" rather than a statement about the public attitudes on the 
death penalty itself); Kirchmeier, supra note 6, at 18; (attributing backlash to the fact that Furman 
"fueled popular resentment of the federal government imposing its will on the states"); Simon, 
supra note 263, at 796 (noting that "[t]he backlash against the Supreme Court after Furman became, 
by its own logic, a rally for state power in a very specific sense."). 
311. As previously mentioned, even the Court's conservatives in Furman disliked the death 
penalty on the merits. See supra notes 248-49 and accompanying text. Even Southern politicians, 
who clearly favored the death penalty on the merits, couched their criticism of Furman in terms of 
states' rights. See, e.g., The Court on the Death Penalty, supra note 264, at 20 (quoting Mississippi 
Senator James Eastland as accusing the Supreme Court of "again legislating and destroying our 
system of government"). See generally Erwin Chemerinsky, Foreword: The Vanishing Constitution, 
103 HARV. L. REv. 43,62 (1989-90) ("Moreover, it is often easier to criticize a decision as usurping 
democracy than it is to debate the substantive desirability of the ruling. If nothing else, it permits 
appeal to a commonly shared ideal of democratic rule, whereas arguments on substantive grounds 
highlight disagreements over values."). 
312. See Steiker, supra note 131, at 129 (noting that the Supreme Court's legitimacy had been 
weakened by prior decisions in civil rights and criminal procedure areas); see also ELIZA 
STEEL WATER, THE HANGMAN'S KNOT: LYNCHING, LEGAL EXECUTION, AND AMERICA'S STRUGGLE 
WITH THE DEATH PENALTY 223 (Westview Press 2003) (noting that the civil rights era was marked 
by federal intervention and resentment of that intervention). 
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of Furman's backlash is making sense of what the Supreme Court did 
next. 
B. Gregg v. Georgia, Another Product of Its Time 
By 1976, years of unexecuted death sentences had created a second 
"pileup on death row."313 Once again, the backlog pressed the Supreme 
Court to decide the death penalty's constitutionality, which it did in the 
1976 companion cases of Gregg v. Georgia314 and Woodson v. North 
Carolina.315 Like Furman,316 Gregg and Woodson were consolidated 
cases. Gregg considered three guided discretion statutes317 and Woodson 
considered two mandatory death penalty statutes. 318 As before, the 
decisions were deeply splintered.319 In two three-Justice plurality 
opinions, the Court upheld the guided discretion statutes, 320 while 
striking those that made the death penalty mandatory for select crimes. 321 
313. The whole point of the NAACP's moratorium strategy was to create a "pileup on death 
row," threatening a bloodbath in the event executions resumed. See BEDAU, supra note 43, at 84; 
MELTSNER, supra note 22, at 107; EPSTEIN & KOBYLKA, supra note 25, at 52-60 (discussing 
moratorium strategy and calling it "litigation laced with psychological warfare"). In 1976, when 
Gregg was decided, there were more than 460 people on death row. ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra 
note Ill, at 41. 
314. 428 U.S. !53 (1976). 
315. 428 U.S. 280 (1976). 
316. See supra notes 67 and 168 and accompanying text (discussing Furman's companion cases). 
317. Guided discretion statutes are statutes that provide some sort of criteria to guide the jury's 
discretion in determining whether to impose death in a capital case. See supra notes 62-65 and 
accompanying text (discussing McGautha's consideration of claim that guided discretion statutes 
were constitutionally required). 
318. See EPSTEIN & KOBYLKA, supra note 25, at 101 (charting provisions of statutes at issue and 
facts of all five cases). 
319. Altogether, the five consolidated cases produced twenty-four separate opinions. See Lesley 
Oelsner, Decision is 7 to 2; Punishment is Ruled Acceptable, at Least in Murder Cases, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 3, 1976, at 7. Justices Brennan and Marshall voted to reverse in all five cases, Justices Burger, 
Blackmun, Rehnquist and White voted to affirm in all five, and Justices Powell, Stewart and 
Stevens voted to affirm in the guided discretion death penalty statute cases but reverse on the 
mandatory ones. See EPSTEIN & KOBYLKA, supra note 25, at 111-14 (discussing and charting 
voting coalitions in Gregg and Woodson); WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note !53, at 434-37 
(discussing same). 
320. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 195 (1976) (holding that Furman's concerns may be met by 
"a carefully drafted statute that ensures that the sentencing authority is given adequate information 
and guidance"). 
321. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 292-93 & n.25 (1976) (invalidating mandatory 
death penalty statutes as inconsistent with evolving standards of decency, but explicitly not 
considering mandatory death penalty statutes for murder by a life-term prisoner). 
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Like Furman, Gregg is difficult to see as a product of principled 
decision-making, but easy to understand as a product of its time. 
According to the Justices in Gregg, the guided discretion death 
penalty statutes at issue did not fall within Furman's prohibition for two 
reasons. First, the nation's "evolving standards of decency" supported 
those statutes, which as a factual proposition was certainly true in 
1976.322 But "evolving standards of decency" was not the reason 
Furman had invalidated the death penalty in the first place. 323 Thus, 
relying on it to bring the death penalty back was a complete non 
sequitur.324 The "evolving standards" doctrine did justify Woodson's 
result,325 but mandatory death penalties were so obviously antiquated 
that no one seriously believed they would pass constitutional muster. 326 
By 1976, the notion of a mandatory death penalty for certain crimes, 
regardless of the circumstances, struck most Americans as 
fundamentally wrong327 -and to the Justices, the notion that the death 
322. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 179 ("(I]t is now evident that a large proportion of American society 
continues to regard [the death penalty] as an appropriate and necessary criminal sanction."); supra 
Part II.A (discussing backlash to Furman). 
323. See supra text accompanying notes 80-83. 
324. Gregg's plurality opinion attempted to make "evolving standards of decency" relevant by 
stating that the petitioners had renewed the argument, see Gregg, 428 U.S. at 179, but it is difficult 
to imagine Anthony Amsterdam, who argued Furman, pushing that argument in 1976. Indeed, 
thirty-five pages of petitioners' thirty-six page brief were addressed to the arbitrariness with which 
the death penalty continued to be administered (as one would expect) and the last page argued that 
the death penalty was an excessive punishment. See Brief of Petitioner, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 
153 (1976) (No. 74-6257), 1976 WL 178713; EPSTEIN & KOBYLKA, supra note 25, at 103 (noting 
that attorneys in Gregg tried to avoid "evolving standards" approach as much as possible). 
325. See Woodson, 428 U.S. at 301 (invalidating mandatory death penalties for being inconsistent 
with evolving standards of decency, and noting that "one of the most significant developments in 
our society's treatment of capital punishment has been the rejection of the common-law practice of 
inexorably imposing a death sentence upon every person convicted of a specified offense"); supra 
text accompanying notes 118-22 (discussing demise of mandatory death penalty statutes). 
Ironically, Woodson also invalidated mandatory death penalties because in practice they did not 
remove the unbridled discretion that Furman found constitutionally objectionable. See infra note 
349 and accompanying text. 
326. See EPSTEIN & KOBYLKA, supra note 25, at 342 n.l7 (noting that law reviews were 
"virtually unanimous" in their prediction that the Court would strike the antiquated mandatory death 
penalty laws); BEDAU, supra note 98, at 166-67 (noting no surprise that the Court struck mandatory 
death penalties in Woodson because they "flew directly in the face of an unswerving historical 
development" towards discretion in the imposition of death). 
327. See Neil Vidmar & Phoebe Ellsworth, Public Opinion and the Death Penalty, in CAPITAL 
PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 93, at 127, 129 (discussing Harris survey in which 
no more than forty-one percent of those asked favored a mandatory death sentence for any given 
crime); see also EPSTEIN & KOBYLKA, supra note 25, at 84 (noting that Congress rejected a 
mandatory death penalty after Furman as "inhumane"). Not even Solicitor General Robert Bork 
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penalty had to be more cruel to be less unusual was equally abhorrent.328 
The states had passed mandatory death penalty statutes only because 
they thought they had to in order to get around Furman. 329 With Gregg 
providing an alternative avenue of relief, Woodson's result was almost a 
given.330 In short, "evolving standards of decency" was reason enough to 
strike the mandatory death penalty statutes, but it did little to legitimate 
the guided discretion ones. For that, the Justices would have to revisit 
the core of Furman's complaint-discretion itself. 
Gregg's second reason for upholding guided discretion statutes was 
that they eliminated the arbitrariness in capital sentencing that Furman 
had found constitutionally objectionable.331 Once again, McGautha v. 
California appeared to dictate a different result.332 In McGautha, the 
Supreme Court had rejected the claim that standards were 
constitutionally required in capital sentencing determinations, in part 
because the Court thought they were unnecessary and in part because it 
thought they would not work. 333 Using the Model Penal Code's proposed 
supported the mandatory death penalties at issue in Woodson. Warren Weaver, Jr., Federal Law 
Official Will Argue Before Court on Death Penalty, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 1975, at 38 (discussing 
Department of Justice's position). 
328. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 401 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (noting that if 
mandatory death penalties are the only option after Furman, he would prefer that the Court impose 
total abolition); THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE (1940-1985), supra note 27, at 621 
(reporting Justice Stevens in conference after Woodson as saying, "[t]o have created a monster like 
North Carolina, which increases the incidence of the penalty, is abhorrent"); Zimring & Hawkins, 
supra note 142, at 956 (noting that the states "might understandably conclude that the only way to 
make executions less freakish in distribution" is to increase them, "inflicting more cruelty to satisfY 
the Court that it was not unusual"). North Carolina's mandatory death penalty statute had produced 
122 death sentences; the states with the next highest were Florida, with seventy-three death 
sentences, California with fifty-seven, Louisiana with forty-seven, and Texas with forty-two. See 34 
States and U.S. Have Capital Punishment Laws, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 1976, at 7. 
329. See Woodson, 428 U.S. at 298 ("[I]t seems evident that the post-Furman enactments reflect 
attempts by the States to retain the death penalty in a form consistent with the Constitution, rather 
than a renewed societal acceptance of mandatory death sentencing."); The Death Penalty Revived, 
supra note 260, at 35 (noting that Gregg struck mandatory death penalties, "the very thing that the 
court seemed to be asking for in 1972"); Death Rattles, supra note 260, at 73 ("So far, most of the 
effort to reinstate the death penalty has concentrated on eliminating 'arbitrariness' by making death 
mandatory for certain crimes."). 
330. Despite the widely-held belief that mandatory death penalty statutes would not pass 
constitutional muster, they almost did. See WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 153, at 434-36 
(discussing initial vote to affirm even mandatory death penalties). 
331. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 206--07 (1976) ("No longer can a jury wantonly and 
freakishly impose the death sentence; it is always circumscribed by the legislative guidelines."). 
332. 402 U.S. 183 (1971). 
333. See McGautha, 402 U.S. at 204-08; supra text accompanying notes 61-65 (discussing 
McGautha). 
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guided discretion statute as an example, the Court in McGautha 
explained: 
It is apparent that such criteria do not purport to provide more 
than the most minimal control over the sentencing authority's 
exercise of discretion. They do not purport to give an exhaustive 
list of the relevant considerations or the way in which they may 
be affected by the presence or absence of other circumstances. 
They do not even undertake to exclude constitutionally 
impermissible considerations. And, of course, they provide no 
protection against the jury determined to decide on whimsy or 
caprice. 334 
The Court in Gregg acknowledged McGautha only by the vague 
reference, "some have suggested that standards to guide a capital jury's 
sentencing deliberations are impossible to formulate,"335 and indeed 
"some" had-namely, four of the plurality justices in Gregg. 336 
The Supreme Court's decision in Gregg was even more inexplicable 
in light of the particulars of Georgia's guided discretion statute. 
Georgia's statute authorized the death penalty upon a finding of any one 
of ten statutorily-identified aggravating circumstances, including murder 
involving "depravity of mind" or "aggravated battery to the victim"337-
circumstances that describe most, if not all, murders. 338 Compounding 
334. McGautha, 402 U.S. at 207; accord id. at 208 ("For a court to attempt to catalog the 
appropriate factors in this elusive area could inhibit rather than expand the scope of consideration, 
for no list of circumstances would ever really be complete. The infinite variety of cases and facets to 
each case would make general standards either meaningless 'boiler-plate' or a statement of the 
obvious that no jury would need."). 
335. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 193. 
336. Justices White, Stewart, Burger and Blackmun all supported the result in Gregg, and had 
also signed on to the majority opinion in McGautha. See THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE 
(1940-1985), supra note 27, at 614-16 (discussing votes in McGautha); MELTSNER, supra note 22, 
at 241-42 (same); supra note 319 (discussing votes in Gregg). The Justices in Gregg even used the 
Model Penal Code to make the opposite point. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 193-94 (using guided 
discretion statute in Model Penal Code to refute suggestion that standards in capital sentencing are 
impossible to formulate). 
337. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 162-66, 196-99 (reproducing and discussing statute). 
338. See Stephen R. McAllister, The Problem of Implementing a Constitutional System of Capital 
Punishment, 43 KAN. L. REv. 1039, 1051-57 (1995) (discussing statutes under consideration in 
Gregg and concluding that "the 1976 cases themselves raise serious questions about the strength of 
the Court's commitment to the guided discretion principle"); Jordan M. Steiker, The Limits of Legal 
Language: Decisionmaking in Capital Cases, 94 MICH. L. REV 2590,2608-09 (1995-96) (arguing 
that such phrases "describe the circumstances surrounding most murders"); Weisberg, supra note I, 
at 321 (concluding that Gregg does "little more than confirm that the Court may permit almost any 
scheme except the kind that Woodson expressly forbids"); see also Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. 
Steiker, Judicial Developments in Capital Punishment Law, in AMERICA'S EXPERIMENT WITH 
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the problem was the fact that Georgia's statute provided no guidance 
whatsoever as to how juries were to make the capital sentencing decision 
once a defendant was determined to be death-eligible.339 In Gregg, the 
Court held that the "isolated decision of a jury to afford mercy" (as 
opposed to its decision to impose death) did not require standards.340 
Given these provisions, John Hart Ely had it exactly right when he said 
of Georgia's statute, "in less serious circumstances this would be 
amusing."341 Before guided discretion statutes and after, juries had 
enormous liberty to impose death for capital crimes whenever they 
wanted-something Furman had said they could not do.342 
The Supreme Court in Gregg was not oblivious to the deficiencies in 
the new guided discretion statutes. As previously noted, most of the 
Justices in Gregg's plurality also had been in McGautha's majority, so 
they already had gone on record against the feasibility of those 
provisions.343 Even if they had not, it was common knowledge by 1976 
that discretion and discrimination in the imposition of death remained. 
The popular press reported it,344 the law reviews discussed it,345 and the 
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, supra note 22, at 47, 65 (noting that death eligibility remains remarkably 
broad today, citing a recent Supreme Court decision upholding a death penalty statute that listed 
murder in "utter disregard for human life" as a sufficiently limiting aggravating factor). 
339. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 162-66 (reproducing and discussing statute); Steiker & Steiker, 
supra note 16, at 391-92 (arguing "(i]fstandardless discretion is problematic because it gives those 
with a mind to discriminate the opportunity to discriminate, unconstrained consideration of any kind 
of mitigating evidence is problematic precisely for the same reason" and quoting as correct the 
NAACP's claim that "'Kill him if you want' and 'Kill him, but you may spare him if you want' 
mean the same thing in any man's language"). 
340. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 203. 
341. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 175 (1980). 
342. See supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text (discussing core holding of Furman); Furman 
v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 253 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring) (lamenting "uncontrolled discretion 
of judges or juries" in capital sentencing); id. at 313 (White, J., concurring) ("[T]here is no 
meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which it is imposed from the many cases in 
which it is not."); id. at 294 (Brennan, J ., concurring) ("No one has yet suggested a rational basis 
that could differentiate ... the few who die from the many who go to prison."). Over time, empirical 
evidence would confirm common sense-virtually every defendant sentenced to death in Georgia 
prior to Furman would have been considered death-eligible under Georgia's newly-drafted guided 
discretion statute as well. See Steiker, supra note 338, at 2609. 
343. See supra note 336 (discussing Justices' votes in McGautha and Gregg). Justices Powell and 
Stevens, who had joined the Court since McGautha, recognized the box the Justices were in; in fact, 
Justice Powell thought that between McGautha and Furman, the Court had little choice but to 
invalidate the statutes in Gregg. See WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note I 53, at 431-32. 
344. See, e.g., Wicker, supra note 302, at 39 (arguing that the "unassailable record shows capital 
punishment to be racially discriminatory" even under the new statutes and providing statistics to 
back up claim); see also, e.g., Death Penalty for Nonwhites Found More Likely Now Than 
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empirical evidence confirmed it.346 Even state governors-including 
Georgia's Jimmy Carter-publicly doubted the constitutionality of the 
death penalty bills they were signing.347 All things considered, the 
NAACP made at least as strong a showing of arbitrariness in Gregg as it 
had in Furman348-and this time, the law was on its side. The Justices 
Previously, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 1976, at 42 (discussing study finding that new state laws have not 
succeeded in reducing discrimination in death-penalty administration); Mary Ellen Gale, How Fair 
Is Our Justice, How Fitting Is Execution? N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 1975, at BRI (praising book that 
concludes that even under the new statutes, "a few people are selected, without adequately shown or 
structured reason for their being selected, to die"); In Spite of All the Talk of Restoring the Death 
Penalty, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Apr. 14, 1975, at 52 (discussing claim that new death penalty 
statutes do not satisfy objections in Furman); Michael Meltsner, Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. II, 1974, at 39 (arguing that "[d]iscretion has not been eliminated, it has merely 
become less visible" and that the new laws, using Georgia's guided discretion statute as an example, 
worked much like the old ones); Oelsner, supra note 298, at 58 (discussing claim that new laws do 
not curb discretion and discrimination in death penalty's administration); Warren Weaver, Jr., 
Penalty of Death Attacked in Book, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 1974, at 46 (discussing leading 
constitutional authority's view that statutes in Georgia, Texas, and other states provide no more than 
a "smokescreen" for "the same old unbridled jury discretion"); Warren Weaver, Ruling Expected on 
Death Penalty, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 1974, at 68 (noting argument that arbitrary infliction of the 
death penalty "has been carefully preserved" and that in Georgia, only seventeen men have received 
the death penalty out of900 rapes, 800 murders, and 6000 cases of armed robbery). 
345. See, e.g., Honorable James R. Browning, The New Death Penalty Statutes: Perpetuating a 
Costly Myth, 9 GONZ. L. REV. 651 (1973-74); see also EPSTEIN & KOBYLKA, supra note 25, at 102 
(noting consensus among law reviews that if Justices in Furman hold to their opinions, new statutes 
will not pass constitutional muster). Perhaps the most famous of these academic works was a book 
by Yale Law Professor Charles Black, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: THE INEVITABILITY OF CAPRICE AND 
MISTAKE (1975). See CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 93, at 153 
(discussing book and quoting its conclusion that the new death penalty statutes "do not effectively 
restrict the discretion of juries by any real standards" and "never will"); EPSTEIN & KOBYLKA, 
supra note 25, at 342 n.l2 (mentioning prominence ofbook). 
346. See CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 93, at 151 (discussing and 
quoting 1973 study concluding that "racial variables are systematically and consistently related to 
the imposition of the death penalty"); EPSTEIN & KOBYLKA, supra note 25, at 94 (discussing and 
quoting 1976 study concluding that "there is no evidence to suggest that post-Furman statutes have 
been successful in reducing the discretion which leads to a disproportionate number of nonwhite 
offenders being sentenced to death"); Death Penalty for Nonwhites Found More Likely Now Than 
Previously, supra note 344, at 42 (same). 
347. See EPSTEIN & KOBYLKA, supra note 25, at 86--87 (noting doubts about Florida's new death 
penalty statute among governor's committee and Governor Jimmy Carter's doubts about new death 
penalty law he signed into effect); Flint, supra note 274, at 55 (reporting Jimmy Carter's pledge to 
sign death penalty bill despite questions about its constitutionality); see also Death Penalty Bill 
Signed, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 1973, at 36 (quoting Louisiana Governor's statement that he had 
"serious reservations" about whether the U.S. Supreme Court would uphold the death-penalty bill 
he had just signed); Rebirth of Death? supra note 270, at 24 (noting that Florida's new death 
penalty statute "is of such shaky construction that some of its own backers doubt it will stand up in 
court"). 
348. See EPSTEIN & KOBYLKA, supra note 25 at 131-32 (noting that the NAACP "made at least 
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were savvy enough to recognize that even mandatory death penalty 
statutes did little to curb discretion in the imposition of death?49 It is 
hard to believe they did not know that guided discretion statutes 
(particularly those at issue in Gregg) suffered from the same 
constitutional infirmities. 350 
In short, Gregg may not have formally overruled Furman, but it 
clearly turned its back on Furman's ideals and constitutional command. 
Gregg's plurality opinion read like Furman's dissents, and even cited 
them from time to time.351 Something had changed; the question (again) 
was what. The Court's composition provides a partial, though ultimately 
unsatisfactory, answer. Between Furman and Gregg, the Court's most 
liberal member-Justice Douglas-retired and was replaced by Justice 
as plausible a showing of arbitrariness in [the new statutes'] application and enforcement in 1976 as 
they did in 1972" and that "what a majority saw as troubling in Furman remained present in 
Gregg''). 
349. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 302-03 (1976) (noting that "mandatory 
statutes enacted in response to Furman have simply papered over the problem of unguided and 
unchecked jury discretion," exacerbating it by "resting the penalty determination on the particular 
jury's willingness to act lawlessly"). 
350. Justice Rehnquist pointed out the inconsistency in his Woodson dissent, but the barb went 
unanswered. See id. at 315 (J. Rehnquist, dissenting) ("To conclude that the North Carolina system 
is bad because juror nullification may permit jury discretion while concluding that the Georgia and 
Florida systems are sound because they require this same discretion, is, as the plurality opinion 
demonstrates, inexplicable."). The plurality's distinction in Gregg was even more bizarre given its 
decision to uphold the Texas statute in one of Gregg's companion cases, Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 
262 (1976). In Jurek, the Justices upheld a hybrid discretionary-mandatory death penalty statute that 
channeled jury discretion by asking three questions-focusing on intent and future dangerousness-
but required imposition of the death penalty if the jury answered the questions in the affirmative. 
See id. at 269 (reproducing Texas statute); see also Lesley Oelsner, Decision is 7 to 2, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 3, 1976, at I (discussing Court's ruling on hybrid Texas statute). 
351. Compare Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 168 (1976) (noting multiple occasions that the 
Court has assumed or asserted the death penalty's constitutionality in the past), and id. at 174-76 
(noting responsibility of Court to not act as legislature, citing Furman dissents), and id. at 176-78 
(noting long history of public acceptance of death penalty in United States), and id. at 181-82 
(characterizing rarity of sentences as result of juries being more discriminating in imposing death 
sentences), with Furman, 408 U.S. at 428 (Powell, J., dissenting) (noting multiple occasions that 
Court has assumed or asserted the death penalty's constitutionality in the past), and id. at 431 
(Powell, J., dissenting) (noting importance of judicial restraint and deference to legislative 
prerogative), and id. at 385-86 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (discussing indicators of public acceptance 
of the death penalty in the United States), and id. at 388 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (viewing 
selectivity of juries in imposing death as "a refinement on, rather than repudiation of' the death 
penalty). Justice Blackmun's one sentence concurrence made the point explicitly. See Gregg, 428 
U.S. at 227 (stating "I concur in the judgment" and citing four Furman dissents); see also ZIMRING 
& HAWKINS, supra note Ill, at 64 (describing Gregg as "an apparently outright reversal of 
opinion" from Furman). 
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Stevens, a moderately conservative Ford appointee.352 But the Court's 
membership cannot be the only explanation for the change, for the vote 
in Gregg was not five-four, but seven-two.353 Once again, Justices 
Stewart and White switched sides.354 Justice Stewart, who wrote the 
plurality opinion in Gregg, reportedly felt betrayed by the abolitionists 
in Furman. 355 They had led him to believe that the death penalty was 
dying anyway and that an abolitionist ruling would just help it along, 
which had not been the case.356 Justice White, who authored a rival, 
three-Justice concurrence in Gregg, also thought that the nation's 
renewed commitment to the death penalty justified a different result. In 
Furman, Justice White had reasoned that states were not imposing the 
death penalty enough to justify its deterrent use.357 Now they were. 
Given the states' renewed commitment to the death penalty, Justice 
White no longer cared about arbitrariness in the imposition of death; as 
he callously acknowledged, "Mistakes will be made and discriminations 
will occur which will be difficult to explain."358 For both Justices, then, 
broader socio-political context once again played a role in the case. 
As in Furman, legal advocacy probably also influenced Gregg's 
result, albeit in a different way. The federal government had stayed out 
of the litigation in Furman, but in Gregg it filed a lengthy amicus brief 
352. The Supreme Court initially agreed to consider the constitutionality of mandatory death 
penalties in 1975, although it split four-four on the issue when Justice Douglas was hospitalized and 
missed the conference vote. It decided to reconsider mandatory death penalties the next year, along 
with guided discretion statutes, once Justice Douglas's replacement had joined the bench. See 
EPSTEIN & KOBYLKA, supra note 25, at 98-99; WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 153, at 
369; see also EPSTEIN & KOBYLKA, supra note 25, at 17 (discussing departure of Justice Douglas, 
"the court's most stalwart liberal," and his replacement by more moderate Justice Stevens). 
353. Indeed, if the decision had been five-four, it may have gone the other way. See EPSTEIN & 
KOBYLKA, supra note 25, at 128-29 (arguing that if the abolitionists had been able to retain the 
votes of Justices Stewart and White, they may well have gotten the vote of Justice Stevens as well). 
But see NAKELL & HARDY, supra note 242, at 29 ("Justice Douglas could have changed the count 
from seven-to-two to six-to-three but not the outcome. His departure from the Court, therefore, was 
not decisive."). 
354. In the aftermath of Gregg, Justice Stewart almost switched again. See Death and Confusion 
at the Court, TIME, Dec. 13, 1976, at 85 (discussing case involving irregularity in Florida death 
penalty procedure and Justice Stewart's angry comment during oral argument that "perhaps as many 
as three members of the court" could "change their minds" about constitutionality of Florida 
statute). 
355. See WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 153, at 432-33. 
356. See WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 153, at 432-33. 
357. See supra note 70 and accompanying text (discussing Justice White's deterrence-based 
rationale in Furman). 
358. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,226 (1976) (White, J., concurring). 
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asking the Court to overrule Furman and sent Solicitor General Robert 
Bork to argue on its behalf. 359 Like Amsterdam, Bork was a worthy 
adversary in the courtroom, but more important was the fact that the 
government's position carried great weight.360 On such a highly 
controversial issue, it is hard to imagine the Justices not at least giving 
serious consideration to the position of the nation's chief executive.361 
Indeed, aside from its refusal to formally overrule Furman, the Justices 
in Gregg did just as Bork had asked, upholding the guided discretion 
statutes while striking those that made the death penalty mandatory.362 
That said, the pressure the Court felt in Gregg almost surely had more 
to do with the larger, exceedingly hostile socio-political climate of 1976 
than the Solicitor General's position. The Justices were clearly moved 
by the backlash against Furman; they said so explicitly in an "evolving 
standards of decency" analysis that was largely irrelevant to the legal 
issues at hand.363 Remaining true to the principles of Furman would 
have been risky. The states already had threatened a constitutional 
amendment to restore the death penalty and by 1976, they were 
perilously close to having the numbers to pull it off. 364 Even a failed 
attempt to override the Court would have been a severe blow to its 
institutional authority.365 In the face of a strong challenge to that 
359. See Lesley Oelsner, High Court is Urged by Bark to Restore Capital Punishment, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. I, 1976, at I; see also BANNER, supra note 77, at 270-71 (comparing federal 
government's involvement in Gregg and absence in Furman); EPSTEIN & KOBYLKA, supra note 25 
at 97 (same). 
360. See EPSTEIN & KOBYLKA, supra note 25, at 97-98 (discussing the Solicitor General's unique 
influence with the U.S. Supreme Court); LAZARUS, supra note 255, at 230-31 (same); Neal Devins, 
Explaining Grutter v. Bollinger, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 347, 355 (2003-04) (noting the Solicitor 
General's average success rate of seventy percent). 
361. See EPSTEIN & KOBYLKA, supra note 25, at 305 (concluding that it was "not surprising that 
the Court buckled and reversed its legal position" in Furman given pressure from the executive 
branch via the Solicitor General, but that Bork's efforts alone cannot explain the result in Gregg); 
MARSHALL, supra note 14, at 83 (summarizing research findings that the Supreme Court is "very 
likely to defer to federal policy makers, regardless of whether the federal law was itself consistent 
with the polls"). 
362. See supra note 327 and text accompanying note 359 (noting the Solicitor General's position 
on mandatory and guided discretion statutes). 
363. See supra notes 322-24 and accompanying text. 
364. See supra text accompanying notes 268, 278 (noting initial attempt to pass constitutional 
amendment to override Furman and subsequent reenactment of death penalty laws by thirty-five 
states). 
365. See BEDAU, supra note 98, at 169 (noting that new death penalty legislation "confront[ed) 
the Court with a potentially severe challenge to its political authority" and that the Court "might 
well have reasoned that it was better to invoke the principle of judicial restraint than to invite 
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authority, the Court in Gregg did what the Court usually does when met 
with intense resistance-retreat. 366 Commentators have seen Gregg for 
what it was, a "judicial surrender to the perceived wishes of the 
public."367 The Supreme Court was under tremendous pressure in Gregg, 
and it is hard to imagine the Justices not succumbing to that pressure. 
Like Furman, Gregg was a decision difficult to understand as a product 
of principled decision-making, but easy to understand as a product of its 
time. 
III. THE INHERENTLY MAJORlT ARlAN INFLUENCE OF 
EXTRALEGAL CONTEXT 
Ironically, in both Furman and Gregg, the litigant with the law on its 
side lost. In Furman, nearly every shred of constitutional law available 
weighed against the NAACP, but it won anyway. In Gregg, the 
abolitionists finally had doctrine on their side, but they still suffered 
defeat. In both cases, broader socio-political context played an integral 
role in the result. Extralegal context helps to explain why the Justices in 
Furman thought invalidating the death penalty was the right thing to do 
in 1972, and why in 1976 the Justices thought differently in Gregg. But 
extralegal context does more than just explain the results in these cases. 
As Furman and Gregg illustrate, the majoritarian influence of extralegal 
nationwide attempts to amend the federal constitution"). 
366. Over two decades ago, Jan Gorecki provided a political explanation of this phenomenon, 
writing: 
[I]n the long run, when opposed by clear and strong sentiment of the majority, the Court has no 
choice but to eventually concede. Its power, and especially the implementation of its decisions, 
depends on the other branches of the government, which, in tum, depend more directly on the 
electorate; hence, the Court's power might be impaired if the Justices went too far too long in 
opposing the will of the nation on an important issue. 
GORECKI, supra note 149, at Ill; see James G. Wilson, The Role of Public Opinion in 
Constitutional interpretation, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1037, 1136 n.425 (1993) ("Judges who stray 
[from popular sentiment] face reversals if they sit on lower courts, derision on and off the bench, 
declining influence over future cases caused by lack of respect and cooperation, and even 
impeachment in extreme situations."). 
367. ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note Ill, at xi. See, e.g., BEDAU, supra note 98, at 169 ("The 
appeal to judicial restraint thus became the fig leaf with which the Court endeavored to hide."); 
Louis D. Bilionis, Eighth Amendment Meanings From the ABA 's Moratorium Resolution, 61 LAW 
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 29, 37 (1998) (noting "the heavy legislative backlash against Furman and the 
Court's substantial acquiescence to that backlash in the 1976 decisions); Steiker, supra note 131, at 
129 (noting Court's willingness to "retrench on the issue of capital punishment in response to the 
outpouring of rage that Furman had generated"); Weisberg, supra note I, at 322 (noting classical 
view that Gregg "amounts to little more than judicial sighs of relief over how Georgia has allowed 
the Court to escape gracefully from the responsibility it posed for itself in Furman"). 
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context limits the Court's inclination and ability to render 
countermajoritarian change. 
A. The Supreme Court's Limited Inclination to Render 
Countermajoritarian Change 
Furman and Gregg both demonstrate how extralegal context limits 
the Supreme Court's inclination for countermajoritarian decision-
making, but they do so in different ways. Furman shows that even in its 
more countermajoritarian moments, the Court tends to move with the 
social and political currents of its time. On a superficial level, Furman 
was one of the Supreme Court's more countermajoritarian moments-it 
invalidated the death penalty statutes of thirty-nine states and the federal 
government, it saved the lives of over 600 condemned capital murderers 
and rapists, and it did so in the conservative, "law and order" times of 
1972.368 Scholars have viewed Furman as a countermajoritarian 
decision,369 and the Justices involved viewed it that way too.370 Indeed, 
368. See supra notes 19-24 and Part I.C.6 and accompanying text (discussing countermajoritarian 
aspects of Furman and "law and order" times of 1972, respectively). 
369. See EPSTEIN & KOBYLKA, supra note 25, at 130--31 (discussing "unrelentingly hostile" 
context of Furman, and noting that "it is critical to note that the [NAACP's] accomplishment came 
in spite of a generally unfavorable political environment"); MEL TSNER, supra note 22, at 316 
(noting that the Court in Furman "acted to limit the human capacity for destructiveness against the 
strong tide of the urge to punish"); Polsby, supra note 199, at 3 (characterizing Furman as 
"remarkable considering the sanguinary temper of the time[s)," which "have scarcely provided a 
tranquil environment for the nurture of new and more polished ideals of reverence for human life"); 
supra note 199 and accompanying text (noting relative unpopularity of any stance that could be 
considered "soft on crime" in 1972). Given the "law and order" tenor of the times, even the NAACP 
expected to lose. See STEVENS, supra note 163, at 138-39. 
370. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text. The closing lines of Justice Marshall's 
Furman concurrence provide a striking example. Justice Marshall quite clearly thought of the case 
as one in which the Court's bravery and willingness to act in a countermajoritarian fashion would be 
celebrated in the future, stating: 
At a time in our history when the streets of the Nation's cities inspire fear and despair, rather 
than pride and hope, it is difficult to maintain objectivity and concern for our fellow citizens. 
But, the measure of a country's greatness is its ability to retain compassion in time of crisis. No 
nation in the recorded history of man has a greater tradition of revering justice and fair 
treatment for all its citizens in times of turmoil, confusion, and tension than ours. This is a 
country which stands tallest in troubled times, a country that clings to fundamental principles, 
cherishes its constitutional heritage, and rejects simple solutions that compromise the values 
that lie at the roots of our democratic system. In striking down capital punishment, this Court 
does not malign our system of government. On the contrary, it pays homage to it. Only in a 
free society could right triumph in difficult times, and could civilization record its magnificent 
advancement. In recognizing the humanity of our fellow beings, we pay ourselves the highest 
tribute. We achieve "a major milestone in the long road up from barbarism" and join the 
approximately 70 other jurisdictions in the world which celebrate their regard for civilization 
and humanity by shunning capital punishment. 
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the whole point of the Court's intervention in Furman was to protect the 
forlorn and forgotten few. 371 
Yet even Furman is more accurately understood as a decision that 
moved with, rather than against, the social and political currents of its 
time. When the Supreme Court decided Furman, the nation was in the 
midst of the strongest abolition movement it had ever seen.372 
Executions had ground to a halt, death sentences had become 
increasingly rare, and outside the South, the states themselves had begun 
to move towards abolition, mirroring a world-wide trend. 373 Even the 
nation's "law and order" mood in the late 1960s and early 1970s did 
little to dampen abolition sentiment. Public support for the death penalty 
was only fifty percent when Furman was decided, and political support 
for the practice was weak.374 Thus, while the Supreme Court technically 
did take a countermajoritarian position in Furman, the circumstances in 
which it was willing to do so were extremely limited. The abolitionists 
held a minority position in 1972, but only slightly so-and they 
appeared to have momentum on their side.375 Like Brown v. Board of 
Education,376 Roe v. Wade,377 and other seemingly heroic, 
countermajoritarian decisions, the Court in Furman decided an issue that 
split the nation roughly in half, protecting minority rights only in the 
context of substantial (and increasing) public support for that position.378 
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 371 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring). 
371. The difference between the concurring Justices in Furman and their dissenting brethren was 
not over the merits of the death penalty, but rather whether the Court should override the states on a 
matter that traditionally had been a state prerogative. See supra notes 248-50 and accompanying 
text (noting that even the dissenters disliked the death penalty on the merits); supra note 351 
(quoting passages from Furman dissenters regarding importance of judicial deference to state 
legislative decisions). The Court's role as protector of minority interests was the justification for 
overriding, rather than respecting, the states' position on this issue. See supra notes 25-27 and 
accompanying text (making point and quoting passages from concurring Justices' opinions). 
372. See supra note 233 and accompanying text. 
373. See supra Parts I.C.I-3 (discussing dwindling use of the death penalty and state and 
international trends toward abolition). 
374. See supra Parts I.C.4-5 (discussing public opinion poll data and political opposition to the 
death penalty). 
375. See supra text accompanying notes 234-38 (discussing increasing abolitionist sentiment in 
late 1960s and early 1970s prior to Furman). 
3 76. 34 7 U.S. 483 (1954). 
377. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
378. See David G. Barnum, The Supreme Court and Public Opinion: Judicial Decision-making in 
the Post-New Deal Period, 47 J. PoL. 652, 655 (1985) (examining five cases in which the Supreme 
Court protected minority rights, including Brown and Roe, and concluding that the "Supreme 
Court's vindication of minority rights occurred in the context of increasing public support-and in 
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As Michael Klarman has persuasively argued, this is about as 
countermajoritarian as the Supreme Court gets.379 
Given the true nature of Furman, one of the most intriguing aspects of 
the case is that the Justices saw themselves as playing a heroic, 
countermajoritarian role in the decision. This dichotomy is perhaps best 
exemplified by Justice Brennan's Furman concurrence. Justice Brennan 
viewed Furman as a countermajoritarian decision and justified it as 
such, explaining: 
The right to be free of cruel and unusual punishments, like other 
guarantees of the Bill of Rights, "may not be submitted to vote; 
(it) depend(s) on the outcome of no elections." "The very 
purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects 
from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them 
beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish 
them as legal principles to be applied by the courts."380 
At the same time, Justice Brennan was the one Justice who concluded 
that the death penalty was unconstitutional in part because it had been 
soundly rejected by contemporary society.381 These views are not 
necessarily inconsistent, 382 but they highlight an inconsistency of sorts-
the Justices in Furman only saw fit to play a countermajoritarian role 
once it almost no longer was. 
Granted, Furman was somewhat belated. One would think that a 
Court susceptible to majoritarian influences would have struck the death 
penalty in the mid-1960s, when abolitionist fervor peaked.383 Yet even 
Furman's timing makes sense upon further reflection. The NAACP did 
some cases even majority public support-for the policy position enunciated by the Court"); id. at 
662 (noting that the Court's protection of minorities was supported by at least the trend of public 
opinion); see also MELTSNER, supra note 22, at 26 ("The power of the courts is great when 
accommodating the newly accepted or refuting the outworn .... "). 
379. See Klarman, supra note 21, at 6 (arguing that the Supreme Court's decisions either impose 
a strong national consensus on relatively isolated outliers or resolve a genuinely divisive issue that 
splits the nation in half, neither of which are truly countermajoritarian acts). 
380. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238,268-69 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring) (internal citation 
omitted) (quoting Bd. ofEduc. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624,638 (1943)). Justice Brennan went on to 
say that without the capacity to provide countermajoritarian protection, "the cruel and unusual 
punishments clause would become ... little more than good advice." !d. at 269. 
381. See id. at 291-300 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
382. It may well be the case that legislative enactments do not accurately represent contemporary 
sentiment, and Justice Brennan's concurring opinion suggested this was his view. See id. 
383. See supra Part I.C.5 (discussing nation's shift to "law and order" mood in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s); supra note 188 and accompanying text (noting the mid-1960s as peak of abolitionist 
sentiment). 
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not launch its massive litigation campaign against the death penalty until 
1967384-and it was not until 1968 that the first significant opportunities 
to curb the death penalty came before the Supreme Court. 385 Before then, 
the Court may (or may not) have had a chance to decide the death 
penalty's constitutionality,386 but it had little incentive to do so. In the 
mid-1960s, the Justices were plenty busy spending their political capital 
on other highly controversial decisions and dealing with massive 
resistance to Brown. 387 Because the legal challenges that culminated in 
Furman were themselves the result of the abolition movement,388 it only 
makes sense that Furman followed, as much as it coincided with, the 
tide of abolition sentiment. 
Moreover, the socio-political context of 1972 was at least more 
conducive to Furman than the late 1960s, when the first major death 
penalty challenges came before the Court. In 1968, crime was the 
nation's top domestic problem, and the Court was on the heels of a 
twelve-point spike in death penalty support.389 It is hard to imagine the 
Justices issuing a Furman-type ruling in that sort of environment, 
particularly at the height of election year "law and order" politics. In 
1972, by contrast, support for the death penalty had stabilized at fifty 
percent, 390 and only ten percent of the public considered crime to be the 
nation's most important domestic problem.391 Again, the point is not that 
384. See supra notes 93 and accompanying text. 
385. See, e.g., Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 523 (1968) (holding that excluding 
veniremen for cause because they voice general objections to the death penalty creates a "hanging 
jury" and is constitutionally impermissible). 
386. In 1963, Justice Goldberg wrote a dissent from denial of certiorari, raising the possibility 
that the death penalty could be considered cruel and unusual for rape because of the racial 
disparities in its imposition, but he raised that issue sua sponte; the defendant had challenged only 
the voluntariness of his confession. Chief Justice Warren reportedly told Justice Goldberg that "in 
view of the numerous attacks on the Court ... it would be best to let the matter sleep for awhile." 
See EPSTEIN & KOBYLKA, supra note 25, at 42-44, 332 (discussing Justice Goldberg's dissent from 
denial of certiorari in Rudolph v. Alabama, its timing in relation to the backlash against Brown, and 
its role in getting the NAACP to start contemplating litigation); MELTSNER, supra note 22, at 33-34 
(noting that even the Justices who thought the death penalty was constitutional did not like it, and 
thus did not want to give it express judicial approval). 
387. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 978 
(1964); see also supra note 297 (noting massive resistance to Brown). 
388. See BEDAU, supra note 98, at 134--35 (discussing role of moral elites in abolition campaign 
and concluding that they are themselves a reflection of "deeper societal forces" moving in same 
direction). 
389. See supra notes 201-02, 207 and accompanying text. 
390. See supra notes 203-05 and accompanying text. 
391. GEORGE H. GALLUP, 1 THE GALLUP POLL: PUBLIC OPINION 1972-1977, at 48 (1978). 
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Furman was inevitable, or even necessarily predictable, in 1972.392 The 
point is that from a historical perspective, Furman's timing made 
sense.393 
Even then, Furman was a decision the Justices would rather not have 
had to make. In the past, the Court had ducked major death penalty 
rulings where it could.394 And in the rulings it did issue, the Court tended 
to take a passive-aggressive approach to the death penalty, encumbering 
its application almost in hopes that the practice would die out on its 
own.395 Indeed, the Court only agreed to decide the Eighth Amendment 
392. See supra note 239 and accompanying text. 
393. Furman made sense in other ways too. Behavioral social science studies have identified an 
extremely limited number of circumstances in which the Supreme Court has issued bold policy 
rulings. See MCCANN, supra note 308, at 69-76 (discussing circumstances). Remarkably, Furman 
exemplifies each one. The Justices in Furman expressed the values of a previously entrenched 
lawmaking majority against a newly ascendant one, typical behavior of the Court during a period of 
"critical realignment" in political regimes. See id. at 69 (discussing moments of "critical 
realignment" in national politics); 700 Await Court's Verdict, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 1972, at E2 
("Former Attorney General Ramsey Clark, who opposed capital punishment, has been succeeded by 
John N. Mitchell, who approves it .... "). The Justices in Furman also decided an issue that other 
prominent political actors-in this case, President Nixon-found too decisive and politically costly 
to address. See McCANN, supra note 308, at 70 (discussing "displacement of conflict" theory); 
supra notes 211-13 and accompanying text (noting that President Nixon did not campaign on the 
death penalty or submit an amicus brief in Furman, and that the death penalty issue was 
conspicuously absent on the 1972 Republican platform). One can even view the Justices in Furman 
as suppressing an outlier practice that had become increasingly at odds with prevailing national (and 
in this case, international) norms. See McCANN, supra note 308, at 69 (discussing the U.S. Supreme 
Court's role in enforcing dominant national norms on resistant state and local officials); supra notes 
127-30 (discussing Southern exceptionalism on the death penalty). Suppressing regional outliers is 
what the Warren Court did best. See LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT IN AMERICAN 
POLITICS 490 (2000) (noting that "the dominant motif of the Warren Court is an assault on the South 
as a unique legal and cultural region"). 
394. See, e.g., Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243-44 (1969) (sidestepping death penalty 
challenge while reversing conviction and death sentence on the basis of defendant's failure to 
understand the nature and consequences of guilty plea); Delay on the Death Penalty, TIME, June 15, 
1970, at 60 (noting that the Supreme Court had thus far declined to rule on the death penalty's 
constitutionality and that recently the Court had "avoided even the questions it had earlier agreed to 
answer"); see also supra note 258 (discussing Boy kin decision). 
395. See, e.g., Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 530 (1968) (holding constitutionally 
impermissible the exclusion of veniremen for cause merely because they voice general objections to 
the death penalty); id. at 532 (J. Black, dissenting) ("If this court is to hold capital punishment 
unconstitutional, it should do so forthrightly, not by making it impossible for the states to get juries 
that will enforce the death penalty."); Elmer Gertz, The Primitive Relic, THE NATION, Jan. 11, 1971, 
at 48, 49 (citing Witherspoon decision in support of the view that the Court wants to make imposing 
the death penalty difficult without expressly invalidating it). The Texas Attorney General opined 
that Witherspoon "effectively does away with the death penalty in all States. It would be a very, 
very remote case where anyone would get death." An End to All Death Sentences? U.S. NEWS & 
WORLDREP.,June 17, 1968,at 15. 
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question in 1972 because governors across the country refused to 
conduct executions until it did. 396 With the entire nation holding its 
breath for the Supreme Court to decide "the ultimate question," the 
Justices had little choice but to resolve the issue.397 It was not a chore 
they relished. Like the public, the Justices were deeply conflicted over 
the death penalty and that conflict showed. It showed in Furman's 
fractured opinions, it showed in the decision's narrow, tentative 
holding,398 and it showed in the oscillating positions of Justices Stewart 
and White, who provided the pivotal (and inconsistent) swing votes in 
McGautha, Furman and Gregg.399 In short, despite rising abolition 
396. See Bad News for the 648 on Death Row, supra note 239, at E8 (noting that governors have 
thus far held off on executions, resulting in "strong pressures on the Court to finally decide if capital 
punishment is, indeed, 'cruel and unusual' puni~hrnent"); Death Row Survives, supra note !58, at 
42 (arguing that until the U.S. Supreme Court decides whether the death penalty is cruel and 
unusual, "no state should act against the prisoners now on death row"); The Question of Life or 
Death, NEWSWEEK, May 17, 1971, at 30; Signs of an End to "Death Row," supra note 105, at 37 
(quoting various state governors as announcing that they will not resume executions until the 
Supreme Court decides whether the death penalty is "cruel and unusual"); States Expected to Delay 
Any Action on Executions, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 1971, at I (reporting that "legal authorities 
expressed a reluctance to act until the Court rules on what they see as the central issue-the 
constitutionality of capital punishment itself'). 
397. The Ultimate Question, supra note 23; see supra note 396. The fact that the Justices would 
have to rule against the death penalty to avoid a bloodbath also played a role in the decision. Justice 
Stewart believed that it was unacceptable for over 600 people to die based on one vote and therefore 
decided ex ante that if there were four other votes to reverse in Furman, he would provide the fifth. 
See WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 153, at 209; see also id. at 207 (noting that Justice 
Black had predicted that the Court would eventually invalidate the death penalty, though he 
believed it was constitutional, just because the Court would not want "that much blood on its 
hands"). Admittedly, the same pressure did not sway the Court in Gregg, although it did cause 
Justice Powell to ponder the possibility of a mass anmesty in the case. See id. at 432; supra note 313 
(noting over 460 people on death row in 1976). 
398. Only two of the Justices in Furman's majority gave the abolitionists what they wanted; the 
other three took smaller steps, refusing to strike the penalty but agreeing to strike its application, 
which few found acceptable in 1972. See supra notes 158--60 (discussing complaints of racial 
discrimination in the imposition of death); GORECKI, supra note 149, at 10-11 (characterizing 
Furman as a narrow, compromised decision that did not resolve the validity of capital punishment 
but did save the lives of those on death row). This may be another reason why the Justices did not 
use "evolving standards" to justify their ruling; it justified nothing short of complete abolition, and 
therefore went further than three of Furman's five Justices wanted to go. See WOODWARD & 
ARMSTRONG, supra note 153, at 215-16 (discussing desire of Justices Stewart and White to reverse 
without striking the death penalty altogether). 
399. Supra notes 253 and 354 and accompanying text (noting Justices Stewart and White's 
change of position between McGautha and Furman, and Furman and Gregg, respectively). In the 
aftermath of the Gregg rulings, Justice Stewart and his plurality almost changed their minds again. 
See Florida and Texas Cases Ensnarl Court's Rulings on Death Penalty, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. I, 1976, 
at 24. In a follow-up appeal regarding the Florida statute upheld in Gregg, Justice Stewart 
reportedly became angry at the state's poor procedural protections, snapping: "This Court upheld 
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sentiment at the time, Furman was a decision the Justices were barely 
able to make. Furman is anything but the bold, countermajoritarian 
decision it appears at first blush. Rather than proving the Supreme 
Court's willingness to withstand majoritarian influences, Furman 
teaches the opposite-that even when facing a weak, arguably 
nonexistent majority, the Court has little inclination to act in a 
countermajoritarian fashion. 
That said, any doubts about the Supreme Court's limited inclination 
for countermajoritarian decision-making in Furman were surely 
removed four years later in Gregg. Faced with a genuinely hostile socio-
political context, the Court in Gregg turned its back on Furman, 
reiterating Furman's lesson even as it rejected its constitutional 
command. In theory, the Supreme Court could have stood its ground. 
Discrimination and arbitrariness in the imposition of death were wrong 
in 1972-and in 1976, they were still wrong. In reality, however, the 
Justices were under too much pressure to do anything other than retreat. 
Thirty-five states had reenacted death penalty statutes, public opinion 
favored the punishment two-to-one, and the nation's chief executive was 
asking the Court to overrule its 1972 decision.400 Gregg v. Georgia 
clearly provided the Supreme Court an opportunity to play 
countermajoritarian hero. It chose not to, validating Robert McCloskey's 
observation over a decade earlier: "it is hard to find a single historical 
instance when the Court has stood firm for very long against a really 
clear wave of public demand.'.4°1 Like the drum major who looks back 
only to see that the band has turned, the Supreme Court breaks path in 
the face of strong opposition only to reassert its leadership position in 
front of whatever direction the nation happens to be facing. The Court is 
willing to lead the country, but only where it is poised to go. 
In sum, Furman and Gregg both illustrate the Supreme Court's 
limited inclination for countermajoritarian decision-making, but they do 
so in different ways. In Furman, the ruling was countermajoritarian on a 
superficial level, but supported by strong majoritarian undercurrents that 
the Florida statute on the representation of the State of Florida and decisions by its supreme court 
that this was open and above the board proceeding. And this case gets here and it's apparent that it 
isn't." See id. He reportedly continued by threatening, "perhaps as many as three members of the 
Court" could "change their minds" based on the facts presented in the case. See id.; Leslie Oelsner, 
Supreme Court and Death Penalty: Uncertainty Heightened by New Rulings, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 
1976, at 22 (reporting problems with Florida practice and relaying comments). 
400. See supra Part II.A (discussing backlash to Furman). 
401. ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 224 (1960). 
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gave the Justices the room and inclination to rule as they did. In Gregg, 
the Justices had none of that room or inclination, providing yet another 
reminder of why the judiciary remains "the least dangerous branch."402 
Whether reflecting socio-political climate or reacting to it, both Furman 
and Gregg illustrate the Supreme Court's limited inclination for 
countermajoritarian change. 
B. The Supreme Court's Limited Ability to Render 
Countermajoritarian Change 
Furman v. Georgia also illustrates the Supreme Court's limited ability 
to effectuate countermajoritarian change. The Court can be an agent of 
change, but when it does more than validate an existing consensus, it 
risks halting-even reversing-change that is already in progress.403 As 
Furman illustrates, that risk is especially high when the Court is 
splintered, and when it is ruling on an issue that the public cares about 
and is accustomed to deciding for itself. Before Furman, the nation 
appeared to be moving towards abolition on its own; in fact, the 
abolition of capital punishment was widely considered to be just a matter 
of time.404 That changed when the Supreme Court intervened, inspiring 
one of the most dramatic backlashes the nation had ever seen.405 
Ironically, Furman galvanized death penalty supporters into action and 
brought the abolition movement to a screeching halt,406 causing even the 
NAACP to wonder whether winning the case was good or bad.407 Like 
other highly salient, controversial decisions, Furman ultimately retarded 
the very cause that the Justices sought to advance, proving true the old 
adage that an activist court is a conservative's best friend.408 
402. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 425 (Alexander Hamilton) (J.R. Pole ed., 2005); 
ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF 
POLITICS ( 1962). 
403. Gerald N. Rosenberg makes this very point with his seminal work, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN 
COURTS BRING ABOUT CHANGE? (1991). 
404. See supra Part I.C; supra notes 234-38 and accompanying text. 
405. See supra Part II.A (discussing backlash to Furman). 
406. See Bohm, supra note 22, at 31 (noting that Furman had a decisive effect on public support 
for the death penalty and that "death penalty support has been increasing steadily ever since"). 
407. MELTSNER, supra note 22, at 307. 
408. See BANNER, supra note 77, at 269 ("Furman, like other landmark cases, had the effect of 
calling its opponents to action."); Kirchmeier, supra note 6, at 75 (noting that Furman created a 
backlash that practically destroyed the abolition movement and that the decision to bypass public 
opinion and seek reform in courts may have brought the movement to a premature end); Klarman, 
supra note 19, at 452-82 (discussing political backlash ignited by the Supreme Court's decisions on 
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In fairness, perhaps rising crime rates would have led to the return of 
strong death penalty support anyway. But they had not had that effect 
before Furman, so perhaps not. We will never know whether Furman 
merely hastened the return of the death penalty's popularity or brought it 
about entirely. What we do know is that the Justices' intervention had an 
impact, but not the one they had in mind. In light of the Supreme Court's 
limited ability to effectuate even slightly countermajoritarian change, 
one cannot help but wonder whether the abolition movement would have 
been better off pursuing more moderate reform (like the moratorium bill 
pending when Furman was decided) through the other, more politically 
accountable branches instead.409 
CONCLUSION 
For the first time in a long time, the Supreme Court's most important 
death penalty decisions have all gone the defendant's way. One gets the 
sneaking suspicion that the Court's newfound willingness to protect 
capital defendants is just a reflection of popular support for death 
penalty reform and will dissipate when needed the most-in less 
hospitable times. At first glance, the Supreme Court's 1972 decision in 
Furman allows for optimism, seemingly exemplifying the Court's 
willingness to play a heroic, countermajoritarian role in the death 
penalty context. From a historical perspective, however, that view of the 
decision is inaccurate. If anything, Furman, Gregg, and the events that 
transpired between them showcase a fundamental flaw in the Supreme 
Court's role as protector of minority rights-its limited inclination and 
ability to render countermajoritarian change. 
Both Furman and Gregg illustrate the Supreme Court's inherent 
limitations, but they do so in different ways. Furman shows that even in 
its more countermajoritarian moments, the Court tends to reflect the 
social and political movements of its time. Gregg shows that when faced 
with a genuinely hostile socio-political context, the Court tends to back 
down, deferring instead to popular sentiment. Taken together, both 
decisions reveal a Supreme Court that is unlikely to intervene on behalf 
of unpopular minorities until a substantial (and growing) segment of 
racial and sex equality). See generally James G. Wilson, The Role of Public Opinion in 
Constitutional Interpretation, 1993 BYU L. REV. 1037, 1134 (1993) ("One of the ironies of the 
modem American system is that one of the political conservatives' best friends is an activist, liberal 
court."). 
409. See supra text accompanying notes 220--21 (discussing moratorium bill). 
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society supports that intervention. Even then, Furman reminds us that 
the Court's "help" may do more harm than good, retarding the very 
cause that the Justices are trying to promote. 
Of course, the lessons of Furman and its aftermath still leave the 
question of how the majoritarian influence of extralegal context interacts 
with the Supreme Court's majoritarian Eighth Amendment doctrine. 
Does doctrine drive the Supreme Court's "evolving standards" decision-
making, or is there still room for extralegal influences? If extralegal 
influences still play a role, can those influences shape the development 
of doctrine itself? These are important and as yet unanswered questions 
that I leave for another day.41° For now, it is enough to know that even 
without the influence of majoritarian doctrine, extralegal context places 
intrinsic limits on the Supreme Court's inclination and ability to protect. 
We tend to see the Supreme Court as a countermajoritarian hero, our 
white knight ready and able to protect unpopular, politically powerless 
minorities who cannot protect themselves.411 Yet this image of the Court 
is ahistoric. In the death penalty context and beyond, the Court's 
inclination to protect is profoundly influenced by the social and political 
setting in which it operates. We ought to recognize that fact and rethink 
our reliance on the Supreme Court to protect unpopular minorities from 
the tyrannical potential of majority rule. 
410. See Corinna Barrett Lain, Deciding Death (forthcoming 2007, on file with author). 
411. Indeed, the Court's countermajoritarian image continues to inform most justifications for 
judicial review. See Barry Friedman, The Politics of Judicial Review, 84 TEXAS L. REV. 257, 279 
("Yet most extant normative theories of judicial review rest on the capacity of judges to act in a 
manner contrary to political or popular preferences. Love it or hate it, the counterrnajoritarian image 
of the Supreme Court endures."). John Hart Ely is probably the most famous proponent of this view. 
JOHN HARTEL Y, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW I 03 (1980) (arguing 
that judicial review is not inconsistent with democratic rule because it protects minorities from 
tyranny of the majority). 
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